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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II  
101 Marietta Street - Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Subject: McGuire Nuclear Station  
Docket Number 50-369/370  
Determination of Event Non-Reportability

Gentlemen:

As a result of the Three Mile Island accident of 1979, Emergency Procedure Guidelines based on a symptomatic response philosophy were implemented in November 1984 at McGuire Nuclear Station. A procedure based on these guidelines, "Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation," was implemented on November 30, 1984. On December 7, 1984, it was discovered that a Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level setpoint, which determines at what level the automatic swapover of nuclear decay heat removal (ND) pumps occur, was not changed in the revised procedure. A potential consequence of this situation is the draining of the RWST. Subsequent investigation of this event has determined that it is not reportable under 10CFR 50.73. Two points support this conclusion. First, the intent of the symptomatic response philosophy is to handle failures of actions to occur, regardless of the initiating event. The procedure in question is entered upon receipt of a low-level alarm in the RWST. At this point the automatic swapover is supposed to occur. However, should the swapover fail to occur for any reason the operator is instructed in the procedure to manually perform the swapover. Thus, the required function is performed.

The second point is that operator action for this particular evolution is consistent with the FSAR analysis (p 6.3-27). Note, also that in the procedure safety injection (NI), chemical and volume control (NV), and containment spray (NS) systems are manually swapped by the operator. Thus, in an event that caused ECCS to initiate, operator actions consistent with FSAR assumptions would be used to mitigate the event.

For large loss of RCS inventory events, ND and NS are the only systems involved here that are needed. Automatic swapover of ND would occur prior to loss of RWST level thereby assuring long term decay heat removal (NS is manually swapped). For small loss of RCS inventory events, the other systems (NV, NI) are needed to mitigate the event. NS is not needed. ND will be swapped either automatically or by operator action well into the recovery from the event.

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
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It is concluded that this event alone could not have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (long term removal of residual heat) and is thus not reportable. No other criteria for reportability in 50.73 are relevant.

Very truly yours,



Hal B. Tucker

HBT/mjf

cc: Mr. W. T. Orders  
Senior Resident Inspector  
McGuire Nuclear Station