


To: James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject: Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/ 15

The following is a preliminary report being submitted
in compliance with the Technical Specifications
paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:


J. T. Cattoll, Jr. 2/28/74 Date

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

B/6/8

Initial Written
Report Date: 2/28 8

Time of
Occurrence: 0945

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/74/15

IDENTIFICATION
OF OCCURRENCE:

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph N/A.
Failure of one torus to drywell vacuum breaker to demonstrate operability during weekly surveillance testing.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15D.

CONDITIONS PRIOR
TO OCCURRENCE:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Steady State Power | <input type="checkbox"/> Routine Shutdown |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hot Standby | <input type="checkbox"/> Operation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cold Shutdown | <input type="checkbox"/> Load Changes During |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Refueling Shutdown | <input type="checkbox"/> Routine Power Operation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Routine Startup | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Operation | |

The major plant parameters at the time of the event were as follows:

Power: Core, 1870 MWt
 Elec., 650 MWe
 Flow: Recirc., 14.9×10^4 gpm
 Feed., 6.95×10^6 lb/hr
 Stack Gas: 27,700 μ Ci/sec

DESCRIPTION
OF OCCURRENCE:

On Thursday, February 28, 1974, at approximately 0945, while performing weekly surveillance testing on the fourteen torus to drywell vacuum breakers, it was found that one vacuum breaker (V-26-9) failed to demonstrate operability. This surveillance testing was being performed to satisfy the requirements of AEC letter (D. J. Skovholt to R. H. Sims, dated January 30, 1974).

The operability testing basically consisted of:

1. Verifying that each valve was seated prior to testing.
2. Manually opening each valve to the fully open position and then allowing it to close without assistance.
3. Verifying that each valve was seated after testing.

V-26-9 was found to be seated prior to testing and opened freely; however, it did not close freely and manual assistance was required to seat the valve after testing.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Design | <input type="checkbox"/> Procedure |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Manufacture | <input type="checkbox"/> Unusual Service Condition |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Installation/ | <input type="checkbox"/> Inc. Environmental |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Construction | <input type="checkbox"/> Component Failure |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Operator | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) |

It is believed that this failure is attributed to excess friction in the valve hinge pins. Similar failures were reported as Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 74-11, dated February 15, 1974, and Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 74-14, dated February 22, 1974.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The drywell-torus vacuum breaker system is required to prevent water oscillation in the downcomers due to low steam flow rates in the downcomers and to provide protection against negative pressure conditions in the containment vessel. The significance of this event is minimal in that the bases of the Technical Specifications state that this condition has no deleterious effect on negative pressure protection since only about 25% of

the available vacuum relief capacity is required for this protection.

The drywell-torus vacuum breaker valves are required to be closed during pipe break accidents (particularly small breaks) to ensure proper steam condensation and prevent torus overpressuring. This valve would have performed this function, if required.

**CORRECTIVE
ACTION:**

Based on the recent history of failures of V-26-9, it was decided to lock this valve in the closed position pending implementation of a satisfactory long-term solution. This locking was in compliance with the requirements of paragraph B.4 of the AEC letter (D. J. Skovholt to R. H. Sims, dated January 30, 1974). Other corrective action being taken is as discussed in a letter to Mr. Robert J. Schmel from Mr. D. A. Ross, dated October 8, 1973. In that letter, it was noted that an apparent "growing" characteristic has been experienced with the teflon bushings at several facilities including Oyster Creek. The bushing difficulty has been discussed with Atwood & Morrill Co. and a long-term solution is under investigation in conjunction with the General Electric Company.

FAILURE DATA: Basic valve data are as follows:

Manufacturer - Atwood & Morrill
Type - Check Valve
Vent Area - 1.75 square feet per valve

Prepared by:



Date:

2/28/74