


Jersey Central Power & Light Company



MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 201-539-6111



February 25, 1974

Mr. A. Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensin
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station
Docket No. 50-219
Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/11

The purpose of this letter is to forward to you the attached Abnormal Occurrence Report in compliance with paragraph 6.6.2.a of the Technical Specifications.

Enclosed are forty copies of this submittal.

Very truly yours,

Donald A. Ross
Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations

CS
Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I

B/622

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/74/11

Report Date

February 25, 1974

Occurrence Date

February 15, 1974

Identification of Occurrence

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.A.3, failure of four torus to drywell vacuum breakers to demonstrate operability during weekly surveillance testing. This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15B.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady state power.

The major plant parameters at the time of the event were as follows:

Power:	Core, 1904 MWt
	Electric, 670 MWe
Flow:	Recirculation, 15.5×10^4 gpm
	Feedwater, 7.23×10^6 lb/hr
Stack Gas:	29,000 μ Ci/sec

Description of Occurrence

On Friday, February 15, 1974, at approximately 1500, while performing weekly surveillance testing on the fourteen torus to drywell vacuum breakers, it was found that four of the vacuum breakers (V-26-5, 6, 9, and 11) failed to demonstrate operability in that they failed to close without assistance for the last 1 inch of travel. This surveillance testing was being performed to satisfy the requirements of AEC letter (D. J. Skovholt to R. H. Sims dated January 30, 1974). This operability testing basically consisted of manually opening each valve to the fully open position and then allowing it to close without assistance. Any hanging up in the opening or closing motions was interpreted as non-operability. Valve V-26-5 was made operable immediately with the application of several successive opening and closing movements. Plant operation continued on the basis of the requirements of paragraph B.5 of the referenced letter, which allows continued operation if not more than 25% of these vacuum breakers are

inoperable. Maintenance on the remaining three inoperable vacuum breakers (V-26-6, 9, and 11) was complete at approximately 0100 on February 16, 1974.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Unusual service condition is a major factor contributing to the cause of this occurrence. It is believed that these failures are attributed to excess friction in the valve hinge pins. A similar failure was reported as Attachment IV to Jersey Central Power & Light Company's letter from Mr. Donald A. Ross to Mr. A. Giambusso dated January 17, 1973.

Analysis of Occurrence

The drywell-torus vacuum breaker system is required to prevent water oscillation in the downcomers due to low steam flow rates in the downcomers and to provide protection against negative pressure conditions in the containment vessel. The significance of this event is minimal in that the bases of the Technical Specifications state that this condition has no deleterious effect on negative pressure protection since only about 25% of the available vacuum relief capacity is required for this protection.

Corrective Action

Valves V-26-6 and 11 were freed with repetitive opening and closing movements. Valve V-26-9 was returned to an operable condition by removing two rings of packing from one side of the shaft, reducing the friction of the valve hinge pin. Corrective action being taken is as discussed in a letter to Mr. Robert J. Schemel from Mr. D. A. Ross dated October 8, 1973. In that letter, it was noted that an apparent "growing" characteristic has been experienced with the teflon bushings at several facilities including Oyster Creek. The bushing difficulty has been discussed with Atwood & Morrill Company and a long-term solution is under investigation in conjunction with the General Electric Company.

Failure Data

Basic valve data are as follows:

Manufacturer - Atwood & Morrill Company
Type - Butterfly
Vent Area - 1.75 square feet per valve