



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE
REGION I
970 BROAD STREET
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY 07102

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R. T. Carlson, Senior Reactor Inspector
Region I, Division of Compliance

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JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY (OYSTER CREEK 1)
CO REPORT NO. 219/71-1

JC has made a noted improvement (seven new additions) in the area of site staffing. Mr. McCluskey has stated that five new engineers will also be hired. The increase in the site staffing should allow JC the flexibility to provide in-house training for all staff personnel and once this has been accomplished we should see a marked reduction in the items of noncompliance. Although time did not permit a detailed review of PORC and GORB minutes for content, all meeting minutes were reviewed and I sensed that both committees are now attempting to meet the Technical Specification requirements. A real improvement was noted in the quality of the minutes. I further sensed that GORB is finally on board with their audit responsibilities. I think as they become more involved with the plant operations through feedback from site audits, that additional improvements in GORB performance (and plant operations) will be forthcoming. I would suspect that Don Hetrick's involvement in GORB has been very instrumental in the development of the audit program. I don't mean to imply by the above statements that I am completely happy with either the GORB or PORC performance at this time, but I certainly see them moving in the right direction. My review of the surveillance program disclosed some shortcomings which have been discussed with the site management. I fully expect to see improvements in this area. I would recommend that we reinspect the GORB performance at Morristown, New Jersey following the next routine inspection. There are signals that McCluskey may leave OC-1 during the next year as he has been instructed to train two (2) replacements. Ross look like the heir apparent.

I contacted Morristown, New Jersey (Don Reese) on May 14, 1971, and was informed that the stress evaluation by Burns & Roe will be completed during the week beginning May 16, 1971. Based on these results, selective NDT examination may be performed for the core spray piping systems. I discussed the reportability aspects of the core spray piping water hammer problem with Tom McCluskey and informed him that we would expect a report of this problem no matter what the outcome of the stress evaluation by Burns & Roe turns up. No definite commitment was obtained from McCluskey on this issue.

The turbine stop valve closure scrams (No's. 14 and 15) discussed in the report highlight the possibility of an event which may border on a situation like "turbine trip without bypass valve opening". The mode of turbine stop valve closure i.e., momentarily loss of oil pressure was reported to have resulted in some delay of bypass valve opening. I have discussed the delay aspects of this event with Bill Farmer, Technical Support Branch, CO:HQ and he intends to pursue this aspect with GE representatives during a meeting scheduled for May 19, 1971. My review of the transient at the site did not disclose any concerns for the two scrams in question.

It is suspected that the reactor vessel level instrumentation (steam condensing pots used for reference legs) that are used for both the GE/MAC level transmitters in the feedwater control system and the triple low level switches used in the reactor protection system may be installed at Oyster Creek in such a manner that they are not free-venting. The concern is based upon the collection of noncondensibles in the steam condensing pots coupled with a small amount of leakage either through instrument bypass or root valves or through defective bellows in ΔP instruments. Such a situation could result in the instrumentation "seeing" a higher water level in the reactor vessel than actual. I discussed these concerns with JC and McCluskey stated that a review would be made of the reference legs to determine if they are free-venting. I intend to pursue this during future inspections.

I have provided a separate memo discussing my concerns of a lack of any program to periodically test the balance of plant instrumentation.

OC-1 is currently controlling liquid effluent release and storage by means of an isotopic analysis. JC has called in a number of consultants (GE, Radiation Management Corporation, and Isotopes, Inc.) in attempts to provide a thorough review of their methods for analyzing liquid wastes. In the interim period, there is a sound basis (independent samples by NYOO AND IOO) for stating that the OC-1 isotopic analysis is if any thing, conservative. Steps have also been taken to correct the nonconservative error in gaseous effluents and JC will use the GE conversion from 6 radioisotope to 22 radioisotopes in the future.

The 30 day report on the isolation condenser instrumentation was overdue (noncompliance) on April 23, 1971. McCluskey stated that the report would be submitted this week. This will be added to the safety letter. The report on the past problems with the diesel generators will be submitted for information within two weeks.

R. J. McDermott
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