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631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

H. D. Thornburg, Chief
Field Support and Enforcement Branch
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, HQ

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY (DN 50-219)
OYSTER CREEK - FUEL STORAGE CAPABILITY

The total storage capacity for spent fuel assemblies at Oyster Creek is 840 assemblies (1.5 cores). At the conclusion of the spring, 1973, refueling outage spent fuel storage was 308 assemblies. The licensee does not have the capability of complete core removal and storage in the pool at this time. Projected assembly removal and storage in 1974 involves an additional 112-116 fuel assemblies. No spent fuel has been shipped from this site.

Discussions with corporate and site management indicated that the GE shipping cask availability is anticipated in February 1974. The cask drop protection system is under fabrication and should be completed in January 1974. Railroad spur installation has been conducted on schedule. Notwithstanding, the licensee indicated that GE may be unable to perform in accordance with the fuels reprocessing contract based on the Morris reprocessing facility projected availability. The licensee's Nuclear Fuels Group (GPU) has been in contact with NFS with respect to interim storage due to contingency factors. It is our understanding that NFS has capability for storage but available space may be committed.

In our view the inability to provide whole core storage capability on site is undesirable. Barring significant core problems we do not project fuel storage problems at Oyster Creek prior to 1975. An RO:I evaluation of storage capability for all regional operating facilities is in progress.

E. J. Brunner, Chief
Reactor Operations Branch

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OFFICE ▶	RO:I					
SURNAME ▶	Greenman	Caphton	Brunner			
DATE ▶		12/14	12/16			

Form AEC-318 (Rev. 9-53) AECM 0240

To: James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject: Preliminary Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 73-31

The following is a preliminary report being submitted in compliance with the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:

J. T. Carroll, Jr. 12/14/73
J. T. Carroll, Jr. Date

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

B/48

Report No. 73-31

SUBJECT: Momentary interuption of 125V DC power supplying instrumentation associated with various safeguard systems.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraphs 1.15D and G. Notification of this event, as required by the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.6.2.a, was made to the AEC, Region I, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, by telephone on Friday, December 14, 1973, at 1510, and by telecopier at 1700.

SITUATION: An electrical ground had developed on 125V DC distribution bus "A" resulting in electricians being called in at approximately 2300, December 13, 1973 to troubleshoot and repair this problem. Electrical grounds of this nature have been an infrequent problem in the past and as of this time no approved procedures have been developed. It is common knowledge that any interuption of power to power panel "E" results in adverse effects regarding service to safeguard instrumentation. Consequently, the electrician, who had performed this same maintenance activity of troubleshooting and repair on occasion in the past, proceeded to place a jumper in a position that would parallel the "A" and "B" distribution buses. This, then, provided non-interuptible alternate feed to power panel "E" and by actuating the "break before make" throwover switch, it could be determined if the ground was in the "E"

power panel by observing the indicating lights on the "B" bus. However, the electrician placed the jumper in the wrong position and effectively did not have the buses paralleled as desired. Upon pushing the local button for transferring the "B" power panel from the "A" to the "B" bus, there was a momentary interuption of power on the order of milliseconds, caused by the normal action of the "break before make" switch, with the following results:

1. Operating CRD pump "A" tripped due to loss of power to low pump suction trip circuit. Operator immediately restarted pump.
2. "B" isolation condenser isolated due to loss of power to pipe-break monitoring system. Operator immediately reset isolation condenser isolation button and valving re-aligned properly for normal standby service.
3. Clean-up system isolated due to loss of power to relaying associated with this function. Operator returned system to service as per normal procedure.
4. DC power was lost to logic channel C (Core Spray System I) and logic channel D (Core Spray System II) for the brief interval. These channels immediately reset automatically requiring no operator action. Logic channels "A" and "B" were not effected and the redundant equipment in each system was available.

5. DC power was lost to the logic channels of Containment Spray System I. Again, with the rapid restoration of power, the logic was automatically restored. The redundant system II was not effected and would have operated if necessary. No operator action required.

6. A trouble alarm was received on both diesel generators, but was immediately reset from the control room and was strictly due to loss of DC power to the alarm relay and had no effect on automatic operation of the diesel generators.

7. Lost DC power to main steam isolation valves, but had no effect on valve operation since AC power was still available and permitted valves to stay open.

8. DC power was lost to miscellaneous annunciators and panels, but did not have any additional effect in the safe operation of the plant.

REMEDIAL ACTION:

Restoration of the equipment to normal status was accomplished through the automatic reset function of effected instrumentation. As noted above, the isolation condenser, CRD pump, clean-up system and miscellaneous alarm functions were manually reset and restored to normal service immediately.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

As the interval of time involved in this incident is on the order of milliseconds and all effected systems reset immediately or within several seconds where operator action was required, the safety significance of this event is minimal. In the case of the isolation condenser, design redundancy was lost for the interval prior to the operator resetting the system. However, the redundant isolation condenser was available and would have performed if required.

Prepared by: James P. Mooney Date: 12/14/73