

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

October 10, 1973

Docke No. 50-219

Jersey Central Power & Light Company ATTN: Mr. I. R. Finfrock, Jr. Vice President - Generation Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road Morristown, New Jersey 07960

Gentlemen:

By letter dated September 20, 1973, you submitted a report entitled "Preliminary Description and Analysis of Proposed Modifications to the Gaseous, Liquid, and Solid Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station." In the course of our review of this submittal, we find that we require additional information to complete our evaluation.

In order for us to complete an expeditious review of these proposed modifications, we request that you provide responses to the questions given in Attachment A by December 2, 1973.

Sincerely,

Robert J. Schemel, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #1 Directorate of Licensing

Enclosure: Actachment A - Request for Additional Information

cc w/enclosure:
G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire
Shaw, Pittman, Potts, Trowbridge
and Manden
910 - 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

GPU Service Corporation
ATTN: Mr. Thomas M. Crimmins
Safety & Licensing Manager
260 Cherry Hill Road
Parsippany, New Jersey 07054

See next page for add'1 cc

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Township of Ocean Waretown, New Jersey 08753 Burtis W. Horner

Stryker, Tams and Dill 55 Madison Avenue Morristown, New Jersey 07960

Ocean County Library 15 Hooper Avenue Toms River, New Jersey 08753

ATTACHMENT A

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-219

- It is proposed to design and construct the liquid waste system and the gaseous waste system to Quality Group D and non-seismic classification. In this regard, discuss how the guidelines in Regulatory Guides 1.26 and 1.29 would be met for the accident conditions.
- Provide the weight of charcoal in each adsorber bed of the proposed gaseous waste system, the operating pressure of the beds, and the dynamic adsorption coefficient for the operating conditions of the beds.
- 3. It is proposed to install the recombiners downstream of the delay line. State the reasons for the proposed installation location since it appears that installation of the recombiners chead of the delay line may be advantageous because it would provide for longer delay of the noble gases and eliminate the possibility of hydrogen explosions in the delay line.
- 4. The Detergent and Laundry Waste Subsystem will utilize a detergent evaporator. For this evaporator, provide the capacity, design temperature, and design pressure.

Jersey Central Power & Light Company

MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD . MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 . 539-6111

October 9, 1973


Mr. A. Giambusso Deputy Director for Reactor Projects Directorate of Licensing United States Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station

Docket No. 50-219

Isolation Condenser Relay Failure



While performing a routine surveillance test on the reactor high pressure - isolation condenser initiation switches, contacts on relay 6K12 failed to close within the preset time delay of 15 seconds after tripping the pressure switch and deenergizing the relay.

Details of the relay are:

Manufacturer: Agastat

Model: 7022PDT (Time Delay)

Range: 5 to 50 seconds

Coil: 120V DC Serial No.: 1712236

The cause of this failure remains unknown. The relay has been removed from the circuit and bench-tested and appears to function properly, even after repeated operation.

Relay 6K12 was replaced with a new relay. A satisfactory surveillance test was conducted and the isolation condenser system then considered to be operable.

As detailed in Amendment 65 to the FDSAR, at least one of the isolation condensers is required to act as a means for heat removal during a postulated loss of coolant accident. Actuation of relay 6K12 can be by means of high reactor **

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Mr. Gjarabusso -2-October 9, 1973 pressure or low-low reactor water level. It is wired into the logic circuit such that tripping of the relay provides one-half of the initiation logic for both condensers, the other one-half being its redundant counterpart on the same instrument penetration. A second redundant instrument penetration also includes two pressure switches, contacts from which also will initiate both isolation condensers. The significance of this event then is the loss of redundancy provided to initiate one-half of the signal for placing the isolation condenser system in service. Before making any recommendation to prevent a reoccurrence of this event, the cause of the relay failure should be identified. The manufacturer will be requested to perform additional tests on the failed relay in an effort to determine the cause of failure. The results of this investigation will be used to determine what further action may be necessary. Enclosed are forty (40) copies of this report. Very truly yours, Donald a. Ross Donald A. Ross Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations DAR: CS Enclosures cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I