

631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

J. P. O'Reilly, Director

SEP 11 1973

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
OYSTER CREEK 1
DOCKET NO. 50-219
LICENSE NO. DPR-16
IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY

I have given this case careful review and I concur with Cantrell's recommendation that the licensee be given the maximum fine for the violation. The civil penalty is warranted under RO Manual Chapter 0820.02; specifically under the last sentence of the paragraph. The violation falls within the definition of Severity Category II in that the violation "if not corrected, may lead to or contribute to an occurrence, incident, or situation involving radiation exposure to employees or the public in excess of permissible limits (and) the release of radioactive materials in effluents in excess of permissible limits". The range of monetary penalty applicable to Severity Category II violations incurred by power reactors is \$500 - 4,000. ?


I recommend that we propose the maximum limit of \$4,000. An imposition of less than the maximum penalty would be considered, by interested persons, to be "soft" in view of our prompt issuance of a bulletin that cost the industry hundreds of thousands of dollars. By taking a hard-nosed position in this case, we will be able to emphasize the importance of prompt evaluation and reporting of all abnormal occurrences.

I believe that the licensee can present no reasonable denial or statement of extenuating circumstances.

R. T. Carlson, Chief
Facility Operations Branch

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OFFICE ▶	GRESS: I Coner/pss	 Carlson				
SURNAME ▶						
DATE ▶	8/24/73	8/24				

D R A F T

License No. DPR-16

Jersey Central Power and Light Company
ATTN: Dr. S. Bortnoff, President
Madison Avenue and Punch Bowl Road
Morristown, New Jersey 07960

Gentlemen:

This letter refers to the inspection conducted on August 3 and 6, 1973, of your activities authorized by AEC Facility License No. DPR-16 at the Oyster Creek Power Station in Forked River, New Jersey and to the discussion of the inspection findings held with Mr. J. T. Carroll on August 6, 1973.

During the inspection, it was found that one of your activities appeared to be in violation of AEC requirements. The item and references to the pertinent requirements are listed in the Notice of Violation, enclosed herewith as Appendix A. The violation occurred during the period from April 15 to August 6, 1973.

The violation identified in Appendix A describes your failure to notify the AEC within 24 hours of your discovery that two-thirds of your installed shock and sway arrestors were incapable of performing their intended safety function. This matter is of serious concern to the AEC in that the AEC considers reporting requirements contained in its Regulations, Licenses and Technical Specifications to be an integral part of the Nuclear Reactor Safety program. The seriousness is indicated by the action we took when we became aware of similar malfunctions at another nuclear power station 60 days after the occurrence at your facility. As you know, as soon as we became aware of these malfunctions

we issued a Regulatory Operations Bulletin to all operating nuclear power plants. This Bulletin directed the operating nuclear power plants to examine all suspect shock and sway arrestors within 72 hours.

In a meeting held on April 24, 1973, between the Director of our Regional Office and Dr. Bartnoff and his staff, you were informed that the AEC was concerned about the adequacy of your management control systems. Your failure to notify the AEC of inoperative shock and sway arrestors indicates that your management control systems in this area are not adequate.

As you are aware from the "Criteria for Determining Enforcement Action", which was provided to you by our letter dated November 1, 1972, the enforcement actions available to us in the exercise of our regulatory responsibility include administrative actions in the form of written notices of violation, civil monetary penalties, and orders pertaining to the modification, suspension, or revocation of an operating license. After careful examination of the license violation identified in Appendix A, this office proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended (42 USC 2282), and 10 CFR 2.205, in the amount of Four Thousand Dollars (\$4,000) as set forth in the Notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties enclosed herewith as Appendix B.

In addition to the need for corrective action to avoid further violations of the specific deficiency identified in Appendix A, we are concerned about the implementation of your management control system that permitted this deficiency to occur. Consequently, in your reply, you should describe in particular, those actions taken or planned to improve the effectiveness of your management control systems for reporting, reviewing, and classifying abnormal occurrences.

While the violation identified in Appendix A does not present an immediate threat to the health and safety of the public and thereby necessitate suspension of plant operations, it is necessary that management action be taken promptly to assure full compliance with AEC requirements in the future. We plan to continue strict surveillance of your program for handling abnormal occurrences to ascertain whether such action has been taken. Our findings and your reply to this letter will provide a basis for us to determine whether any further enforcement action is called for, such as suspension, modification, or revocation of your license.

Sincerely,

Donald F. Knuth
Director of Regulatory Operations

Enclosures:

1. Appendix A, Notice of Violation
2. Appendix B, Notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties

License No. DPR-16

APPENDIX A

Jersey Central Power and Light Company
ATTN: Dr. S. Bortloff, President
Madison Avenue and Punch Bowl Road
Morristown, New Jersey 07960

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Gentlemen:

Based on the results of an AEC inspection conducted on August 3 and 6, 1973, it appears that certain of your activities were not conducted in full compliance with conditions of your AEC Facility License No. DPR-16 as indicated below:

Paragraph 6.6.2 of the Technical Specifications requires that you notify the Director of the Regional Regulatory Operations Office in the event of an abnormal occurrence and that this notification be made by telephone and telegraph within 24 hours of your recognition of the unusual occurrence. It also requires that you submit a written report of the occurrence to the Director of Licensing within 10 days. An abnormal occurrence is defined, in Section 1.15 of the Technical Specification, as a failure of one or more components of an engineered safety feature or plant protection system that causes or threatens to cause the feature or system to be incapable of performing its intended function.

Contrary to this requirement, you failed to notify the Director of the Regional Regulatory Operations Office, or report to the

Director of Licensing, within the prescribed time limits, that 88 of 132 hydraulic shock and sway arrestors had been found defective between April 15 and June 5, 1973.

Again on July 22, 1973 you failed to make timely notification and to submit a timely report when you discovered that 8 of the reconditioned arrestors had again been found to be defective.

(Severity Category II)

(Civil Penalty = \$4,000)

This notice is sent to you pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.201 of the AEC's "Rules of Practice", Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations. Section 2.201 requires you to submit to this office within twenty (20) days of your receipt of this notice a written statement or explanation in reply including: (1) corrective steps which have been taken by you and the results achieved; (2) corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved. However, in this instance we have received your letter dated August 6, 1973 to the Director of Licensing covering the first (1) and third (3) parts of the required reply. Accordingly, in your reply to this notice you need only describe the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations.

FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Donald F. Knuth
Director of Regulatory Operations

License No. DPR-16

APPENDIX B

Jersey Central Power and Light Company
ATTN: Dr. S. Bortnoff, President
Madison Avenue and Punch Bowl Road
Morristown, New Jersey 07960

NOTICE OF PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY

Gentlemen:

This office proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 USC 2282), and to 10 CFR 2.205 in the amount of Four Thousand Dollars (\$4,000) for the specific violation set forth in Appendix A to the cover letter. In proposing to impose a civil penalty pursuant to this Section of the Act and in fixing the proposed amount of the penalty, the factors identified in the statement of considerations published in the Federal Register with the rule making action which adopted 10 CFR 2.205 (36 FR 16894) August 26, 1971, have been taken into account.

You may, within twenty (20) days of the date of this notice, pay the civil penalty in the amount of Four Thousand Dollars (\$4,000) or you may protest the imposition of the civil penalty in whole, or in part, by a written answer. Should you fail to answer within the time specified, this office will issue an order imposing the civil penalty in the amount proposed above. Should you elect to file an answer protesting the civil penalty, such answer may (a) deny the violation listed in the Notice of Violation in whole or in part, (b) demonstrate extenuating


circumstances, (c) show error in the Notice of Violation or (d) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty.

Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from your statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but you may incorporate by specific reference (e.g., giving page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition.

Your attention is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205 regarding, in particular, failure to answer and ensuing orders; answer, consideration by this office, and ensuing orders; requests for hearings, hearings and ensuing orders; compromise; and collection. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which has been subsequently determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, the matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 USC 2282).

FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Donald F. Knuth
Director of Regulatory Operations



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION 1

~~970 BROAD STREET~~
~~NEWARK, NEW JERSEY 07102~~

631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

J. P. O'Reilly, Director

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
OYSTER CREEK 1
DOCKET NO. 50-219
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SEP 11

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I believe that the licensee can present no reasonable denial or statement of extenuating circumstances.

Handwritten signature of R. T. Carlson in cursive.

R. T. Carlson, Chief
Facility Operations Branch

To: James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject: Abnormal Occurrence Report 73-22.

The following is a preliminary report being submitted
in compliance with the Technical Specifications
paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:

J. T. Carroll, Jr. 8/10/73
J. T. Carroll, Jr. Date

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

E/160

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ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE

REPORT NO. 73-22

SUBJECT: Violation of the Technical Specification, paragraph 1.15.E., excessive leakage through Main Steam Isolation Valve NS03B.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15.E. Notification of this event as required by the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.6.2.a, was made to AEC Region I, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, by telephone on Monday, September 10, 1973, at 9:45 a.m., and personally to Mr. E. Greenman on Monday, September 10, 1973.

SITUATION: The reactor was shutdown (scrammed) on September 8, 1973 at 0656. At 2255 on September 9, 1973, NS03B was tested for leakage and found to be in excess of 100 SCFH. The limit, as detailed in the Technical Specifications, is 9.95 SCFH (5% of L_{t0} [20]). An estimate of the leak rate is now being formulated and is conservatively expected to be \approx 200 SCFH.

CAUSE: Unknown at this time.

REMEDIAL ACTION:

Prior to disassembly of the valve, stem measurements are being taken on all four valves to check for conformity. In addition, the following organizations have been contacted, informed of the situation, and asked for comments. Their comments will be incorporated into our decision on further action.

REMEDIAL ACTION (Con't)

Atwood-Morrill (vendor)
General Electric Company
MPR Associates

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The rate of pressure buildup in the reactor was compared to a graph of pressure buildup where at least one valve in each steam line was leak tight. These plots compared favorably. This implies that one valve in the "B" Main Steam Line (i.e., NS04B) was leak tight. This was confirmed when pressure buildup between the valves was observed to be approximately the same as the reactor pressure. The redundancy feature will be ascertained only upon successful completion of the NS04B leak test.

Prepared by:

Ronald M. Bright

Date:

9/10/73


To: James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject: Abnormal Occurrence Report 73-21.

Following is a preliminary report being submitted
in compliance with the Technical Specifications
paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:


J. T. Carroll, Jr. 9/10/73
Date

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

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3pp.

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Date: 9/10/73
Time: 3:00 a.m.

ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE

REPORT NO. 73-21

SUBJECT: Failure of 21 Hydraulic Shock and Sway Arrestors on piping systems in the Drywell, including units on both Core Spray and both Isolation Condenser loops.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15.D. Notification of this event as required by the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.6.2.a, was made to AEC Region I, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, by telephone on Monday, September 10, 1973, at 12:45 p.m., and personally to Mr. E. Greeman on Monday, September 10, 1973.

SITUATION: The plant was shutdown on September 8, 1973 for the purpose of inspecting the Hydraulic Shock and Sway Arrestors located on piping systems throughout the Drywell.

CAUSE: The snubbers were made inoperable due to a loss of hydraulic fluid.

REMEDIAL ACTION:

The failed Hydraulic Shock and Sway Arrestors were replaced using snubbers rebuilt with seal kits supplied by the Bergen Paterson Pipe Support Company. The new seals are of a different type, which according to Bergen Paterson, will provide a longer seal life.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The loss of snubber operability resulted in a reduction in the ability of the plant to safely survive a design bases earthquake. The failures were such that they affected both Core Spray and both Emergency Condenser Systems.

Prepared by:

Arthur H. Pine

Date:

9/10/73

To: James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject: Abnormal Occurrence Report 73-20.

The following is a preliminary report being submitted
in compliance with the Technical Specifications
paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:

J. T. Carroll, Jr. 9/10/73
J. T. Carroll, Jr. Date

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

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B/162

ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE

REPORT NO. 73-20

SUBJECT: Failure of Isolation Condenser NE01A Condensate Return Valve V-14-34 to operate during the last stages of a plant cooldown.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15D. Notification of this event as required by the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.6.2.a, was made to AEC Region I, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, by telephone on Sunday, September 9, 1973, at 12:45 p.m., and personally to Mr. E. Greenman on Monday, September 10, 1973.

SITUATION: During the last stages of a plant cooldown, an attempt was made to initiate the "A" Isolation Condenser. The condensate return valve V-14-34, however, failed to operate. Pertinent data is as follows:

Valve Manufacturer: Crane
Size: 10" Wedge Gate
Operator Manufacturer: Philadelphia Gear Company/
Peerless Electric
Operator Type: SNV Size 2
Motor Rating: 4.3 h.p. @ 1900 rpm, 125 volts DC,
35 amps

Prior to this failure, the valve had been operated successfully with no failures on previous operability surveillance tests and also had been used several times during the initial stages of the plant cooldown.

CAUSE: Both overloads for the starting contactor were found tripped.

September 8, 1973

REMEDIAL ACTION:

The overloads were reset and the valve was operated electrically with no prior manual operation. It was fully stroked open and closed twice, operating satisfactorily. A trace of currents drawn by the motor was taken and compared with a trace taken the previous Thursday (September 6, 1973). No differences were detected.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The significance of this event is the loss of redundancy of the Isolation Condenser System, one of which is required to act as a means for heat removal as detailed in Amendment 67 to the FDSAR.

Prepared by:

W. H. Rivas, Jr.

Date:

9/10/73


To: James P. O'Reilly
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Region I
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From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject: Abnormal Occurrence Report 73-19

The following is a preliminary report being submitted
in compliance with the Technical Specifications
paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:

 9/10/73
J. T. Carroll, Jr. Date

cc: Mr. A. Gianbusso

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B1163

Date: 9/8/73
Time: 6:55 a.m.

ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE

REPORT NO. 73-19

SUBJECT: Violation of the Technical Specification, paragraph 3.7.A.2, in that although both startup transformers were energized to carry power to the station 4160V AC buses, neither transformer could be considered operable due to an improper setting on the C base differential monitoring relay.

Additionally, this event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15G, in that proper procedural controls were not implemented with respect to protective relay testing, which resulted in the development of an unsafe condition in connection with the operation of the plant.

Notification of this event, as required by the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.6.2.a, was made to AEC Region I, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, by telephone on Saturday, September 8, 1973, at 10:15 a.m., and by telecopier on Monday, September 10, 1973, at 1:30 p.m.

SITUATION:

A plant shutdown had progressed to the point where, with electrical output at approximately 90 MWe, a transfer of station loads from the Auxiliary Transformer to the Startup Transformers was attempted. When a closing signal was applied to the SlA breaker, a loss of power occurred the the "1A" 4160V AC bus, which among other things caused two circulatory water pumps, three reactor recirculation pumps and the operating condensate and feedwater pumps to trip. Diesel Generator #1 started

In the "Fast Start" mode, reenergizing the 4160V "1C" bus and the requisite safeguard power supplies. An attempt was made to start the B and C condensate pumps, but before either pump could be started, the reactor scrambled due to low water level. Automatic transfer to the S1B transformer was accomplished, but later in attempting to start a condensate pump powered from the "1B" 4160V bus, S1B tripped initiating the "Fast Start" sequence on Diesel Generator #2. The second CRD pump was started to assist in monitoring reactor water level which dropped to 9 feet above the active fuel. The reactor was isolated to prevent water inventory loss and the emergency condensers were initiated as needed to remove decay heat. The point at which reactor isolation occurs and the emergency cooling system is initiated was not reached.

CAUSE: The problem was traced to an incorrect setting of the current transformer ratio matching taps for the C phase differential relay on both startup transformers. In attempting to either carry a sizeable load or start a large load, a differential fault was sensed, tripping the output breakers.

REMEDIAL ACTION:

The current transformer ratio matching taps were set up properly and station loads were returned to normal. The company Relay Department was contacted and load checks were conducted in each of the startup transformer phase differential relays. All checks were satisfactory.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The significance of this event is that the designed redundancy of power supplies for the station 4160V buses was not present and, in fact, had not been present since July 30, 1973 when the relay test was made. However, both diesel generators did function properly upon the loss of power. Consequently, plant safety was not endangered.

Prepared by:

D. H. Reave, Jr.

Date:

September 10, 1973