## 00




UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460

## 18 MAR 1974

Mr. A. Giambusso Deputy Director for Reactor Projects Directorate of Licensing U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D.C. 20545

50-219



2884

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Thank you for your letter of February 20, 1974, concerning the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station and its effects on the Oyster Creek Marina.

With regard to your request for information concerning the "...present EPA position on the acceptability of the proposed New Jersey water quality criteria...", I asked Jack Anderson of my staff to see to it that some assistance was provided. He arranged for your staff to be contacted by Mr. Paul Arbesman or Mr. Harry Allen of EPA's Region II office. I understand this has been accomplished and I trust they have satisfied your needs.

Should any further problems or questions arise in this area, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely yours,

El Con Meyer

Sheldon Meyers Director Office of Federal Activities

9604170253 960213 PDR FOIA DEKOK95-258 PDR



2381

To:

James P. O'Reilly Directorate of Regulatory Operations Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From:

Jersey Central Power & Light Company Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219 Forked River, New Jersey 08731

50-619

Subject:

Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/ 23

The following is a preliminary report being submitted in compliance with the Technical Specifications paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:

 $\frac{1}{J. T. Carroll, Jr. Date}$ 

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

Initial Telephon	e		Date of	
Report Date:	3/16/74		Occurrence:	5/15/74
Initial Written			Time of	
Report Date:	3/18/74	*	Occurrence:	1852

## OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-319/74/23

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.4.3, the high flow isolation setpoint for the Isolation Condenser condensate line break sensors were found to actuate at differential pressures in excess of those as stated in Technical Specification table 3.1.1.H.2 (<27 inches  $\Delta P H_2O$ ).

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Steady Stath Power Hot Standby Cold Shutdown Refueling Shutdown Routine Startup Operation	Routine Shutdown Operation Load Changes During Routine Power Operation Other (Specify)
Power:	Reactor, 1902 MWt Elec., 661 MWe
Flow:	Recirc., 15.3 x 10 <sup>4</sup> gpm Feed., 7.10 x 10 <sup>6</sup> lb/hr
Desetor Dressure.	1020 neig

Reactor Pressure: 1020 psig Stack Gas: 40,600 µCi/sec

state the second second second state and second second second second second second second second second second

医乳清静脉炎 化合同分离子 化离子的 医肺肠炎 医结核的 医结核的 人名法德德 化合物 医二氏结核的 化化合物的 医外外的 医胆汁的 化化合物的 人名法德德

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE :

On Friday, March 15, 1974, at 1852, while performing routine surveillance testing on the Isolation Condenser condensate high flow line break sensors, it was observed that two of the four sensors (located two each on the A and B Isolation Condensers) actuated at setpoints above the Technical Specification limit of 27 inches H<sub>2</sub>O. The two sensors, 1B11A2 and 1B11B2, Abnoimal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/23

> were both found to actuate at 29 inches of H<sub>2</sub>O differential pressure. The complete condensate line break sensor surveillance results were as follows:

Isolation Condenser A						
Trip	Reset					
(inches H2O)	(inches H <sub>2</sub> 0)					
26.5	23					
29.5	25					
	Trip (inches H <sub>2</sub> O) 26.5					

And an Contain

## Isolation Condenser B

	Trip	Reset
Sensor	(inches H2O)	(inches H <sub>2</sub> O)
1B11B1	27	25.5
1B11B2	29	26.5

The 1B11A2 and 1B11B2 sensors were recalibrated and were surveilled to function in the proper manner. The surveillance retest results were as follows:

and the second		Isolation Conden	ser A	
tanita in the second		Trip (inches H <sub>2</sub> O)	Reset (inches H20)	and the second
181	1A2	27	23	
		Isolation Conden	ser B	
Sen	sor	Trip (inches H <sub>2</sub> 0)	Reset (inches H <sub>2</sub> O)	
181	182	26.5	24.5	

Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/23

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE : Design Manufacture Installation/ Construction Operator

Contra 11 Rea

Procedure Unusual Service Condition Inc. Environmental Component Failure Other (Specify)

The cause of the occurrence has been attributed to sensor drift.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The safety significance of this event lies in the loss of system redundancy. Had a condition occurred whereby the condensers would have been required to isolate, the redundant sensors, 1B11A1 and 1B11B1, would have performed the isolation function in the proper manner.

CORRECTIVE Corrective action will be taken, as appropriate, pending Plant ACTION: Operations Review Committee review of this occurrence.

FAILURE DATA:	Type: Range:	Barton Differential Pressure Switch 0-60 inches H O
	Pressure Rating:	1500 psig 1B11A2 - 278-965
and the second second		1B11B2 - 278-967
Share Say . Sugar	leader and the letters	and the second of the line of the second second second

Prepared by: (

Date: 3/18/74

Page 3

James P. O'Reilly Directorate of Regulatory Operations Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From:

To:

Jersoy Contral Power & Light Company Oyster Greek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219 Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject:

Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/ 22

The following is a preliminary report being submitted in compliance with the Technical Specifications paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:

BI 591

the second statement of the second of the second statement of the second second second second second second second 1929, in a sing of the second of the second

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

64130335 5p

		1 18	11.4		p.	٠		
1.1.	471		Dat.	1	*		3/	

174

Occurrence:

1550

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION PORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

> Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/22

TIFICATION (. ACCURRENCE:

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 2.3.7 , Low Pressure Main Steam Line Pressure Switch, RE230, was found to trip at a pressure less then the minimum required value of 860 psig.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as dcfined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1,15A

( . DITIONS PRIOR

T. ACCURRENCE:

X Steady State Power Hot Standby Cold Shutdown Refueling Shutdown Routine Startup Operation

l'ower:

PIOW:

Stack Gas:

Routine Shutdown Operation Load Changes During Routine Power Operation Other (Specify)

Reactor, 1902 MWt Flec., 661 MWe Recirc., 15.3 x 10" gpm Feed., 7.10 x 10° 1b/hr Reactor Pressure: 1020 psig 40,600 \Ci/sec

IC: CRIPTION C. ACCURRENCE :

On Friday, March 15, 1974, at 1550, while performing a routine surveillance test on the four Main Steam Line Low Pressure Switches, it was discovered that RE23D tripped at 850 psig. This value is below the minimum required trip point of 860 psig which is derived by adding to the Technical Specification limit of 850 psig a 10 psig head correction factor.

Abbornel Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/22

The "as found" and "as left" switch settings were:

	"As Pound" Settings	"As Loft" Settings
RE23A	865 psig	861 psig
RE23B	864 psig	864 psig
RE23C	865 paig	865 psig
RD23D	850 psig	860 psig

Pressure switch RE23D was immediately recalibrated and rechecked to actuate at 860 psig.

APPARENT CAUSE.

<u> </u>	Design Manufacture Installation/	and sold diversion	Procedure Unusual Service Condition Inc. Environmental
	Construction Operator	104200-104000	Component Fallure Other (Specify)

Switch repeatability is a recognized problem and work is in progress to formulate a final solution.

WALYSIS OF

Ð

As indicated in the bases of the Technical Specifications, "The low pressure isolation of the Main Steam Lines at 850 psig was provided to give protection against fast reactor depressurization and the resultant rapid cooldown of the vessel. Advantage was taken of the scram feature which occurs when the Main Steam Isolation Valves are closed to provide for reactor shutdown so that high power operation at low reactor pressure does not occur, thus providing protection for the fuel cladding integrity safety limit."

The adverse consequences of reactor isolation occurring at reactor pressure approximately 10 psig below the specified minimum value of 860 psig is limited to those effects attendant to a greater than normal reactor cooldown rate. The fuel cladding integrity safety limit only comes into effect for power operation at reactor pressures less than 600 psig or for power operation greater than 354 MWt with less than 10% recirculation flow. Therefore, the consequences of a 10 psig lower than normal reactor isolation and scram setpoint has no threatening effect whatsoever on the fuel cladding integrity.

The effects of a too rapid cooldown due to the lower isolation pressure are inconsequential since there is less than 2°F difference between the saturation temporature for 860 psig and 850 psig.

XORRECTIVE ACTION : Continuing corrective actions being taken at this time are as stated in Abnormal Occurrence Report Nos. 74-9, 74-10, and 74-12, and as restated herein:

 Investigation is being conducted into the basis for the steam line low pressure setting of 850 psig. Development of a Technical Specification change to lower the setpoint will follow if results of transient analyses indicate this possibility. (See Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 73-30.)

2. Recommendations to possibly reduce or eliminate the sensor setpoint change problem have been received. It was reported that General Electric tests on a pulsating line to simulate plant conditions show that pre-cycled Barksdale switches show improvement but that the switches still do not meet 1% repeatability. General Electric, therefore, recommended an Ashcroft switch as it is more accurate. The Ashcroft catalog number is 61 S 6080 BN20-06L-1028.

As a result, one switch of each type (pre-cycled Barksdale and Ashcroft) has been purchased for test and evaluation at Dyster Creek. An Ashcroft switch is currently on hand and undergoing evaluation.

ALLURE DATA:

Manufacturer data pertinent to these switches are as follows:

Moletron Corp. (subsidiary of Barksdale) Los Angeles, California Pressure Actuated Switch Model 372 Catalog #372-65549A-293 Rango 20-1400 psig Proof Psi, 1750 G

Previous Abnormal Occurrence Reports involving these switches are:

 Letter to Mr. A. Giambusso from Mr. D. A. Ross, dated December 24, 1973.

2. Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 74-1.

5. Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 74-9.

4. Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 74-10.

5. Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 74-12,

repared by:	Michael S I	Date:	3/18/74