

Jersey Central Power & Light Company



MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 539-6111

October 1, 1973

Mr. Donald J. Skovholt
Assistant Director for
Operating Reactors
Directorate of Licensing
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545



Dear Mr. Skovholt:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket 50-219 - Outstanding Licensing Items

This is to inform you of the status of the Main Steam Isolation Valve evaluation in response to your letter dated April 3, 1973.

During the past year on two (2) occasions the outboard MSIV's failed to close upon receiving an isolation signal. These failures are attributed to sticking pilot operated power valves. Upon inspection of these valves a small amount of fine red dust was found on the sleeve "O" rings.

The outboard MSIV's are presently air operated, whereas the inboard MSIV's are nitrogen gas operated with air as a back-up supply and have not exhibited any similar failures. Thus, in order to upgrade the reliability of the MSIV closure, it is planned to change the gas supply from the current instrument air to nitrogen. This modification is presently being reviewed by the Safety Review Committee.

To aid in your current and future evaluation of MSIV performance, the following information is provided:

a. The minimum clearance between the pilot valve piston and the pilot valve cylinder is considered proprietary information and the vendor will not make it available; but the pistons in the pilot valves do not have increased clearances, contrary to your letter dated April 3, 1973.

b. The cleanliness of the MSIV's nitrogen gas supply is governed by the cleanliness of the "boil-off" from the nitrogen supply tank, which can be considered pure. At present there is a "Y" strainer used to prevent large particles from entering the system. The back-up supply air system's cleanliness is governed by the post filter from the plant's air compressors. The filter media is Glastex GB providing 5-10 micron particle retention. The installation of 3-5 micron filters is presently being considered for both of these systems.

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Mr. Donald J. Skovholt


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c. The temperature environment for the MSIV pilot operated power valves is approximately 125-130° F for the inboard valves, and 150-165° F for the outboard valves.

d. The present preventive maintenance program for the MSIV pneumatic control system consists of cleaning the pilot operated power valves with acetone and blowing down the gas lines. This program is performed during the annual refueling outages.

Very truly yours,



Donald A. Ross

Manager - Nuclear Generating Stations

RLL/DAR/pmd

To: James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject: Preliminary Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 73-25

The following is a preliminary report being submitted
in compliance with the Technical Specifications, para-
graph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:

J. T. Carroll, Jr. 10/1/73
J. T. Carroll, Jr. Date

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

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B/129

SUBJECT: Failure of Isolation Condenser initiation relay 6K12 to function when deenergized while performing routine surveillance.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15D. Notification of this event, as required by the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.6.2.a, was made to AEC Region I, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, by telephone on Saturday, September 29, 1973, at 1:35 p. m., and by telecopier on Monday, October 1, 1973, at 12:00 p. m.

SITUATION: While performing a routine surveillance test on the Reactor High Pressure - Isolation Condenser initiation switches, contacts on relay 6K12 failed to open within the preset time delay of 15 seconds after tripping the pressure switch and deenergizing the relay.

CAUSE: Unknown. The relay has since been removed from the circuit and bench tested and appears to function properly.

REMEDIAL ACTION:

Relay 6K12 was replaced with one from spares. A satisfactory surveillance test was conducted and the Isolation Condenser System then considered to be operable.

September 28, 1973

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

As detailed in Amendment 67 to the PDRAR, at least one of the Isolation Condensers is required to act as a means for heat removal during a postulated Loss of Coolant Accident. Actuation of relay 6K12 can be by means of High Reactor Pressure or Low Low Reactor Water Level. It is wired into the logic circuit such that tripping of the relay provides one-half of the initiation logic for both condensers, the other one-half being its redundant counterpart on the same instrument penetration. A second redundant instrument penetration also includes two pressure switches, contacts from which also will initiate both isolation condensers. The significance of this event then is the loss of redundancy provided to initiate one-half of the signal for placing the Isolation Condenser System in service.

Prepared by:

DR. R. J. [Signature]

Date:

10/1/73


To: James P. O'Reilly
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Region I
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King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject: Preliminary Abnormal Occurrence Report 13-24.

The following is a preliminary report being submitted in compliance with the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:


J. T. Carroll, Jr. 9/28/73
Date

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

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B/130

SUBJECT: Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15.E, failure of Main Steam Isolation Valves NS04A and NS04B to meet acceptable leakage as specified in Technical Specification 4.5.F.1.D.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15.E. Notification of this event as required by the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.6.2.a, was made to AEC Region 1, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, on Friday, September 28, 1973, at 3:50 p.m., and by telecopier on Friday, September 28, 1973, at 5:00 p.m.

SITUATION: At 1801 on September 27, 1973, Main Steam Isolation Valve NS04B was tested for leakage and the leakage was measured to be approximately 15.15 SCFH.

At 2035 on September 27, 1973, Main Steam Isolation Valve NS04A was tested for leakage and the leakage was measured to be approximately 96.59 SCFH.

Both valves, NS04A and NS04B, were operated following the reactor shutdown and prior to being checked for leakage. Operation of the valves during the shutdown was required to allow adequate

ventilation of the reactor vessel, through the main steam lines, while performing maintenance on NS03B, in order to minimize radiogas concentrations in the drywell.

CAUSE: Leakage past the valve packing was detected on both NS04A and NS04B which contributed substantially to the leak rate. Repairs to the packing and a retost of the valves is required to determine whether any other cause contributed to the excessive valve leakage.

REMEDIAL ACTION:

To be determined.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

To be submitted following evaluation.

Prepared by:

E. J. Thomas

Date:

9-28-73