

2/20/73

Note to File

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY (OYSTER CREEK VALVE TESTING)

I called Ivan Finrock, Vice President, Jersey Central Power & Light Company on February 16, 1973, to discuss certain aspects of Bob Engelken's note to Frank Kruesi dated February 15, 1973, on the above subject. I told Mr. Finrock ~~that~~ the basis of the letter and that we were pleased with Jersey Central's response and feel certain that we will also be pleased with their followup inspection program.

I have sent to Mr. Finrock, a copy of the referenced letter and have sent a copy of it to the state of New Jersey.

Dictated by JPO'R

James P. O'Reilly
Director

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Chapman
JH
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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

February 15, 1973

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NOTE TO F. E. KRUESI

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY (OYSTER CREEK) - DOCKET NO. 50-219
VALVE TESTING FOLLOWING PRIMARY SYSTEM BLOWDOWN OCCURRENCE OF DECEMBER 29,
1972

On December 29, 1972, a primary system blowdown occurred at the Oyster Creek reactor facility following a reactor scram from full power (650 Mwe). The blowdown resulted from a malfunctioning relief valve and was similar in many respects to the blowdown occurrence that took place at the Pilgrim facility on October 26, 1972.^{1/} Pertinent details relating to the Oyster Creek blowdown are discussed in "Directorate of Regulatory Operations Notification of an Incident or Occurrence" - Blue Sheet No. 78, dated January 4, 1973, and in Jersey Central's report to the Directorate of Licensing, dated January 17, 1973.

During the course of the Oyster Creek depressurization, two other malfunctions of safety related valves occurred (in addition to the relief valve malfunction). These were as follows:

1. Following receipt of a main steam isolation closure signal (initiated automatically when reactor pressure decreases below 850 psig), one of the four main steam isolation valves failed to close; and
2. The condensate return valve in one of the two isolation condenser systems failed to open after the reactor had been isolated from the main condenser.

The safety of the reactor was not jeopardized, however, by either of these valve malfunctions since redundant features built into each of these systems resulted in proper isolation and cooldown of the reactor primary system.

^{1/} Reference - "Directorate of Regulatory Operations Notification of an Incident or Occurrence" - Blue Sheet No. 71, dated October 31, 1972.

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February 15, 1973

Following completion of their investigation and repair program, Jersey Central planned to resume reactor operations on January 7, 1973. The unrelated failure of three valves important to nuclear safety, however, coupled with an already high incidence of valve failures experienced during the past year at Oyster Creek and other power reactor facilities, raised concern within Regulatory as to the reliability of valves in safety related systems at Oyster Creek. As a result, the Jersey Central Power and Light Company was contacted by our Region I (Newark) Office on January 5, 1973, and informed that the Regulatory staff considered it important to functionally test the operability of all valves important to safety prior to resumption of power operation and, furthermore, that the adequacy of the valve surveillance test program at Oyster Creek should be reexamined to determine whether improvements could be made in the test program.

These AEC concerns were pursued both with plant management and with the Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations. As a result, the licensee identified 115 valves in 13 safety related systems which would be functionally tested prior to plant startup. In addition, the licensee initiated a plan of action to review the merits of the present valve surveillance test program, both as to frequency and test method, and to further pursue these areas with the appropriate valve manufacturers. Region I plans to follow up on this matter during future inspections.

The licensee kept the plant shutdown until completion of the valve testing. All of the valves functioned satisfactorily except one of the torus to drywell vacuum breaker valves which required repair due to its failure to meet the appropriate opening force criterion. Reactor operations were resumed on January 12, 1973.

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R. H. Engelken
R. H. Engelken

cc: A. Ciambusso, L
J. M. Hendrie, L
D. J. Skovholt, L
J. G. Keppler, RO
J. P. O'Reilly, RO:T
PDR
Loca: PDR