

Jersey Central Power & Light Company



MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 539-6111

May 15, 1973



Mr. Donald J. Skovholt
Assistant Director for Reactor Operations
Directorate of Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D.C. 20545

Dear Mr. Skovholt:

In your letter to Jersey Central dated April 16, 1973, authorization to load replacement fuel in the Oyster Creek Reactor was granted, but in the absence of more detailed information, authorization to operate the reactor was withheld. We have accumulated the requested information and have filed it. However, in the meantime, we request authorization to conduct low power physics tests with the reactor head removed and power less than 5 Mw.

This authorization will permit work to continue at the plant while your staff reviews the additional information we have filed. The additional information you requested, has no bearing on operations at this low power level with the head removed, and is only required to satisfy your concerns about operation at the normal operating power levels near 1910 Mw.

Your continued cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Very truly yours,

Ivan R. Finckel, Jr.
Ivan R. Finckel, Jr.,
Vice President

asb

MR T. WAMBACH

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May 15, 1973

Mr. A. Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station
Docket No. 50-219
Failure of Torus to Reactor Building
Vacuum Relief Valve V-26-18

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, Paragraph 1.15.F. Notification of this event, as required by the Technical Specifications, Paragraph 6.6.B, was made to AEC Region I, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, on Friday, May 4, 1973.

While performing local leak rate testing, it was found that one of the torus to reactor building vacuum breaker lines would not hold pressure between the isolation valves (V-26-17 & 18). The lack of air leakage through check valve (V-26-17) indicated that the leakage was through the butterfly valve (V-26-18).

Details of the valve are as follows:

Air Operated Butterfly, Rockwell
Size - 20"
Rating - 150 psi
Operator - Conoflow Corp.

Inspection of V-26-18 showed that the valve was 0.010 inches off the seat, indicating that the linkage on the valve arm required adjustment.

The valve was inspected and the boot seat and butterfly disc were found in good condition. The valve was found to be 0.010 inches off the seat. The boot seat and butterfly disc were cleaned and the valve

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
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linkage was adjusted to position the valve disc properly on the seat. The adjustment consisted of increasing the stroke in the close direction. The line between the isolation valves was then pressurized and the leakage was calculated to be 0.492 SCFH well within the technical specification limit. The cause of the change in linkage adjustment has not been determined.

There was no safety significance associated with this occurrence since the redundant component (check valve V-26-17) was shown to be leakage tight. This is implied by the fact that the check valve was not moved during the testing period, so that the maximum possible leakage through the check valve was 0.492 SCFH.

To prevent a reoccurrence of this type problem, indicating marks were placed on the disc shaft. Several operating tests will be performed prior to plant startup to verify repeatability of linkage and valve position based on these markings. Also, additional leak rate measurement will be performed prior to plant startup to verify the adequacy of relying on these new markings to ensure the valve has closed properly following future operability surveillance tests.

Very truly yours,



Donald A. Ross
Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations

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Enclosures (40)

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region 1