


To: James P. O'Reilly  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations  
Region I  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company  
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject: Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/ 14

The following is a preliminary report being submitted  
in compliance with the Technical Specifications  
paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:

 2/25/74  
J. T. Carroll, Jr. Date

cc: Mr. A. Gianbusso

B1624

Initial Telephone  
Report Date: 2/25/74

Date of  
Occurrence: 2/22/74

Initial Written  
Report Date: 2/25/74

Time of  
Occurrence: 1400

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence  
Report No. 50-219/74/14

IDENTIFICATION  
OF OCCURRENCE:

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.A.3,  
Failure of two torus to drywell vacuum breakers to demonstrate  
operability during weekly surveillance testing.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as de-  
fined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15B.

CONDITIONS PRIOR  
TO OCCURRENCE:

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Steady State Power	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Shutdown
<input type="checkbox"/> Hot Standby	<input type="checkbox"/> Operation
<input type="checkbox"/> Cold Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Load Changes During
<input type="checkbox"/> Refueling Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Power Operation
<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Startup	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)
<input type="checkbox"/> Operation	

The major plant parameters at the time of the event were as  
follows:

Power: Core, 1880 MWt  
Elec., 658 MWe  
Flow: Recirc.,  $15.0 \times 10^4$  gpm  
Feed.,  $7.12 \times 10^6$  lb/hr  
Stack Gas: 26,000  $\mu$ Ci/sec

DESCRIPTION  
OF OCCURRENCE:

On Friday, February 22, 1974, at approximately 1400, while per-  
forming weekly surveillance testing on the fourteen torus to  
drywell vacuum breakers, it was found that two of the vacuum  
breakers (V-26-6 and 9) failed to demonstrate operability.  
V-26-6 failed to close without assistance for the last one (1)  
inch of travel and V-26-9 did not move freely in both the  
opening and closing movements. This surveillance testing was

being performed to satisfy the requirements of AEC letter (D. J. Skovholt to R. H. Sims, dated January 30, 1974). This operability testing basically consisted of manually opening each valve to the fully open position and then allowing it to close without assistance. Any hanging up in the opening or closing motions was interpreted as non-operability. Both valves were made operable immediately with the application of several successive opening and closing movements. Plant operation continued on the basis of the requirements of paragraph B.5 of the referenced letter, which allows continued operation if not more than 25% of these vacuum breakers are inoperable.

APPARENT CAUSE  
OF OCCURRENCE:

<input type="checkbox"/> Design	<input type="checkbox"/> Procedure
<input type="checkbox"/> Manufacture	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Unusual Service Condition
<input type="checkbox"/> Installation/	<input type="checkbox"/> Inc. Environmental
<input type="checkbox"/> Construction	<input type="checkbox"/> Component Failure
<input type="checkbox"/> Operator	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)

It is believed that these failures are attributed to excess friction in the valve hinge pins. A similar failure was reported as Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 74-11, dated February 15, 1974.

ANALYSIS OF  
OCCURRENCE:

The drywell-torus vacuum breaker system is required to prevent water oscillation in the downcomers due to low steam flow rates in the downcomers and to provide protection against negative pressure conditions in the containment vessel. The significance of this event is minimal in that the bases of the Technical

Specifications state that this condition has no deleterious effect on negative pressure protection since only about 25% of the available vacuum relief capacity is required for this protection.

CORRECTIVE  
ACTION:

Valves V-26-6 and 9 were freed immediately with repetitive opening and closing movements. Corrective action being taken is as discussed in a letter to Mr. Robert J. Schemel from Mr. D. A. Ross, dated October 8, 1973. In that letter, it was noted that an apparent "growing" characteristic has been experienced with the teflon bushings at several facilities including Oyster Creek. The bushing difficulty has been discussed with Atwood & Morrill Co. and a long-term solution is under investigation in conjunction with the General Electric Company.

FAILURE DATA:

Basic valve data are as follows:

Manufacturer - Atwood & Morrill  
Type - Butterfly  
Vent Area - 1.75 square feet per valve