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February 6, 1985

Mr. J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator,
Region III - Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22

Dear Mr. Keppler:

In response to your letter dated December 27, 1984, which transmitted Inspection Report No. 50-263/84-27 (DRSS), the following information is provided:

Exercise Weakness No. 1

The following improper controller techniques were evident in the Control Room and/or Emergency Operations Facility: controllers displayed or distributed scenario data or other information not specifically requested by participants; and controllers improperly phrased certain questions which could have led participants to take actions that they might not otherwise have taken. (Paragraphs 4A and 4d) (263/84-27-01).

Response

"Section IV of each Exercise package contains a section entitled "Controller Training and Instructions" which explicitly describes controller responsibilities. For future exercises conducted after May 1, 1985, these responsibilities will be more strongly emphasized including the observations of the December 5, 1984 NRC exercise as examples of items not to be done. These examples will be incorporated into the Drill and Exercise Program Manual by May 1, 1985."

Exercise Weakness No. 2

Contamination control was inadequately demonstrated at the Access Control Point and at the entrance to the Emergency Operations Facility. (Paragraphs 4c and 4d) (263/84-27-02).

Response

Contamination control at the Access Control Point will be strengthened by revising the implementing procedure for access control during emergencies (A.2-108). Specific guidance will be incorporated to ensure that:

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
- 1) contamination control areas and monitoring equipment are set up at appropriate locations as part of the procedure initiation.
- 2) upon egress from potentially contaminated areas, all personnel and equipment are properly monitored for contamination; and
- 3) the person responsible for access control is aware of the requirements and therefore better able to provide adequate supervision.

Contamination control at the Emergency Operations Facility will be enhanced by ensuring that a qualified radiation protection specialist is present at the control point when personnel or materials are required to be monitored. To accomplish this, the SECURITY FORCE DUTIES section of the corporate implementing procedure EPIP 1.1.5, START-UP AND OPERATION OF THE EOF, will be revised. Specific guidance will be incorporated to ensure that in the event it becomes necessary to implement contamination control at the EOF:

- 1) the security guard summons a qualified specialist to oversee and/or assist with contamination monitoring prior to permitting access;
- 2) the qualified specialist is aware of the requirements for a thorough frisk for contamination prior to entering the EOF.

These procedure revisions should be completed, distributed and implemented by May 1, 1985.

Respectfully submitted,



C. E. Larson, Vice President
Nuclear Generation
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cc: G. Charnoff
NRC Resident Inspector