

December 15, 1970

J. P. O'Reilly, Chief, Reactor Inspection & Enforcement Br.,
Division of Compliance, Headquarters

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY (OYSTER CREEK 1)
DOCKET NO. 50-219

The attached report of an inspection at the subject facility on October 13-16, 1970 is forwarded for action. There were no items of safety significance noted.

Six items of noncompliance were identified. These were processed by means of the 592 procedure. Consideration was given to going the safety letter route, however, it was not felt to be warranted in view of the nature of the items (mostly related to surveillance testing) and observations made by Nolan, Keppler and myself during our recent special inspection with reference to related corrective measures taken or scheduled to be taken in response to our earlier observations. McDermott plans to give the surveillance testing program special consideration during his next inspection. It will be a new ball game if deficiencies are detected at that time.

Although not stated in the report, corrective actions specified in JC's response to the September 9, 1970 safety letter that came under areas reviewed by McDermott during this inspection were confirmed. The remaining action items were confirmed by Nolan, Keppler and/or myself during our special effort. (Results to be documented in separate report).

We consider that there may be generic considerations in the design change made by JC in the initiating logic circuitry for the isolation condenser. JC stated that the cause for the loss of function, which was identified by the closure of the excess flow check valve, was a design error. We recommend that this matter be reviewed at other BWR's as is appropriate.

We're not at all happy with the operating experience and lack of followup on problems relating to the emergency diesel generators. The latter aspect, lack of followup, was emphasized as reflecting negatively management's control on their overall surveillance program. These matters will receive additional attention during the next inspection.

JC was made aware of the carbon-14 issue as per your memorandum dated October 17, 1970. They indicated that they will assess the magnitude of C-14 in their effluents.

The requirements of PI 3000/1, "Survey of Security Measures for Emergency Power Systems", were completed. Answers to the questions posed in paragraph B of the subject PI follow:

OFFICE ▶	COMPLIANCE				
SURNAME ▶	CARLSON:maz				
DATE ▶	12/15/70				

1. We feel that there is reasonable assurance that a person cannot gain access to the plant, and specifically to the emergency power system controls, undetected; however, the system is not considered to be infalible, i.e., any knowledgeable person with a mind to it (intent on sabotage) could probably accomplish his mission. This same statement is probably true for most if not all facilities.
2. Our review disclosed that some key components within the emergency power system could be defeated without positive indication in the control room.
3. With respect to the emergency diesel generators, could be as long as two weeks (testing frequency). With respect to the DC portion of the emergency power system, the licensee indicated that the availability of the system is assured (at least in part) on a shift basis. We have some reservations as to the validity of this position.

Other matters of interest spoken to in the report include the following:

1. Noticeable improvements were observed in the area of facility staffing. (This matter will also be spoken to in the special report on our review of management systems).
2. A problem has been experienced with pluggage of the main circulating water intake screens with sea grass.
3. GPU quality control people reported that they rejected some control rod drives that otherwise would have been reinstalled by GE.
4. Although some minor increase has been noted in total stall flows, control rod drive operating performance has been trouble free.
5. An operator error resulted in an instance of an unscheduled scrambling of a control rod into the core.
6. Main coolant chemistry is being maintained within applicable requirements. Salt water leaks are being experienced in the main condenser.
7. A faulty packing on a recirculation pump discharge valve resulted in an increase in unidentified leakage within containment to near limits, necessitating a reactor shutdown for investigation and correction.
8. JC has finally initiated stack monitor correlation measurements. A preliminary review of early results suggests a good correlation, however, we plan additional review. The stack release rate at the time of the inspection was ~ 7000 uCi/sec.

9. Monitoring of containment air activity and relative humidity are being investigated as possible additional means of primary system leak detection.

R. T. Carlson
Senior Reactor Inspector

Attachment:

CO Report No. 219/70-7
by R. J. McDermott,
dated 12/2/70 (21 cys)

cc: A. Giambusso, CO
L. Kornblith, Jr., CO
R. H. Engelken, CO

November 10, 1970

J. P. O'Reilly, Chief, Reactor Inspection & Enforcement Br.,
Division of Compliance, Headquarters

JERSEY GENERAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY (OWNER GENCO 1)
DOCKET NO. 30-219

The attached report of a special inspection at the subject facility on September 23-25, 1970, is forwarded for distribution. This inspection was made for the purpose of reviewing the circumstances relating to the recent rash of malfunctions experienced in the turbine initial pressure regulator system.

Our inspector was satisfied with the performance of licensee management regarding these events, including the reviews by the Plant Operations Review Committee and the General Office Review Board. Followup on the additional planned modifications to the facility, identified in the summary, will be documented in future inspection reports. Likewise, with respect to the results of the metallurgical studies on the broken linkage.

With regard to the generic aspects, it is recommended that the following be included in action being considered by CO:HQ:

1. Establish that GE does supply modified control linkages, as appropriate, for the BWR's of common design. Five such facilities are identified in the report.
2. Establish that adequate maintenance practices and procedures are in effect at other BWR's for the KPR system to minimize the probability of problems with dirt including specifically in the hydraulic control valve (Moog valve).
3. Further reviews be undertaken by CO:HQ and/or DEL, as is appropriate, to confirm JC-GE statements to the effect that their analysis of possible failure modes of the IPR system has encompassed the most severe transient possible. Also, that GE be requested to supply a topical report on this system in that regard.

The applicability of items 1 and 2 above to BWR's in Region I will be acted upon, as is appropriate, by this office.

R. T. Carlson
Senior Reactor Inspector

B/437

Attachment:
CO Report NO. 219/70-6
by R. McDermott dated 11/2/70 (21 cps)

OFFICE ▶	COMPLIANCE		
cc: A. Cimmino, CO:HQ w/attachment	CARLSON:maz		
SURNAM ▶			
L. Kornblith, CO:HQ w/attachment			
DATE ▶	11/10/70		

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