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To: James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219
Forsyth River, New Jersey 08731

Subject: Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/ 17

The following is a preliminary report being submitted
in compliance with the Technical Specifications
paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:

J. T. Carroll, Jr. 3/8/74
J. T. Carroll, Jr. Date

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

B/603

2125

Initial Telephone
Report Date: 3/8/74

Date of
Occurrence: 3/7/74

Initial Written
Report Date: 3/8/74

Time of
Occurrence: 1700

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/74/17

IDENTIFICATION
OF OCCURRENCE:

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.7.B, when power operation of the reactor continued with the SB transformer unavailable for service for a time period greater than the Technical Specification limit of 7 days out of any 30 day period.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15B.

CONDITIONS PRIOR
TO OCCURRENCE:

<u> </u> Steady State Power	<u> X </u> Routine Shutdown
<u> </u> Hot Standby	<u> </u> Operation
<u> </u> Cold Shutdown	<u> </u> Load Changes During
<u> </u> Refueling Shutdown	<u> </u> Routine Power Operation
<u> </u> Routine Startup	<u> </u> Other (Specify)
<u> </u> Operation	<u> </u>

Power: Elec., ≈ 100 MWe
Reactor, ≈ 300 MWt
Flow: Recirc., 7.5×10^4 gpm
Feed., 1.2×10^6 lb/hr
Stack Gas: $\approx 10,000$ μ Ci/sec

DESCRIPTION
OF OCCURRENCE:

On Thursday, March 7, 1974, at 1700, as part of the routine plant shutdown procedure, it was required to transfer plant power from the 1B auxiliary transformer to the SB startup transformer. The control room operator on duty operated the closing switch for the S1B breaker with no results. The reactor shutdown was terminated, holding the generator electric power at approximately 100 MWe in order to maintain a power supply path through the 1B auxiliary transformer. Inspection

of the S1B breaker revealed that the closing spring was not in the wound position; hence, breaker closure was not possible in either the manual or automatic mode. The failure of the spring to wind has been traced to a failed spring cam switch which closes when the spring unwinds. The cam switch closure normally causes a relay, 52Y, to energize which in turn deenergizes the S1B breaker closing coil 52X, contacts from 52X in turn cause the spring winding motor to start and rewind the spring. Since the cam switch contacts failed to cause 52Y to energize, a continuous current was applied to 52X causing it to burn which resulted in freezing the coil auxiliary contacts in their energized position. It is thought at this time that the failure of the spring to rewind occurred during the January 12, 1974 reactor shutdown operation, since this was the last successful operation of the breaker. After replacing the 52X coil and the failed contact in the cam switch, successful transfer of load from 1B auxiliary transformer to the SB startup transformer was achieved.

APPARENT CAUSE
OF OCCURRENCE:

- | | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Design | <input type="checkbox"/> | Procedure |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Manufacture | <input type="checkbox"/> | Unusual Service Condition |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Installation/
Construction | <input type="checkbox"/> | Inc. Environmental |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Operator | <input type="checkbox"/> | Component Failure |
| | | <input type="checkbox"/> | Other (Specify) |

The failure of the cam switch contacts is presently under investigation.

ANALYSIS OF
OCCURRENCE:

The S1B breaker is intended to close automatically when the 1B auxiliary transformer breaker trips. Had the breaker been required to perform this function, it would have resulted in a loss of power to the 1B and 1D 4160 volt switchgear. The 1-2 Emergency Diesel Generator would have initiated in the fast start mode and assumed load on the 1D emergency bus.

CORRECTIVE
ACTION:

The corrective action will be determined after PORC evaluation of the incident.

FAILURE DATA:

Manufacturer data pertinent to the failed switch:

General Electric Company Switch
Part #456-A8668-5
4160V Switchgear

Prepared by:

Arthur H. Rine

Date:

3/8/74