



UNITED STATES
 ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
 DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
 REGION I
 631 PARK AVENUE
 KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

August 14, 1974

Jersey Central Power and Light Company
 Attention: Mr. Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.
 Vice President
 Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road
 Morristown, New Jersey 07960

License No. DPR-16
 Insp. No. 74-14

Gentlemen:

This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. Cooper of this office on July 23-24, 1974 at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1 of activities authorized by AEC License No. DPR-16 and to the discussions of our findings held by Mr. Cooper with Mr. Donald A. Ross and other members of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection, and to a subsequent telephone discussions between Mr. Carroll and Mr. Cooper on July 30 and August 1, 1974.

The area examined during this inspection was limited to Physical Protection Program. Within this area, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector.

Within the scope of this inspection, no violations were observed, however, program weaknesses were found in certain areas of your program. The program weaknesses are listed in the enclosure to this letter. With respect to these program weaknesses, please submit to this office within 30 days of your receipt of this notice, a written statement of explanation in reply, including, a description of any steps that have been or will be taken to correct them, a description of any steps that have been or will be taken to prevent recurrence, and the date all corrective actions or preventive measures were or will be completed.

In accordance with Section 2.790(d) of the AEC's "Rules of Practice", Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, documentation of your control and accounting procedures for safeguarding special nuclear materials and your facility security procedures are exempt from

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DATE ▶	8/12/74		8/14/74		

disclosure; therefore, the inspection report will not be placed in the Public Document Room and will receive limited distribution.

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

Walter G. Martin, Chief
Materials and Plant Protection
Branch

Enclosure:
Description of program weakness

bcc: RO Chief, Field Support and Enforcement Branch, HQ (w cy of Encls & Rpt)
RO Chief, Materials and Plant Protection, HQ (w cy of Encl & Rpt)
RO:I Materials and Plant Protection Branch (2) (w cy of Encls & Rpt)
RO:HQ Files (w cy of Encls & Rpt)
RO:HQ (4) (w cys of Encls & Rpt)
Directorate of Licensing, HQ (4) (w cys of Encls & Rpt)
DR Central Files (w cy of Encls & Rpt)
PDR (w/o cy of Encls & Rpt)
RO:I Regulatory Reading Room (w/o cy of Encls and Rpt)
State of New Jersey (w/o cy of Encls & Rpt)

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ENCLOSURE
DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM WEAKNESSES

Jersey Central Power and Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-219

The following items appear to be program weaknesses in your existing Physical Protection Program:

1. ANSI N18.17-1973, paragraph 3.3, states that "the protected area shall be enclosed by a physical barrier, which shall be constructed so its integrity will not be compromised by natural bodies, structures or access points." Contrary to this, the following conditions were found which affect the integrity of the perimeter barrier:
 - a. A 13-inch gap was noted under the motor-driven main gate.
 - b. A 10-inch gap was noted along Zone 1 of the perimeter fence.
 - c. Numerous hinge pins on exterior doors and perimeter fence gates have not been secured. In addition, some hinges have been installed flat against door jams, so that the screws which secure them are exposed.
 - d. Chain securing the railroad gate in the perimeter fence was of lightweight twisted wire construction instead of hardened steel.
 - e. Covers for 2 junction boxes of the perimeter fence alarm system were not in place, thereby exposing the wiring to the elements.
2. ANSI N18.17-1973, paragraph 3.4, states that "vital areas should be isolated from non-vital equipment and facilities to the maximum extent practicable so that access can be limited to a minimum number of authorized persons." Contrary to this the following conditions were found which affect the integrity of the vital areas:
 - a. Hinge pins on doors leading into vital areas have not been secured.
 - b. Two exterior doors were not closing and latching due to bad fit and/or weak door closers.
 - c. Latches on the left side of the double doors leading into the cable spreading room were defective.

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3. ANSI N18.17-1973, paragraph 3.4.3, states that "operational surveillance shall be supplemented by monitoring of all access points, including emergency exits, into unoccupied vital areas by intrusion detection devices and alarms." Contrary to this, the following conditions were found:
 - a. Alarms have not been installed on doors leading into any of the vital areas.
 - b. The vital areas which you have designated as "Group B" must be alarmed as well as those in "Group A".

4. Regulatory Guide 1.17, paragraph C.1.a, states that "the plant security forces should have onsite armed and uniformed individuals whose primary duties are the protection of facilities from acts that could endanger the health and safety of the public." Contrary to this the following condition was found:
 - a. The guard force has not yet been armed (your letter dated June 21, 1974 stated that this would be completed by the end of September 1974).

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