

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
DOCKET NO. 50-219

J. G. Keppler, RO:HQ

Attached is a copy of the proposed blue
sheet for the Oyster Creek facility,
a copy of which was forwarded to your
office by facsimile on 1/3/72.

R. T. Carlson, RO:I

1/3/72

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DRAFT
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
NOTIFICATION OF AN INCIDENT OR OCCURRENCE

Facility: JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY (OYSTER CREEK)

Problem:

RO Region I (Newark) was informed by the licensee by telephone on December 29, 1972 that a primary system relief valve had failed to reseal when actuated following a turbine trip and reactor scram from full power earlier that day. Failure of the relief valve to reseal resulted in a blowdown of an estimated 50,000 gallons of primary coolant to the containment torus. The following preliminary information was provided by the licensee:

1. At 6:08 a.m. on December 29, 1972 with the reactor operating at full power (650 MWe gross), a turbine trip and reactor scram occurred when an operator inadvertently opened a switch panel serving the turbine control system.
2. During the ensuing transient, reactor pressure increased to 1070 psig at which point the relief valves functioned as intended. However, one relief valve failed to reseal, resulting in the discharge of an estimated 50,000 gallons of primary coolant to the torus.
3. Reactor pressure decreased from 1000 psig at the start of the occurrence to 660 psig within two minutes and 200 psig within sixty minutes. Reactor vessel cooldown during the first hour was 156° F.

The Technical Specification bases assume 10 emergency cooldowns of 300° F./hr. (normal cooldown limit - 100° F./hr.).

4. At the time of the scram, an attempt was made per procedure to switch from run mode to startup mode, thus bypassing the containment isolation function in order to retain the main condenser hotwell as a heat sink. In this instance, the bypass key broke in the mode switch, resulting in isolation of the drywell when the reactor pressure reduced to the isolation trip point of 850 psig. One of the four main steam isolation valves (No. NS04B) failed to close at the time of initiation.
5. Both isolation condensers were initiated manually. The A system functioned satisfactorily; however, the condensate return valve on the B unit did not open as a result of failure of the valve motor.
6. There were no significant radioactivity releases to the environs or personnel exposures as a result of this occurrence.

The plant is currently in the cold shutdown condition. The licensee is investigating the cause of the failures with the primary coolant relief valve, the main steam isolation valve and the B isolation condenser condensate return valve. Disposition of the 50,000 gallons of reactor coolant which has mixed with the chromated (rust inhibitor) torus water is of immediate concern to the licensee in that the amount exceeds available storage capacity and the presence of the rust inhibitor prevents discharge


to the environs. The plant will be returned to operation following completion of the investigations and repairs as necessary.

Action:

1. An RO inspector is at the site to obtain detailed information on the occurrence. Further action by RO will be based on the results of this inspection.
2. Region I has informed the State of New Jersey and the Northeast Office of the Division of Public Information by telephone.
3. Commissioner Ramey's Technical Assistant, Commissioner Doub's Technical Assistant and the Staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy are being informed by copy of this notification.

Prepared by: Robert T. Carlson

Robert T. Carlson 1/2/73



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION 1
970 BROAD STREET
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY 07102

RO Inquiry Report No. 50-219/72-320

Licensee: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road
Morristown, New Jersey 07960

License No.: DPR-16

Facility: Oyster Creek - BWR
Forked River, New Jersey

Descriptive Title: Equipment Failure - Floor Drain Sample Tank
Recirculation Line

Prepared by:

F. S. Cantrell for
F. S. Cantrell, Reactor Inspector

12/15/72
Date

A. Date and Manner AEC was Informed:

On December 7, 1972, during an inspection at the site.

B. Description of Particular Event or Circumstance:

When the operator started the recirculation pump for the "A" floor drain sample tank, at about 8:00 a.m., December 6, 1972, he noted a slight decrease in tank level. He immediately went to the sample tank area (which is outside the radwaste building) and observed water spraying against the building and running down into the curbed area around the tanks, and spraying on the sidewalk outside the curbing. He immediately went back inside and stopped the pump. A tank inventory showed that 50 gallons of water was lost from the tank. An inspection in the area showed that the drain line inside the curbing was valved to go to the discharge canal rather than to return to the radwaste building. As a result, only approximately 1 gallon of water was recovered.

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C. Action by Licensee:

1. A sample of water was obtained from the tank and was analyzed, with the following results:

<u>Isotopes</u>	<u>Activity (uCi/cc)</u>	<u>Ratio (Activity/MPC)</u>
Gross Activity	2.05×10^{-2}	-
Cobolt-60	5.89×10^{-3}	117.8
Cesium-144	4.08×10^{-3}	453.3
Cesium-137	5.99×10^{-3}	299.5
Manganese-54	3.55×10^{-3}	35.5

2. The pipe that failed was on the discharge side of the pump and was located just outside of the building between the building and the tank. This pipe is 3" carbon steel pipe and was repaired by welding a patch over the failed area. According to the maintenance foreman, he has ordered stainless steel pipe to replace this line and the comparable line to the "B" floor drain sample tank.
3. The water that landed on the sidewalk outside of the curb was soaked up with a blotter, however, before the area was surveyed for contamination, it started raining. The sidewalk was not smeared for contamination until December 7, 1972. At that time, the sidewalk was clear of contamination, however, the area inside the curb was contaminated up to 5000 cpm. The sand next to the sidewalk was also contaminated. The upper layer of sand was removed with the contamination. The licensee issued instructions for the drain from the curbed area to be either valved closed, or to the radwaste building sumps.
4. The licensee plans to survey other equipment to determine the potential for this type of corrosion-erosion failure as part of his general study of the operation of the radwaste facility.
5. The licensee will submit a written report to the Directorate of Licensing within 10 days as required by the Technical Specifications.

MEMO ROUTE		See me about this.	Concurrence.	For action.
Form AEC-93 (Rev. May 14, 1972) AEC-93 0240		Note and return	The signature.	For information
TO (Name and unit)		INITIALS	REMARKS	
J. G. Keppler, RO (2)		DATE	RO INQUIRY REPORT NO. 50-219/72-32Q	
			JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.	
			OYSTER CREEK	
TO (Name and unit)		INITIALS	REMARKS	
cc: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX RO:HQ (5) DR Central Files Reg. Standards (3) Dir. of Licensing (13)		DATE	The subject inquiry report is forwarded for your information. Distribution will be made by this office to the PDR, LPDR, NSIC, DTIE and State representatives after review by the licensee for proprietary information.	
TO (Name and unit)		INITIALS	REMARKS	
		DATE		
FROM (Name and unit)		REMARKS		
D. L. Capton, RO:I				
PHONE NO.	DATE			
	12/18/72			

USE OTHER SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL REMARKS

GPO : 1971 O - 445-1

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