

Georgia Power Company
Route 2 Box 139A
Waynesboro, Georgia 30830
Telephone 404 554-9961 Ext. 3360
404 724-8114 Ext. 3360

PLEASE NOTE
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NUMBER



Georgia Power
The Southern Electric System

D. O. Foster
Vice President and Project
General Manager
Vogtle Project

December 19, 1984

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II - Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

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Reference: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant-Units 1 and 2; 50-424, 50-425;
Limatorque Operator Motors Qualification; GN-443, dated 11/12/84.

Attention: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

In our previous correspondence on this subject, Georgia Power Company indicated that the results of the evaluation of this concern would be reported to the USNRC by December 21, 1984.

Georgia Power Company has completed its evaluation of this matter and has determined that the condition reported to the USNRC by Westinghouse Power Corporation in their letter NS-EPR-2964, dated September 26, 1984, is applicable to equipment supplied for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant and is therefore reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e). A copy of the Westinghouse letter and a summary of our evaluation are attached for your reference. Properly qualified replacement equipment has already been ordered by Westinghouse for Vogtle and will be installed prior to initial fuel loading.

This response contains no proprietary information and may be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Yours truly,

D. O. Foster
D. O. Foster

REF/DOF/tm

Attachment

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Westinghouse
Electric Corporation

Water Reactor
Divisions

Nuclear Technology Division

Box 355
Pittsburgh Pennsylvania 15230

September 26, 1984

NS-EPR-2964

Mr. R. C. DeYoung, Director
Division of Inspection and Enforcement
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Phillips Building
7920 Norfolk Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20014

Dear Mr. DeYoung:

This is to confirm the telephone conversation of September 26, 1984, between Messrs. C. G. Draughon and J. A. Achenbach of Westinghouse and Mr. Robi Singh of the NRC. In that conversation Westinghouse notified the NRC of a reportable item associated with motors utilized in safety-related Limitorque operator applications. This item was reported under 10CFR50.55e for five construction plants (A. W. Vogtle Units 1 and 2, Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2 and Millstone Unit 3) as discussed below. Westinghouse has advised these utility customers.

Background and Description

Westinghouse was informed by personnel at the Millstone 3 site that the motors on four Limitorque operators were not qualified to IEEE 323-1974 and IEEE 344-1975. A review of the purchase order determined that the valves were specified to those standards, but no certification was supplied in the valve data package. Westinghouse subsequently reviewed all other orders with the same requirements and determined that a similar problem exists on the A. W. Vogtle Units 1 and 2 and Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2 sites.

All affected valves are in the charging pump auxiliary miniflow line. Had this problem gone undetected, the valve may not have functioned to provide charging pump miniflow in the event of a steamline break or feedline break, which could ultimately have led to pump damage from running on the pump deadhead.

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Immediate Corrective Action

Since no operating plants are involved, no immediate corrective action is required.


Permanent Corrective Action

All affected motors have replacement, qualified units on order. All involved sites will have qualified motors installed prior to initial fuel loading.

If you require additional information on this subject, please contact J. A. Achenbach (412-374-4041) or C. G. Draughon (412-374-5761) of my staff.

Very truly yours,

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION



E. P. Rahe, Jr., Manager
Nuclear Safety Department

CGD/anj

Evaluation for a Reportable Condition
Unqualified Limatorque Operator Motors

Initial Report:

On October 19, 1984, Mr. C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager, reported a potential deficiency to Mr. John Rogge of the USNRC concerning unqualified Limatorque motor operators. In subsequent correspondence, GPC indicated that the NRC would be informed if this condition was reportable per 10 CFR 50.55(e) by December 21, 1984.

Background Information:

On September 26, 1984, Westinghouse notified the NRC of a reportable item associated with motors utilized in safety-related Limatorque operator applications. Westinghouse was informed by personnel at another power plant that the motors on four Limatorque operators were not qualified to appropriate IEEE standards (IEEE 323-1974 and 344-1975). The affected valves are in the charging pump auxiliary miniflow line (Nos. 8508A, B and 8509A, B). Westinghouse reviewed the purchase order and determined that the valves were specified to the appropriate IEEE standards, but no certification was supplied in the valve data package.

Engineering Evaluation:

The centrifugal charging pumps are major components in that portion of the chemical and volume control system which also function as a high head injection flowpath in the emergency core cooling system. The system was modified to provide an auxiliary miniflow path which is made available to protect each charging pump. Whenever a safety injection actuation signal is present, the normal miniflow path through the seal water heat exchanger is isolated. The auxiliary path is placed in service by automatically opening a motor-operated isolation valve in each individual charging pump branch line. The normally closed isolation valve receives power from the same electrical power train as the charging pump it is protecting.

If the reactor coolant pressure subsequently decreases, due to the processes imposed on the reactor coolant system, the relief valve will reclose as the charging pump flow is again directed into the Reactor Coolant System. The auxiliary miniflow line will remain in service to relieve the pump flow should the reactor coolant pressure again increase.

After the operator has diagnosed the initiating event and has assured that the requirements for termination of safety injection have been met, the charging pump subsystem can be realigned for normal operation. One step in this realignment procedure will be to reclose the one isolation valve in each auxiliary miniflow path to take the paths out of service.

In the case of an accident in which the safety injection flow cannot be terminated, the auxiliary miniflow path will remain in service until the refueling water storage tank reaches a low water level condition and the transfer to circulation is to be accomplished. One step in the transfer to recirculation will require the operator

to close both major operated isolation valves in each auxiliary miniflow path to positively isolate the relief valve from the charging pumps and prevent a return of the recirculation fluid to the refueling water storage tank.

It should be noted that since the motors for the motor-operated isolation valves did not have the proper certification, it cannot be assumed that these valves will be able to open or close as illustrated in the previous discussion. Thus, this condition could cause damage to the high-head centrifugal pumps.

Review for QA Program Breakdown

A review was conducted to determine if a quality assurance program breakdown existed within Westinghouse on Limitorque. It was concluded that this condition was caused by transitions in Limitorque's internal procedures and subsequent investigations have shown this to be a one-time occurrence. Thus a breakdown in a quality assurance program did not occur.

Conclusion:

This condition represents a reportable condition per the criteria of 10 CFR 50.55(e) since it could have affected the future safe operation of the plant had it remained uncorrected.

Corrective Action:

Westinghouse has ordered qualified replacement motors for the valves.