



UNITED STATES  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION  
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS  
REGION I  
631 PARK AVENUE  
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

*W. J. Tom*  
*VZBR*

JUN 19 1974

John G. Davis, Deputy Director for Field Operations  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, RO:HQ

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY (JCP&L)  
OYSTER CREEK, LEAK IN BOTTOM VESSEL HEAD AT INSTRUMENT PENETRATION

It is our view that the recent weld failure did in fact constitute an unreviewed safety question, requiring D.L. authorization because the weakened area (extent unknown) increased the probability of the tube ejection. We understand that the licensee is additionally proposing a support structure to preclude ejection.

Licensing has concluded per Memo Grier to O'Reilly, dated June 14, 1974, that no restrictions on resumption of operations should be imposed because of this matter. However, inasmuch as JCP&L is apparently unable to characterize the defect in the weld, it is requested that D.L. be contacted to consider the following:

1. Increased and more stringent surveillance for vessel penetrations.
2. A monitoring and test program on the affected in-core penetration including, for example, vibrational measurements.
3. A more frequent leakage surveillance program for dry well unidentified leakage.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

*James P. O'Reilly*  
James P. O'Reilly  
Director

cc: B. Grier

*B/504*

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**James P. O'Reilly  
Director**

cc: B. Grier

Greenman  
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Capton  
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