

AUG 15 1972

J. G. Keppler, Chief, Reactor Testing & Operations Branch  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, HQ

RO INQUIRY REPORT NO. 50-219/72-25  
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
OYSTER CREEK - BWR  
EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCY - RELIEF VALVE DISCHARGE PIPING

The subject inquiry report is forwarded for your action in that this problem may be generic.

We do not know when the licensee became aware of this deficiency. The problem at the relief valve end of the pipe was known at least by June 2, 1972. Corrective action was taken during the refueling outage that was in progress at that time. In this case, we did not learn of a possible deficiency until after the plant was shut down following an unrelated scram on August 9, 1972.

We plan to follow the resolution of this matter and will keep you informed as is appropriate. We plan to discuss with the licensee the need for timely reporting of deficiencies or changes in accident analysis. The licensee stated that this deficiency would be included in the report concerning inadequate supports in the vicinity of the relief valves. That report is to be submitted by August 25, 1972 per agreement with Licensing.

R. T. Carlson, Chief  
Reactor Operations Branch

Enclosure:  
Subject Inquiry Report (18 cys)

cc: P. A. Morris, RO  
H. D. Thornburg, RO  
R. H. Engelken, RO  
RO Files

B/365

OFFICE ▶ RO  
SURNAME ▶ Cantrell:smg Carlson  
DATE ▶ 8/15/72

RO Inquiry Report No. 50-219/72-25

Subject: Jersey Central Power & Light Company

Facility: Oyster Creek - EWR

License No.: DPR-16

Title: Equipment Deficiency - Relief Valve Discharge Piping

Prepared by: \_\_\_\_\_

F. S. Cantrell, Reactor Inspector

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

A. Date and Manner AEC was Informed:

August 11, 1972, by telephone call from Mr. T. J. McCluskey, Station Superintendent.

B. Description of Particular Event or Circumstance:

A design evaluation of the reaction forces along the vent piping from the electromatic relief valves (ERV) indicated that the supports might be overstressed in the vicinity of the ERV (Inquiry Report 219/72-13). The study was extended to include the full length of the vent pipes. This evaluation indicated that the supports for the discharge piping in the torus might be overstressed.

C. Action by Licensee:

Temporary supports (cables) were installed while the reactor was shut down following a scram that occurred on August 9, 1972.

No schedule has been established for implementing a permanent fix.

AUG 15 1972

J. G. Keppler, Chief, Reactor Testing & Operations Br.  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, HQ

RO INQUIRY REPORT NO. 50-219/72-24  
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
OYSTER CREEK - BWR  
EQUIPMENT FAILURE - ISOLATION CONDENSER FAILURE

The subject inquiry report is forwarded for your information.

The licensee stated that he planned to conduct sufficient testing of the valves and switches to assure that the isolation condensers will operate when required. He stated that the isolation signal was the first that had been received since the five second delay was added to the system.

The licensee's actions appear to be adequate.

We plan to follow the resolution of this matter during the next inspection.

E. T. Carlson, Chief  
Reactor Operations Branch

Enclosure:  
Subject Inquiry Report

cc: R. Minogue, RS (3)  
R. S. Boyd, L (2)  
R. C. DeYoung, L (2)  
D. J. Skovholt, L (3)  
H. R. Denton, L (2)  
P. A. Morris, RO  
H. D. Thornburg, RO  
R. H. Engelken, RO  
RO Files  
DR Central Files

8/366

OFFICE ▶	RO				
SURNAME ▶	Cantrell:smg	Carlson			
DATE ▶	8/14/72				

8303310166 1p.



After the reactor is pressurized with two bypass valves open (next startup), and prior to putting the plant on line, the isolation condensers will be initiated to verify the fix.

2. The open and close limit switches, the torque switch and the overload switch settings on both isolation condenser condensate drain valves were checked and were found set properly.

The drain valves have been operated several times since without failure. (The torque switch is bypassed in the opening cycle of the valve.)

The specific cause of the failure has not been determined.

3. The licensee stated that he planned to submit a ten day written report of these events to Licensing.

Aug 9 1972

J. G. Keppler, Chief, Reactor Testing & Operations Branch  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, HQ

RO INQUIRY REPORT NO. 50-219/72-23  
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
OYSTER CREEK - BWR  
EQUIPMENT FAILURE - HIGH FLOW SWITCH EMERGENCY CONDENSER

The subject inquiry report is forwarded for your information.

The licensee's action appears to be responsive. Upon receipt of the licensee's report, we will make an additional review of the subject.

R. T. Carlson, Chief  
Reactor Operations Branch

Enclosure:  
Subject Inquiry Report

cc: R. Minogue, RS (3)  
R. Boyd, L (2)  
R. DeYoung, L (2)  
D. Skovholt, L (3)  
H. Denton, L (2)  
P. Morris, RO  
H. Thornburg, RO  
R. Engelken, RO  
RO Files  
DR Central Files

B/367

OFFICE ▶	RO Carlson:ds
SURNAME ▶	<i>S. m/h</i>
DATE ▶	8/9/72

~~8303310198~~

lp.

Subject: Jersey Central Power & Light Company

License No.: DPR-16

Facility: Oyster Creek - BWR

Title: Equipment Failure - High Flow Switch Emergency Condenser

Prepared by: F. S. Cantrell, Reactor Inspector

8/9/72  
Date

A. Date and Manner AEC was Informed:

August 4, 1972, by telephone call from Mr. T. J. McClusky, Station Superintendent.

B. Description of Particular Event or Circumstance:

During a routine surveillance test on August 4, 1972, one of two steam leg high flow switches for one isolation condenser failed to operate. The switch failure was caused by a leak in the bellows. The isolation condenser was considered inoperable while temporary repairs to the switch bellows were completed. The switch is a Barton Model 278 delta pressure switch.

C. Action by Licensee:

Temporary repairs to the bellows were made on August 4, 1972, and the switch was checked out. A replacement switch was ordered. The licensee is investigating the cause of the problem and the applicability to other switches. The licensee intends to submit a 10 day written report to Licensing on this matter.

AUG 4 1972

J. G. Keppler, Chief, Reactor Testing & Operations Br.  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, HQ

RO INQUIRY REPORT NO. 50-219/72-22  
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
OYSTER CREEK - BWR  
EQUIPMENT FAILURE - CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP

The subject inquiry report is forwarded for your information.

The licensee's action appears to be appropriate.

We plan to follow this investigation and will keep you informed as is appropriate. It should be noted that the licensee does not plan to make a written report if the investigation shows the pump was operable in the automatic mode. We concur.

R. T. Carlson, Chief,  
Reactor Operations Branch

Enclosure:  
Subject Inquiry Report

cc: R. Minogue, RS (3)  
R. S. Boyd, L (2)  
R. C. DeYoung, L (2)  
D. J. Skovholt, L (3)  
H. R. Denton, L (2)  
F. A. Morris, RO  
H. D. Thornburg, RO  
R. H. Engelken, RO  
RO Files  
DR Central Files

8303310241 lp.

B/368

OFFICE ▶	RO	Carlson		
SURNAME ▶	Cantrell:smg	Carlson		
DATE ▶	8/4/72			



RO Inquiry Report No. 50-219/72-22

Subject: Jersey Central Power & Light Company

Facility: Oyster Creek - BWR

License No.: DPR-16

Title: Equipment Failure - Containment Spray Pump

Prepared by: F. S. Cantrell, Reactor Inspector

Date

JCP&L  
letter  
7/2

A. Date and Manner AEC was Informed:

August 2, 1972, by telephone call from Mr. T. J. McCluskey, Station Superintendent.

B. Description of Particular Event or Circumstance:

While trying to recirculate torus water to obtain a sample on August 1, 1972, the C containment spray pump would not start manually. (The other pump in the same loop was subsequently used to obtain the sample.)

The breaker position switch associated with the C pump was cleaned and the pump started without difficulty. If the failure to start was caused by the breaker position switch, the pump would not have started automatically to perform its intended safety function; however, if the problem was in the individual control switch, the automatic initiation feature would not have been negated. Technical Specification 3.4.C permits one pump to be inoperable for 15 days.

The suspected breaker is a GE supplied breaker, type AK-2A-50, 1600 amp, 600 volt. The switch inside that required cleaning is a GE type SPM-10AB593.

C. Action by Licensee:

The investigation is continuing to demonstrate that the breaker position switch was the only cause of failure, or if other switches are subject to the same failure. The licensee will make a 10 day written report as required by Technical Specifications if the problem is determined to be associated with the breaker position switch or some other mechanism that could have prevented automatic operation.

~~8303310247~~ lp.

JUL 26 1972

J. G. Keppler, Chief, Reactor Testing & Operations Br.  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, HQ

RO INQUIRY REPORT NO. 50-219/72-20  
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
OYSTER CREEK - BWR  
EXTERNAL OVEREXPOSURES - EXPOSURES GREATER THAN 3 REM/QUARTER

The subject inquiry report is forwarded for your information.

These overexposures are being investigated for the licensee by a committee from the Parsippany Office appointed by the Company President. We plan to follow the results of this investigation and will review this matter in more detail during the next routine inspection.

R. T. Carlson, Chief,  
Reactor Operations Branch

Enclosure:  
Subject Inquiry Report

cc: R. Minogue, RS (3)  
R. S. Boyd, L (2)  
R. C. DeYoung, L (2)  
D. J. Skovholt, L (3)  
H. R. Denton, L (2)  
P. A. Morris, RO  
H. D. Thornburg, RO  
R. H. Engelken, RO  
Regional Directors, RO  
G. W. Roy, RO  
RO Files  
DE Central Files

B/369

8303310316 1p.

OFFICE ▶

RO

SURNAME ▶

Cantrell:smg Carlson

7/26/72

Subject: Jersey Central Power & Light Company

Facility: Oyster Creek - BWR

License No.: DPR-16

Title: External Overexposures - Exposures Greater than 3 Rem/Quarter

Prepared by: F. S. Cantrell, Reactor Inspector                    
Date

A. Date and Manner AEC was Informed:

July 14, 1972 by Mr. D. Ross, Technical Supervisor, during a site inspection.

B. Description of Particular Event or Circumstance:

The film badge report for the April - June 1972 quarter from Landauer, Inc. showed that during this period, 11 employees received whole body exposures in excess of 3.0 Rem (3.010 to 3.360 Rem). Ten of these employees were maintenance personnel and one man was a health physics technician. All of the men with high exposures were involved in general maintenance work during the May - June refueling outage. Personnel were not assigned to radiation work after receiving an estimated 2500 mrem until the results of the film badge was received. Additional exposure was then permitted for low radiation work based on ion chamber dosimeters.

C. Action by Licensee:

The licensee is investigating the exposure of each person and will submit a written report to the Director of Regulatory Operations as required by 10 CFR 20.405. Each employee has been given a whole body count (given to all station employees except the clerks). The Chairman of the General Office Review Board and the President of Jersey Central Power & Light Co. have been notified as required by Technical Specifications.

JUL 26 1972

J. S. Keppler, Chief, Reactor Testing & Operations Br.  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, HQ

RO INQUIRY REPORT NO. 50-219/72-19  
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
OYSTER CREEK - BWR  
EXCEED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS - HYDRO TEST WITH POTENTIAL  
LACK OF APPROPRIATE PRESSURE RELIEF PROTECTION

The subject inquiry report is forwarded for your information.

Technical Specifications give the set point for the safety valves (1212 - 1239 + 12 psig) and specify that reactor pressure not exceed 1375 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor. The control rod drive pump develops approximately 1450 psig pressure. Section III of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requires the vessel to be protected by a self actuated relief device against the consequences of steady state and transient conditions of pressure and temperature in excess of design conditions. Our view is that the intent of both the Technical Specifications and the applicable code was violated in the instance noted.

The licensee stated that a self actuating relief device will be provided in the future if the safety valves are gagged during future hydro tests; however, the licensee does not consider this matter a violation or reportable under the Technical Specifications. We concur in their view on reporting. We also agree with their proposal to have a self actuating relief device operable during future hydro tests.

R. T. Carlson, Chief  
Reactor Operations Br.

Enclosure:  
Subject Inquiry Report

cc: R. Minogue, RS (3)  
R. S. Boyd, L (2)  
R. C. DeYoung, L (2)  
D. J. Skovholt, L (3)  
H. R. Denton, L (2)

P. A. Morris, RO  
H. D. Thornburg, RO  
R. E. Engelken, RO  
Regional Directors, RO  
RO Files  
DR Central Files

B1370

8303310359 4p.

OFFICE ▶	RO <i>ms</i>
SURNAME ▶	Cantrell:smg Carlson
DATE ▶	7/26/72

Subject: Jersey Central Power & Light Company

Facility: Oyster Creek - BWR

License No.: DPR-16

Title: Exceed Technical Specifications - Hydro Test with Potential  
Lack of Appropriate Pressure Relief Protection

Prepared by: F. S. Cantrell, Reactor Inspector Date \_\_\_\_\_

A. Date and Manner AEC was Informed:

July 12, 1972, as a result of a review of the Foreman's Log during a routine inspection at the site. Additional information was provided by Mr. T. J. McCluskey, Station Superintendent.

B. Description of Particular Event or Circumstance:

The safety valve vendor (Dresser) recommended to the licensee that all safety valves on the reactor vessel be gagged at 80% of set pressure during a hydro test (operating pressure leak test) conducted on June 16, 1972 following the recent refueling. The reason given was to avoid collecting water on the outside of the seat bushing if the valve leaked. The previously reported problem with cracks in seat bushings (Inquiry Report 50-219/72-09) was partially attributed to water being held up in this region as the result of safety valve leakage. Pressure for the hydro was supplied by throttling the control rod drive pump and bleeding off through the clean up system. Pressure was administratively limited to 1060 psi. The electromagnetic relief valves were operable during this period; however, they are not self actuating. The relief valves on the clean up system were also operable; however, their availability would be negated in the event of containment isolation.

C. Action by Licensee:

The licensee stated that gagging safety valves had been reviewed, that the hydro procedure had been changed to carefully control the pressure administratively and that the pressure was maintained well below the set point of the safety valves (1212 psi). As a result, the licensee did not consider this a violation of the Technical Specifications; however, in the future the safety valves will not be gagged unless a self actuating relief valve is provided in the system.

JUL 25 1972

J. G. Keppler, Chief, Reactor Testing & Operations Branch  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, HQ

RO INQUIRY REPORT NO. 50-219/72-21  
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
OYSTER CREEK - BWR  
PUBLIC INTEREST - ALLEGED FISH KILL DUE TO HOT WATER

The subject inquiry report is forwarded for your information.

The information obtained was relayed to John Russo, New Jersey Department of Radiological Protection by Dr. Gallina of our staff. Mr. Russo informed Dr. Gallina that he had a team of personnel working in the vicinity of Oyster Creek at the present time, and that he had not had any reports from them to substantiate these allegations; however, he would direct them to investigate.

The above information and the information obtained from the Oyster Creek facility was relayed to Mr. Russett by telephone on July 24, 1972. At that time, he implied that if the condition did not improve, he and his neighbors would try other means to obtain a solution to the problem.

Any additional information obtained from the State of New Jersey will be relayed to Mr. Russett as is appropriate. Your office will be kept informed of substantive developments. At present, the licensee does not plan to make a written report on this matter. We concur in this position based on the information currently available.

R. T. Carlson, Chief,  
Reactor Operations Branch

Enclosure:  
Subject Inquiry Report

- cc: R. Minogue, RS (3)
- R. S. Boyd, L (2)
- R. C. DeYoung, L (2)
- D. J. Skovholt, L (3)
- H. R. Denton, L (2)
- P. A. Morris, RO
- H. D. Thornburg, RO
- R. H. Egelken, RO

B/271

OFFICE ▶	RO Files			
SURNAME ▶	DR Central Files R Regional Director, RO Cantrell:smg Gallina	Carlson		
DATE ▶	7/25/72			

8303310252 4p.

RO Inquiry Report No. 50-219/72-21

Subject: Jersey Central Power and Light Company

Facility: Oyster Creek - BWR

License No.: DPR-16

Title: Public Interest - Alleged Fish Kill due to Hot Water

Prepared by: \_\_\_\_\_

F. S. Cantrell, Reactor Inspector

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

A. Date and Manner AEC was Informed:

July 24, 1972, by telephone call from Mr. James J. Russett, at 10:00 a.m., who stated that he owned a house on the first lagoon up the discharge canal from the bay.

B. Description of Particular Event or Circumstance:

Mr. Russett stated that fish were coming to the top and dying in the discharge canal because of the hot water discharged by the nuclear plant. In addition, he stated there was seaweed and scum on top of the water the full length of the discharge canal. He stated that he measured the water temperature at several locations using a calibrated thermometer with the following results:

1. At the Route 9 bridge over the discharge canal - 98° F.
2. In the lagoon opposite his house (approximately 3/4 mile downstream) -- Mr. Russett's estimate) - 95° F.
3. About 1 mile further downstream (out in the bay) - 94° F.
4. Near the entrance to Barnegat Bay from the Ocean - 82° F.

Mr. Russett stated that he thought the situation was deplorable and thought he should contact some other environmental or wildlife agency. He was told the inspector would forward this information to the appropriate state agency.

C. Action by Licensee:

Mr. Ross, Technical Supervisor at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, who was contacted by telephone on July 24, 1972, supplied the following information:

1. The inlet cooling water temperature at the plant is  $90^{\circ} \pm 1^{\circ}$  F and has been steady at this temperature for several days.
2. The  $98^{\circ}$  F. in the discharge canal at the Route 9 bridge is probably correct.
3. The power level has been approximately 1890 MWt (approximately 635 Mwe gross).
4. The cooling water flow through the condensers is 460,000 gpm. One additional dilution pump is operating adding approximately 290,000 gpm flow to the canal. Two other dilution pumps are available which could increase the dilution flow to approximately 780,000 gpm. These two pumps are not being used because the increased flow would increase the amount of grass and seaweed drawn into the inlet canal. At present, the grass and seaweed is directed to the dilution pump where it is pumped to the discharge canal.
5. Mr. Ross stated that the water that enters the bay from swamps, bogs, Oyster Creek, etc., can be described as "cedar water" and contains impurities that cause foaming when created as passing over rocks, or through pumps. The water then has a brownish foamy look. He stated this matter had been reviewed with Mr. Charles Amato of the State of New Jersey.
6. Oyster Creek has a discharge temperature limit of  $95^{\circ}$  F (state imposed) at a bouy located in the bay between the inlet and the outlet canal. The temperature is normally recorded on a chart at the bouy; however, due to equipment malfunctions, no data has been collected for the past two weeks. (Ross is not sure OC has collected any good data this summer). The recorder was picked up 7/13/72 and brought back to the plant for repairs. It was being re-installed today (7/24/72). The instrument people were instructed to take a portable temperature indicator with them and obtain water temperature in the vicinity of the bouy.



JUL 6 1972

J. G. Keppler, Chief, Reactor Testing & Operations Branch  
 Directorate of Regulatory Operations, HQ

RO INQUIRY REPORT NO. 50-219/72-18  
 JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
 OYSTER CREEK - BWR  
 EXCEED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS - RAD WASTE STORAGE TANK INVENTORY

The subject inquiry report is forwarded for your information.

In spite of raising the Technical Specification limit for the content of the tank farm from 0.7 Ci to 10.0 Ci (Change No. 10), rad waste management following an extended shutdown continues to be a problem.

At present, the waste concentrator is plugged requiring a shut down of this waste processing stream. According to Mr. McCluskey, money has been budgeted to install a second waste concentrator.

This matter will be reviewed during an inspection beginning July 5, 1972. Mr. McCluskey stated that a written report would be submitted in 10 days as required by Technical Specifications.

R. T. Carlson, Chief,  
 Reactor Operations Branch

Enclosure:  
 Subject Inquiry Report

cc: R. Minogue, RS (3)  
 R. S. Boyd, L (2)  
 R. C. DeYoung, L (2)  
 D. J. Skovholt, L (3)  
 H. R. Denton, L (2)  
 P. A. Morris, RO  
 H. D. Thornburg, RO  
 R. H. Engelken, RO  
 RO Files  
 DR Central Files

B/372

OFFICE ▶	RO				
SURNAME ▶	Cantrell smg	Carlson			
DATE ▶	7/6/72				

8303310376 1p.

RO Inquiry Report No. 50-219/72-18

Subject: Jersey Central Power & Light Company

Facility: Oyster Creek - BWR

License No.: DPR-16

Title: Exceed Technical Specification Limits - Rad Waste Storage Tank Inventory

Prepared by: F. S. Cantrell, Reactor Inspector

                      
Date

A. Date and Manner AEC was Informed:

June 30, 1972, by telephone call from Mr. T. J. McCluskey, Station Superintendent.

B. Description of Particular Event or Circumstance:

The inventory of the outside rad waste "tank farm" was 12.78 Ci when the contents were analyzed at 2:00 pm on June 28, 1972. Technical Specifications paragraph 3.6.C limits inventory to 10.0 Ci and directs that the contents be recycled if the inventory exceeds 5.0 Ci. By 3:30 pm on June 28, the contents had been recycled back to the rad waste building and the inventory of the tank farm was 3.87 Ci. Analysis of the tank farm contents is performed on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays in comparison to Technical Specifications required once every 72 hours.

C. Action by Licensee:

The investigation showed that waste neutralizer tanks A and B overflowed during the regeneration of a condensate demineralizer. The overflow went to the floor drain sump and was pumped to the floor drains sample tank via the floor drain collector tank and a process filter on June 27, 1972. The A floor drain sample tank contained 10.45 Ci and the B sample tank 1.0 Ci. The Plant Operating Review Committee will review this violation.

JUN 29 1972

J. G. Keppler, Chief, Reactor Testing & Operations Branch  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, HQ

RO INQUIRY REPORT NO. 50-219/72-17  
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
OYSTER CREEK - BWR  
SURVEILLANCE TEST OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

The subject inquiry report is forwarded for your action in that the problem may be generic.

The failure of the cooling radiator shutters to open may be a "weak link" in the emergency power supply. The engine high temperature cutout is supposed to be bypassed in the fast start mode, but not in the test mode. If the shutters failed to open under emergency conditions, the diesel would rapidly overheat. Fast operator action would be required to prevent damage to the engine and the consequent loss of that source of emergency power. Under these conditions, we question whether the operator would be acting correctly if he shutdown the diesel. OC's Technical Specifications permit one of the two EDGs to be out of service for seven days in a thirty day period.

The licensee's actions appear to be responsive; however, we plan to review this matter during the next inspection scheduled for July 5 - 7, 1972. Also, we plan to review this failure at other operating power reactors in Region I to determine if there are any generic problems. The licensee will submit a 10 day written report on this matter.

R. T. Carlson, Chief  
Reactor Operations Branch

Enclosure:  
Subject Inquiry Report (18 cys)

cc: P. A. Morris, RO  
H. D. Thornburg, RO  
R. H. Engelken, RO  
RO Files

B/373

OFFICE ▶	RO <i>Cartrell:smg</i>	<i>Carlson</i>			
SURNAME ▶					
DATE ▶	9/29/72				

8303310452 1p.

RO Inquiry Report No. 50-219/72-17

Subject: Jersey Central Power & Light Company

License No.: DPR-16

Facility: Oyster Creek - BWR

Title: Equipment Failure - Surveillance Test Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)

Prepared by: F. S. Cantrell, Reactor Inspector

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

A. Date & Manner AEC was Informed:

June 26, 1972, by telephone call from Mr. T. J. McCluskey, Station Superintendent.

B. Description of Particular Event or Circumstance:

On June 26, 1972, during a routine surveillance test with the No. 1 EDG loaded, the generator tripped off line due to high engine temperature. The diesel throttled back to idle speed automatically. The preliminary investigation showed that the cooling radiator shutters (damper) failed to open. These shutters are scheduled to open in steps in order to allow the engine to reach operating temperature in a minimum amount of time.

C. Action by Licensee:

An investigation is being conducted to determine the specific cause of the shutters failing to open. Mr. McCluskey stated that the PORC would review the findings and that a 10 day written report would be submitted to L.

~~8303310455~~ 4p.

JUN 22 1972

J. G. Keppler, Chief, Reactor Testing & Operations Br.  
 Directorate of Regulatory Operations, HQ

RO INQUIRY REPORT NO. 50-219/72-16  
 JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
 CYSTER CREEK - BWR  
 EQUIPMENT FAILURE - REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RELAY

The subject inquiry report is forwarded for your information.

At the time of the communication, the licensee had no explanation as to the cause of failure. We plan to review this matter during the next inspection, currently scheduled for the week of June 26, 1972.

R. T. Carlson  
 Chief, Reactor Operations Br.

Enclosure:  
 Subject Inquiry Report

cc: R. Minogue, RS (3)  
 R. S. Boyd, L (2)  
 R. C. DeYoung, L (2)  
 D. J. Skovholt, L (3)  
 H. R. Denton, L (2)  
 P. A. Morris, RO  
 H. D. Thornburg, RO  
 R. H. Engelken, RO  
 RO Files  
 DR Central Files

8303310461 Lp.

6/27/72

OFFICE ▶	RO				
SURNAME ▶	Cartrell:smg				
DATE ▶	6/22/72				

RO Inquiry Report No. 50-219/72-16

Subject: Jersey Central Power & Light Company

License No.: DPR-16

Facility: Oyster Creek

Title: Equipment Failure - Reactor Protection System Relay

Prepared by: \_\_\_\_\_

F. S. Cantrell, Reactor Inspector

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

A. Date and Manner AEC was Informed:

June 16, 1972, by telephone call from Mr. T. J. McCluskey, Station Superintendent.

B. Description of Particular Event or Circumstance:

An odor of burning insulation noted on June 15, 1972 was traced to the 6K28 relay in the reactor protection system. This relay operates the "seal in" contacts for the main steam isolation valves outside containment and trips the recirculation loop sample valves on an isolation signal.

C. Action by Licensee:

The 6K28 relay was replaced and checked to assure proper operation. The licensee stated that a 10 day written report would be submitted to the Directorate of Licensing.

8303310468 1p.

JUN 22 1972

3944

J. G. Keppler, Chief, Reactor Testing & Operations Br.  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, HQ

RO INQUIRY REPORT NO. 50-219/72-15  
JEKSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
OYSTER CREEK - BWR  
EQUIPMENT FAILURE - ISOLATION VALVE LEAKING EXCESSIVELY

The subject inquiry report is forwarded for your action. The frequency of failure of these valves during surveillance testing continues to cause concern about the ability of the valves to perform the required function. We have observed failures to close and failures to close in the required time as well as failures to meet specifications on leak tightness. In each specific instance, the licensee's action appears to have been responsive to the problem encountered; however, the overall performance of these valves still leaves a lot to be desired. It is recommended that Licensing be informed of our concern and requested to review the specific testing requirements for adequacy.

We plan to review this latest problem during the next routine inspection. The licensee will submit a 10 day report to Licensing.

R. T. Carlson  
Chief, Reactor Operations Br.

Enclosure:  
Subject Inquiry Report (18 cys)

cc: P. A. Morris, RO  
H. D. Thornburg, RO  
R. H. Engelken, RO  
RO Files

B/325

8303310485 1A.

OFFICE ▶	RO <i>JM</i>	<i>R</i>				
SURNAME ▶	Cantrell:smg	Carlson				
DATE ▶	6/22/72					

Subject: Jersey Central Power & Light Company

License No.: DPR-16

Facility: Oyster Creek - BWR

Title: Equipment Failure - Isolation Valve Leaking Excessively

Prepared by: F. S. Cantrell, Reactor Inspector

                          
Date

A. Date and Manner AEC was Informed:

June 16, 1972, by telephone call from Mr. T. J. McCluskey, Station Superintendent.

B. Description of Particular Event or Circumstance:

While performing a surveillance check on June 16, 1972, main steam isolation valve (MSIV) NSO3B was found leaking 100 cfm. The maximum permitted leakage is 9.9 cfm. This valve held during the system hydro test conducted during the previous week.

C. Action by Licensee:

Jersey Central is investigating the cause of the leakage and plans to make the necessary repairs to correct the leakage prior to reactor startup. The licensee plans to submit a 10 day written report.



JUN 22 1972

3944

J. G. Keppler, Chief, Reactor Testing & Operations Br.  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, HQ

RO INQUIRY REPORT NO. 50-219/72-14  
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
OYSTER CREEK - BWR  
EQUIPMENT FAILURE - EXPANSION JOINT IN EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER LINE

The subject inquiry report is forwarded for your information.

We consider the licensee's action responsive; however, this matter will be reviewed during the next inspection. The licensee will submit a 10 day report to the Directorate of Licensing.

R. T. Carlson  
Chief, Reactor Operations Br.

Enclosure:  
Subject Inquiry Report

- cc: R. Minogue, RS (3)
- R. S. Boyd, L (2)
- R. C. DeYoung, L (2)
- D. J. Skovholt, L (3)
- H. R. Denton, L (2)
- P. A. Morris, RO
- H. D. Thornburg, RO
- R. H. Engelken, RO
- RO Files
- DR Central Files

B/376

8303310495 1p.

OFFICE ▶	RO				
SURNAME ▶	Cartrell:smg Carlson				
DATE ▶	6/22/72				

RO Inquiry Report No. 50-219/72-14

Subject: Jersey Central Power & Light Company

License No.: DPR-16

Facility: Oyster Creek - BWR

Title: Equipment Failure - Expansion Joint in Emergency Service Water Line

Prepared by: F. S. Cantrell, Reactor Inspector

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

A. Date and Manner AEC was Informed:

June 16, 1972, by telephone call from Mr. T. J. McCluskey, Station Superintendent.

B. Description of Particular Event or Circumstance:

While conducting a routine surveillance test to verify the operability of the containment cooling system in conjunction with a loss of outside power, the expansion joint in the discharge of the A emergency service water pump ruptured. The containment emergency cooling is provided by two separate loops. Each loop has redundant heat exchangers with one emergency service water pump supplying each heat exchanger. Any one of the heat exchangers with its emergency service water pump is capable of removing the fission process decay heat from containment.

C. Action by Licensee:

The ruptured expansion joint was replaced and tested satisfactorily. A visual inspection of the other three expansion joints did not show any problems.

JUN 5 1972

J. G. Keppler, Chief, Reactor Testing & Operations Br.  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, HQ

RO INQUIRY REPORT NO. 50-219/72-13  
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
OYSTER CREEK - BWR  
EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCY - RELIEF VALVE DISCHARGE PIPING

The subject inquiry report is forwarded for your information.

This is the first occurrence at a BWR facility that we are aware of, and it provides additional statistics to substantiate our concern regarding the generic aspects of the problem. We, as well as JCP&L, were surprised at MPR's findings in that the relief valves have operated frequently without problems. According to JCP&L, conservative calculations were made; however, they intend to affect the necessary modifications prior to startup. We consider this action to be responsive to the problem; however, the adequacy of the fix has not been ascertained. A report by the licensee will be submitted to the Directorate of Licensing.

We will stay abreast of this matter and keep you informed as appropriate. Our inspector will also review this matter during the next routine inspection.

R. T. Carlson  
Chief, Reactor Operations Br.

Enclosure:  
Subject Inquiry Report

- cc: R. Minogue, RS (3)
- R. S. Boyd, L (2)
- R. C. DeYoung, L (2)
- D. J. Skovholt, L (3)
- H. R. Denton, L (2)
- Office of Operations Evaluation, RO
- Asst. Director for Procedures, RO
- R. H. Engelken, RO
- Regional Directors, RO
- RO Files
- DR Central Files

B/277

OFFICE ▶	RO				
SURNAME ▶	Spessard:smg Carlson				
DATE ▶	6/5/72				

8303310507 1p.

RO Inquiry Report No. 50-219/72-13

Subject: Jersey Central Power & Light Company

License No.: DPR-16

Facility: Oyster Creek - BWR

Title: Equipment Deficiency - Relief Valve Discharge Piping

Prepared by: F. S. Cantrell, Reactor Inspector

          
Date

A. Date and Manner AEC was Informed:

June 2, 1972, by telephone call from Mr. T. J. McCluskey, Station Superintendent.

B. Description of Particular Event or Circumstance:

Mr. McCluskey stated that a design evaluation has been made on the reaction load in the discharge piping from the reactor safety valve and the pressure relief valves. This study, which was conducted by JCP&L's consultant, HPR Associates, indicated the supports might be over stressed when the relief valves are actuated. Additional supports were recommended for the relief valve piping in the vicinity of the relief valves.

C. Action by Licensee:

The licensee has been in contact with Licensing concerning their findings and stated suitable modifications would be made prior to reactor startup.