



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION I
970 BRAD STREET
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY 07102

June 28, 1973

Mr. Schuyler Mott, Librarian
Ocean County Library
15 Hooper Avenue
Toms River, New Jersey 08753

Docket No. 50-219

Gentlemen:

Enclosed are copies of correspondence between Region I,
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, and Jersey Central
Power and Light Company (JCP&L).

This correspondence is submitted pursuant to arrangements made
with the Public Proceedings Branch, Office of the Secretary for
use by the public.

Where possible, these materials should be punched and filed in a
folder labeled as follows:

Correspondence to and from Applicant or Licensee
(Excluding Environmental & Antitrust)

Sincerely,

Mrs. Pat Carey
Administrative Officer

Enclosures:
Abnormal Occurrence Report 73-13

cc: Central Mail & Files Unit, Document Room Clerk w/o encl

9/20/6



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

V-2

JUN 28 1973

MEMO TO FILES

THRU: J. G. Keppler

for Reinmuth
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY (OYSTER CREEK)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP FAILURE TO START

REF: G. W. Reinmuth response dated September 19, 1972, to a
request for technical assistance by J. G. Keppler

The problem of the containment spray pump failure to start was pursued during an RO Region I inspection at the site on November 9-10, 1972, in accordance with TAB's suggestion (RO Inspection Report No. 50-219/72-05). While the failure was not explained completely, the conclusion reached by our inspectors was similar to TAB's, i.e., the probable cause was a lack of control power to the breaker.

During a followup discussion with the DL project leader, it was learned that DL has contacted the licensee regarding the problem. A technical specification change is under consideration by DL which would require the testing of the core spray system following its return to service after it has been deactivated.

It is concluded that RO need take no further action on this matter.

D C Kirkpatrick
D. C. Kirkpatrick
Reactor Inspection Specialist

cc: G. W. Reinmuth, RO
R. T. Carlson, RO:I

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Jersey Central Power & Light Company

MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 539-6111

June 28, 1973

Mr. A. Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station
Docket No. 50-219
Reactor Coolant Analysis Frequency

The purpose of this letter is to report a sample of reactor coolant was not analyzed for total radioactive iodine content between 0020 June 9, 1973 and 0830 June 13, 1973 (104 hours, 10 minutes). This event is a violation of Technical Specification, Paragraph 4.6.C., which states a sample of reactor coolant shall be analyzed at least every 72 hours to determine the total radioactive iodine content. This event is also considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in Technical Specification, Paragraph 1.15.G. Notification of this event as required by the Technical Specifications was made to AEC Region I, Directorate of Regulatory Operations on Monday, June 18, 1973.

This extended sample analysis frequency resulted from the station's multichannel analyzer becoming inoperative on June 9, 1973 and it was not until June 12, 1973 that the vendor's service representatives could effect repair of this instrument. The multichannel analyzer is the only instrument presently used to measure total reactor water iodine activity.

The safety significance associated with this event is minimal since gross beta gamma counting of reactor water was performed during this period at the normal daily frequency. Gross gamma counting of filtered radioactive water was performed during the period at the normal daily frequency also. Both of these counting techniques include total iodine radioactivity. None of the results obtained from these analyses showed a deviation from normal levels during the period of June 9th to June 13th.

In addition, off-gas activity, which is a sensitive indication of fission product activity, did not show any significant or unexplained deviation from normal levels during this period. This is indicated by continuous recording of stack gas activity in the control room and verified by off-gas grab sample analysis on June 11, 1973.

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Mr. Giambusso

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June 28, 1973

To prevent reoccurrence of this kind, more detailed administrative requirements will be issued to the chemistry technicians to advise supervision when the prescribed analysis frequency cannot be maintained. Laboratory procedures will be developed to permit use of a single channel analyzer for measurement of total iodine activity to cover time periods when the multichannel analyzer becomes inoperable in the future.

Enclosed are forty (40) copies of this report.

Very truly yours,



Donald A. Ross
Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations

DAR:cs
Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I

File - 1

Jersey Central Power & Light Company

MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 539-5111

June 28, 1973

Mr. A. Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station
Docket No. 50-219
Containment Spray System Failure

The purpose of this letter is to report a failure of containment spray system #2 automatic reset circuitry due to a failed relay coil 16R22B; additionally, failure of containment spray pump 51C to manually start upon actuating the bypass and control switch in the control room. This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, Paragraph 1.15.0. Notification of this event as required by the Technical Specifications was made to AEC Region I, Directorate of Regulatory Operations on Monday, June 18, 1973.

Following successful performance of the containment spray system automatic initiation test, the system was returned to normal standby readiness. However, about an hour and a half later, an odor of overheated insulation was detected by an electrician performing routine inspection in the 400 switchgear room in which containment spray logic panel ERSS is located. The odor was traced to relay 16R22B which performs the function of automatically resetting the system to a standby condition when the mode switch is returned to "automatic". The relay was found in the de-energized state when it normally should have been energized.

Relay details are as follows:

Manufacturer: General Electric
Model: 7R22B
Type: 125 VDC TRU

Upon replacing the coil and series resistor on the relay, the system was placed in the "dynamic test" mode and an operability check attempted on containment spray pump 51C. However, the pump did not start. Pump 51D, in the same system, was checked and found to start satisfactorily.

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June 28, 1973

The failure of relay 16K22B is thought to have been caused by an internal breakdown of the coil insulation resulting in an "open" in the coil windings.

The pump starting failure was traced to a wire which had broken off from the key lock switch. This broken wire may have contributed to a previous failure of containment spray system #2 which was reported by Mr. I. R. Finfrock, Jr. in his letter of August 11, 1972 to Mr. A. Giambusso. The wire failure was noted to occur at the break in insulation near the terminal connection. This break was not detectable in the inspection reported in the referenced letter.

The circuitry and components associated with relay 16K22B were checked to eliminate any external cause for the failure. The coil and series resistor on 16K22B were replaced. In order to check the automatic reset capability of the system, the system mode switch was then placed in "dynamic test" and a surveillance test initiated. During this test, the broken wire on the key lock switch was found and reconnected and the mode switch returned to "automatic". The system returned to a standby condition and the relay was verified to be energized. Further voltage checks were made on the relay and found to be satisfactory.

In each of the two above cases, the containment spray system would have functioned normally had it been called upon for emergency service. Following the failure of relay 16K22B, the system would not have "reset" automatically if the mode switch had been moved out of "automatic" to some other mode. The operator, however, would have been aware of this failure due to the presence of the "disable alarm" and could have reset the system manually.

The failures of relay coil 16K22B and the broken key lock switch wire were isolated events which do not indicate the need for any further action.

Enclosed are forty (40) copies of this report.

Very truly yours,

Donald A. Ross
Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations

DAR:cs
Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I

To: James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region I
970 Broad Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102

From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket # 50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject: Abnormal Occurrence Report 73-13.

The following is a preliminary report being submitted
in compliance with the Technical Specifications
paragraph 6.6.2.

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Date: June 21, 1973

Time: 11:25 p.m.

ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE

REPORT NO. 73-13

SUBJECT: Violation of the Technical Specification, para. _____.

(or),

Failure of Diesel Generator #2 to be fully operable during power operation, in that power transformer fuses were blown during a lightning storm in the vicinity of the plant.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, para. 1.15.0. Notification of this event as required by the Technical Specifications, para. 6.6.8 was made to AEC Region I Directorate of Regulatory Operations on Friday June 22, 1973.

SITUATION:

During a plant startup, with plant electrical loads being supplied by off site power, a lightning storm occurred in the vicinity of the plant causing an apparent voltage surge on the IB 4160v bus, resulting in blowing the three power transformer fuses for Diesel Generator #2. The result of this failure was to render the Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps inoperable since they are among auxiliaries supplied by the transformer. Although the unit would have started and been operable if a loss of off site power had occurred, its fuel supply would have been limited to the quantity in the Day Tank.

CAUSE:

The cause of this failure is thought to be as a result of a voltage surge which occurred on the 1 B bus during a lightning storm in the vicinity of the plant.

REMEDIAL ACTION:

As a result of a subsequent plant scram and the need to have both Diesel Generators operable to restart, two of these fuses were replaced (only two were in stock), the third jumped, and a satisfactory operability check was made once the storm had left the area. Once the reactor had been made critical and the mode switch transferred to "RUN", the fuse drawer was pulled out and the unit made inoperable. Fuses were immediately ordered and daily surveillance testing of the other unit was started.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The significance of this event is the loss of redundancy of the AC emergency power sources provided at the plant.

MEMO ROUTE ^{SHIP}		See me about this. Note and return	For concurrence or signature.	For action. For information.
Form AIC-93 (Rev. May 14) AIC M-0240				
TO (Name and unit)		INITIALS	REMARKS	
H. D. Thornburg, Chief, FS&EB		DATE	Licensee: Jersey Central Power & Light Co.	
			Docket No.: 50-219	
			Abnormal Occurrence: Report dated 6/21/73	
TO (Name and unit)		INITIALS	REMARKS	
RO:HO (5) DR Central Files (1) Regulatory Standards Dir. of Licensing (13)		DATE	The attached report from the subject licensee is	
		(3)	forwarded in accordance with RO Manual Chapter 10	
TO (Name and unit)		INITIALS	REMARKS	
RO Files		DATE	The action taken by the licensee is considered	
			appropriate. Followup will be performed during	
			the next inspection as appropriate. Copies of	
FROM (Name and unit)		REMARKS		
<i>R. T. Carlson</i> R. T. Carlson, RO:I		the report have been forwarded to the PDR, Local		
		PDR, NSIC, DTIE and State representatives. The		
		licensee will submit a 10 day written report to		
		Licensing.		
PHONE NO.	DATE			
	6/27/73			

USE OTHER SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL REMARKS

GPO : 1971 O

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