

**DUKE POWER COMPANY**

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HAL B. TUCKER  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

85 JAN 29  
January 24, 1985

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

RE: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2  
Docket Nos. 50-414  
Significant Deficiency No. 414/84-24

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to 10CFR 50.55(e), please find attached Significant Deficiency Report  
No. 414/84-24 concerning contaminated piping.

Very truly yours,

*Hal B. Tucker*  
Hal B. Tucker

LTP/mjf

Attachment

cc: Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector  
Catawba Nuclear Station

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DUKE POWER COMPANY  
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

REPORT NUMBER: SD 414/84-24

REPORT DATE: January 24, 1985

FACILITY: Catawba Nuclear Station - Unit 2

IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCY:

While performing a modification on valve 2NI-178B, oily water was discovered in the NI system. A system walkdown revealed that the source of the oil was through valve 2NI-361 which had a temporary construction air line attached. This situation was evaluated on Nonconforming Item Report 19085.

INITIAL REPORT:

On December 27, 1984, Virgil Brownlee, NRC Region II, Atlanta, Georgia, was notified of the subject deficiency by D M Collings and L M Coggins of Duke Power Company, Charlotte, North Carolina, 28242.

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY:

On October 15, 1984, steam was reported coming from inside valve 2NI-178B which had been disassembled for an NW system modification. Further investigation by the Construction Testing Group showed the steam to be a fine cool mist. Also, valve 2NI-178B contained about one inch of oily water. From this it was concluded that construction air was the source and within two hours of the first call the temporary air connection at valve 2NI-361 was found and isolated.

In order to identify the extent of the contamination, a complete system walkdown was performed to verify all valve positions. A set of flow diagrams were marked up showing these valve positions and the suspected contaminated boundaries. This information was forwarded to Design Engineering for evaluation per Nonconforming Item Report 19085.

The contaminated pipe was recleaned with Triton X-100 until samples showed no oil or grease. Also, sample valves and instrument lines were disassembled to check for contamination. All affected pipe, valves, and instruments have been identified and cleaned as required by NCI 19085.

ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS:

Had this condition gone undetected, it could have caused serious corrosion problems due to the chemical composition of the oil. However, had it not been detected by Construction, it would have been detected by Nuclear Production during Start-up when they established chemistry. This problem would have been corrected before plant operations and there would have been no impact on public safety.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

This situation was evaluated by Significant Corrective Action Evaluation (R-6A) #1067. This is the first and only known occurrence of this type. There are no generic implications. However, some precautionary steps have been taken. In accordance with R-6A #1067 Catawba crafts were cautioned on the dire consequences of using construction air in any permanent system. Also, due to moisture in the construction air lines, air dryers are being installed which will provide water and oil free air. No further action is required.