



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION I
970 BROAD STREET
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY 07102

OCT 12 1972

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Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I

RO REPORT NO. 50-219/72-04
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
OYSTER CREEK

This inspection was extended to 7 days at the site in an attempt to close out all of the inquiry reports, Memo route slips from HQ, and unresolved items from previous inspections. The inspection plan started with 55 items but was expanded to include additional items noted or that occurred during the inspection. A 5 day routine inspection had been conducted February - March 1972. The number of items on the inspection plan as well as the number of inquiry reports for the calendar year to date (28) is an indication of the activity associated with BWR's.

Another indication of the activity associated with reactors is the number of different groups that were at the plant during the inspection. A group from Region I met with HASL, HQ and JCPL one day. There was a group from Oak Ridge reviewing the proposed Environmental Report for two days. EPA and representatives of the State of New Jersey were taking samples in the discharge canal and in the bay one day. I was informed by Mr. McCluskey that JCPL planned to create a new position at Oyster Creek of assistant superintendent. The purpose is to provide promotional opportunities for present personnel and to provide better supervision of plant operation. He indicated that it had become about impossible for one man to follow the operation in the detail needed and to meet the other demand on the station superintendent. He indicated Don Ross would be promoted to assistant superintendent but would continue to carry the duties of technical supervisor until a replacement is selected. (Anticipated date is October 1, 1972 for the replacement). I concur in the planned action for the same reasons.

The requested action or information was obtained for the following HQ memos:

1. MRS 7/8/71 OC Rep't Primary Containment Leak Rate Test

9604170492 960213
PDR FOIA
DEKOK95-258 PDR

2. MRS 3/28/72 W DB-50 Rx Seran Breakers Problem
OC does not use DB-50 breakers for load shedding.
3. MRS 1/12/72 Millstone Report - Loss of Automatic Blowdown Function of A Relief Valve
OC does not have Target Rock relief valves. (Electromatic RV's)
4. MRS 1/12/72 Inspect Torus Baffles
Baffles were inspected and 18 were removed (JCPL report dated June 2, 1972)
5. MRS 1/20/72 Capacity Test of Station Batteries
Oyster Creek has TS requirement to load test for approximately 8 hours ever 6 MOS
6. MRS 3/14/72 Big Rock Point - System Breaker
Oyster Creek has check valves in the Spent Fuel Pool fill line, however, these check valves are not tested. PORC is to evaluate means to assure that siphoning can not occur.
7. MRS 3/31/72 Reactivity Anomalies
 1. Discussed problem with Technical Supervisor
 2. QC predicts critical based on experience not by calculating individual rod worth.
 3. GE did not supply a revised curve for SD margin vs MWD/MTU for Core 1A or 1B. New curves included in submittal No. 3 for Core II.
 4. Actual shutdown margin was not determined only that the shutdown margin met TS requirement at least 1.65% ΔK (R_{eff} .25%) with most reactive rod withdrawal (Core II). Core 1A & 1B required 0.25% ΔK shutdown margin.
8. MRS 4/18/72 Pressure Swt problem at Monticello
 1. Licensee was not informed of problem by GE, however, Licensee had GE FEM 71-26 which prescribed the proper Swt setting.
 2. Licensee has some of the same switches as Monticello and is replacing their switches with BZR-169. Replacement is scheduled to be completed by 10/14/72 (during routine surveillance tests).

9. MRS 4/6/72 GE HFA Relays

1. OC received FEM 71-26
2. The pull in voltage has been checked and reset as necessary.
3. The results will be forwarded to TSB with this memo.

10. MRS 6/19/72 Paddle Type Flow Swt

1. a - Flow to Cleanup Filters (2 Swt)
b - Seal leakage from Recirculation Pump (5 Swt)
c - Liquid Poison System (1 Swt)
2. Included above
3. PORC evaluating the problem

It is our understanding that a proposal has been made to require all licensee's to demonstrate the operability of the liquid poison system by functionally testing with D.I. water once per cycle. (OC's TS 4.2 currently require function test once/cycle). At OC this is the only direct path in which a shattered flow switch could get to the reactor. In other systems the poison would be stopped by filters or demineralizers.

11. MRS 6/15/72 Sensitivity of the Leak Detection System

The OC leak detection system is based on sump levels and flow from the sump. Other methods that JCPL stated they would evaluate were unsuccessful (semi-annual report January-June 1972)

- a. Over a 24 hour period the accuracy of the system has been calculated by JCPL to be ± 0.1 gpm at a rate of 1 gpm and ± 0.02 gpm at a rate of 5 gpm.

A 5 gpm leak would be detected within 20 minutes if the timer on the pump works as designed. (Timer is set to alarm if the leakage rate reaches 4 gpm.)

The bases for TS 3.3 states that the "leakage of the magnitude specified can be detected reasonably in a matter of a few hours utilizing the available leak detector schemes . . ."; "Additional qualitative information is available . . . via the monitored drywell atmospheric condition . . . fluctuation in atmospheric condition are expected". The Technical Supervisor indicated that the latter is almost useless.

- b. The action point administratively for unidentified leakage is 4 gpm to shutdown, however, any increase above the 1-1.2 ppm normal leakage would require an evaluation. The drywell cannot be inspected during power operation.
- c. Identified leakage, ie valve and pump packing is piped to one sump and unidentified leakage goes to another sump. OC has determined a fan cooler leak by water analysis. (Fan cooler leakage is considered unidentified.)
- d. The minimum sensitivity of the leak detection system (based on the sumps) is given in a. (above).

12. MRS 11/11/71 Failed Retaining Pins-Turbine

OC had same problem. Details in report Paragraph 24.

← The information or action requested by your notes on memos was obtained as follows:

1/Note (undated) Standard for Overhead and Gantry Cranes~advised licensee

2/Note (5/26/72) Shipping Cask Liner Failure-advised licensee

3/IM 3/72-02 Bearing Failure Limitorque Valve
Licensee does not have this model.

4/Memo Brunner to Keppler 2/28/72 Use of Membranes in Stored Water Tanks. No floating membranes at OC.

← The licensee has been requested to supply us with up-to-date copies of P&ID in use at the plant. We provided him a list of the drawings we have and the list of revisions. Some revisions have been supplied in the form of blue print size drawings.

← Jersey Central Power & Light report (August 10, 1972) on the 11 overexposures has been reviewed and is not acceptable for the following reason:


1. Radiation rates were not provided
2. Specific control measures were not given i.e. how close to 3 rem the men were allowed to approach.
3. Corrective action to prevent recurrence and the date corrective action will be implemented.

According to the letter which was written approximately 10 days after Jersey became aware of the overexposures, GORB was still planning to investigate the overexposure. It is my understanding that the reason a 30 day report is required (vs a 10 day report) is to allow time for an investigation and to provide the above information. If HQ does not inform JCP&L that the report is unacceptable, I feel we should cite JCPL for inadequate controls or surveys and require them to provide the above information.

Currently OC does not have a specific requirement to test the relief valves on the Liquid Poison System. Mr. McCluskey stated that a definite schedule would be established and implemented, however, I feel this matter should be referred to Licensing for inclusion in the TS's.

I feel JCPL had shown definite improvement in reporting of unusual events, however, I still plan to encourage prompt reports.

In the area of audits by GORB, I feel that the audits performed are not in the depth required to detect problems. I need to do more in this field myself to come up with specifics. The audit reports that I have seen generally indicated compliance with procedures. It is difficult for me to believe that procedures are adequate and followed and to have as many unusual events and occurrences as OC. If I don't get satisfied in this area, I plan to request that I be informed when audits are being performed and accompany the auditor. If it still appears to be a problem, I think we should attend PORC and GORB meetings on an unannounced basis - at least once per year. With our present inspection program, we cannot reasonably assure the safe operation of one of these plants unless these groups function as intended.



Floyd S. Cantrell
Reactor Inspector