

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION I
970 BROAD STREET
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Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I

RO INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-219/72-05
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
OYSTER CREEK

At the time of the last inspection, I was informed of Jersey Central's intention to promote Don Ross to Assistant Superintendent at Oyster Creek and was subsequently informed that the promotion had taken place. When I arrived for this inspection, I was told that Ross had been promoted to Manager, Nuclear Generation, McCluskey's boss. I truly think Ross was reluctant to accept this position, probably because he would have to move. I mentioned my concern about the lack of an Assistant Superintendent to Charlie Amato during a phone conversation on January 31, 1973. He stated that his office had the same concern and also was concerned about the lack of a strong replacement for Ross at the site. He implied that Ross was moved out of the position of Assistant Superintendent because he could not qualify under State Law as an Assistant Superintendent or Superintendent of a power plant because of the lack of experience in a fossil fuel generation plant. In addition, he did not know who in the company could replace McCluskey or who would be the Superintendent of the Forked River 1 Station. He is of the opinion that only someone from one of Jersey Central's three fossil plants could qualify under State Law. In light of the above question, I feel we should have an informal meeting with the President or Vice President to discuss the immediate plans for providing a back-up for the Plant Superintendent and the long range plans to assure a replacement is available.

I feel that V. Burzi's inspection of electrical problems will cause Jersey Central to make more thorough investigations of failures and be able to submit a more meaningful report. He in effect, informed Jersey Central that the reason given for the containment spray pipe failures, in their report, dated August 11, 1972, was so much B. S. No reason was specifically determined for the failure; however, it appears that the only possible cause could have been that fuses were left out of the "close" circuit.

Specific information or action request for the following HQ memo was obtained.

MRS 3/14/72 - Big Rock Point - Siphon Breaker - A PORC evaluation indicated that this is not a problem at Oyster Creek, even though the check valves in the fill line cannot be tested.

MRS 6/19/72 - Paddle Type Flow Switches - Oyster Creek plans to inspect these switches during the spring 1973 refueling outage and evaluate the results of this inspection.


MRS 9/21/72 - Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements - Oyster Creek continues surveillance testing program during the outage.

MRS 6/28/72 - Fuel Handling Activities - Oyster Creek uses own people.

MRS 10/27/72 and MRS 11/8/72 - Delta P Cells - Oyster Creek does not have Barton Model 368, 384 or 386 switches (has 224, 295, 296 and 278).

MRS 8/9/72 - Safety Valve Actuation Occurrence - DW inspected for tape over pressure tape.

In reference to gagging S Valves during the hydro test, Jersey Central has changed their procedure to require installing a relief valve (safety) on the discharge of the Control Rod Drive Pump.



F. S. Cantrell
Reactor Inspector