

Louis D. Putney

Attorney At Law

4805 SOUTH HIMES AVENUE
TAMPA, FLORIDA 33611-2616

Personal Injury and Wrongful Death
Wills, Estates and Guardianship
Employment Discrimination
Family Law

TELEPHONE
(813) 831-3376
FAX (813) 831-8770

March 28, 1996

CERTIFIED MAIL - P 575 223 678

Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

RE: Suspension or revocation of the nuclear
operating license for Florida Power Corporation's
Crystal River Nuclear Plant (CR3)

Dear Sir or Madam:

I am writing on behalf of my client, Barry L. Bennett, pursuant to 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, § V.B.7, and 10 CFR § 2.206, to request that the NRC institute a proceeding pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202, to suspend or revoke the operating license of Florida Power Corporation's Crystal River nuclear plant, or for such other action as may be proper.

The specific grounds for this request are observations of my client during his employment as a Trainer/Range Master for SBI, Inc., a company providing contract nuclear security services for Florida Power Corporation at its Crystal River nuclear power plant (CR3). These observations include the following:

1. In order to comply with its nuclear licensing requirements, Florida Power Corporation is required to implement a security program which would be effective against a terrorist attack on the nuclear reactor. Mr. Bennett is aware of facts which indicate that the security program in place at CR3 is inadequate and that the plant is susceptible to attack by terrorists. In the present world and national environment, this is a grave concern.

During an Operational Security Response Effectiveness (OSRE) security drill in 1995 in which Mr. Bennett participated, nuclear security at CR3 was seriously compromised in the simulation. The drill involved a simulated terrorist attack of a particular attack configuration, a configuration which might reasonably be expected to occur in

96041203007HP XA 4/29/96

the event of such a terrorist attack. (In the interest of nuclear security at the plant, the specific configuration will not be disclosed herein, but will be provided directly to your office upon request.) Under the criteria established, the drill would be determined a failure of nuclear security if the simulated terrorists were capable of taking out three of the nuclear plant's systems. When the drill was conducted under a particular configuration, the simulated terrorists were successful in taking out at least three systems. Presumably, were this not a drill, the outcome could have been catastrophic.

It is Mr. Bennett's understanding that the results of this particular unsuccessful drill were intentionally not written up and reported to the NRC, that the nuclear security deficiencies revealed by the drill have never been addressed, and that the nuclear plant remains susceptible to a terrorist attack initiated in this configuration.

2. Mr. Bennett believes there is a general laxity of security at CR3, as well as a pattern of failure to report security breaches, based upon the following incidents which occurred in 1995:

a. Guard found asleep at Post 25 -- no incident report filed;

b. Security lieutenant took badge off site -- no incident report may have been filed; and

c. Guard with duty of watching 3 security zones found reading a book on duty -- no incident report filed.

3. Mr. Bennett believes that the current security requirement of only one guard to monitor several protected zones or entrances to the protected area does not provide adequate security.

4. Mr. Bennett has been informed that Florida Power Corporation has plans to substantially reduce the security force at the nuclear plant in the near future, which he believes would result in a significant compromise of nuclear security at CR3.

Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
March 28, 1996
Page -3-

Mr. Bennett maintains that these safety concerns can be substantiated through plant records, and through interviews with specific security personnel familiar with these topics. These deficiencies at the nuclear plant render the nuclear security program, which is critical to nuclear safety at CR3, ineffective resulting in a potentially catastrophic situation.

Specifically, in the course of the NRC's proceedings pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202, it is requested that the NRC thoroughly investigate my client's allegations and, upon a determination that the allegations are founded, suspend or revoke Florida Power's operating license until such time as these serious security and safety deficiencies are corrected.

The NRC is requested to act quickly and decisively to protect public safety and the environment as a whole in accordance with it's Congressional mandate.

Sincerely,



Louis D. Putney

LDP/me

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
The Honorable D. Robert Graham
The Honorable Connie Mack
The Honorable Michael Bilirakis
The Honorable Sam M. Gibbons
The Honorable Clifford B. Stearns
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young
The Honorable Lawton Chiles
The Honorable David J. Fischer
The Honorable Dick A. Greco
The Honorable Curtis A. Rich, Sr.
Nuclear Information & Resource Service
Public Citizen
Union of Concerned Scientists
Board of Directors, Florida Progress Corporation