File 50-219

Jersey Central Power & Light Company

MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 201-539-6111

MEMBER OF THE General Public Utilities Corporation GPU ELECTRIC POWER COMPANIES SYSTEM

February 14, 1974

Mr. A. Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station
Docket No. 50-219
Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/10

The purpose of this letter is to forward to you the attached Abnormal Occurrence Report in compliance with paragraph 6.6.2.a of the Technical Specifications.

Enclosed are forty copies of this submittal.

Very truly yours,

Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.
Vice President

pk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/74/10

Report Date

February 14, 1974

Occurrence Date

February 8, 1974

Identification of Occurrence

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 2.3.7, low pressure main steam line pressure switches RE23A, C, and D were found to trip at pressures less than minimum required value of 860 psig. This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15A.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady-state power.

The major plant parameters at the time of the occurrence were:

Power:	Reactor: 1908 MWt
	Electric: 672 MWe
Flow:	Recirc. 60.2 x 10^6 lb/hr
	Feed: 7.13 x 10^6 lb/hr
Reactor Pressure:	1020 psig
Stack Gas:	28,357 µci/sec

Description of Occurrence

On Friday, February 8, 1974, at 1030, while performing a surveillance test on the four main steam line low pressure switches, it was discovered that RE23A, C, and D tripped at 850, 856, and 855 psig, respectively. These values are below the minimum required trip point of 860 psig, which is derived by adding to the Technical Specification limit of 850 psig head correction factor.

The as-found switch settings were:

	Test Results
RE23A	850 psig
RE23B	860 psig
RE23C	856 psig
RE23D	855 psig

The pressure switches were then recalibrated and checked to actuate as follows:

	Test Results
RE23A	860 psig
RE23C	860 psig
RE23D	860 psig

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Design is considered to be the major factor contributing to this event. Sensor drift is a recognized problem and work is in progress to formulate a final solution. The steps required to achieve this end were delineated in Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/1.

Analysis of Occurrence

As indicated in the bases of the Technical Specification, "The low pressure isolation of the main steam lines at 850 psig was provided to give protection against fast reactor depressurization and the resultant rapid cooldown of the vessel. Advantage was taken of the scram feature which occurs when the main steam isolation valves are closed to provide for reactor shutdown so that high power operation at low reactor pressure does not occur, thus providing protection for the fuel cladding integrity safety limit."

The adverse consequences of reactor isolation occurring at reactor pressure approximately 10 psig below the specified minimum value of 860 psig is limited to those effects attendant to a greater than normal reactor cooldown rate. The fuel cladding integrity safety limit only comes into effect for power operation at reactor pressures less than 600 psig or for power operation greater than 354 MWt with less than 10% recirculation flow. Therefore, the consequences of a 10 psig lower than normal reactor isolation and scram setpoint has no threatening effect whatsoever on the fuel cladding integrity.

The effects of a too rapid cooldown due to the lower isolation pressure are inconsequential since there is approximately a 1°F difference between the saturation temperature for 860 psig and 850 psig.

Corrective Action

Continuing corrective actions being taken at this time are as follows:

1. Investigation is being conducted into the basis for the steam line low pressure setting of 850 psig. Development of a Technical Specification change to lower the setpoint will follow if results of transient analyses indicate this possibility.

2. Recommendations to possibly reduce or eliminate the sensor setpoint change problem have been received. It was reported that General Electric tests on a pulsating line to simulate plant conditions show that precycled Barksdale switches show improvement but that the switches still do not meet 1% repeatability. General Electric, therefore, recommended an Ashcroft switch as it is more accurate. The Ashcroft catalog number is 61 S 6080 BN20-06L-1028.

   As a result, one switch of each type (precycled Barksdale and Ashcroft) are being purchased for test and evaluation at Oyster Creek.

Failure Data

Manufacturer data pertinent to these switches are as follows:

Meletron Corp. (subsidiary of Barksdale)
Los Angeles, California
Pressure Actuated Switch
Model 372
Catalog No. 372-6SS49A-293
Range 20-1400 psig
Proof Psi. 1750 G

Previous Abnormal Occurrence Reports involving these switches are:

1. Letter to Mr. A. Giambusso from Mr. D. A. Ross, dated December 24, 1973.

2. Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/1.

3. Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/9.