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J. P. Stohr, Senior, Environmental Protection and Special Programs Section, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I

INSPECTOR'S EVALUATION
RO INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-219/73-16
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY (JCPL)
OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR STATION (OC)

The above inspection report documents the findings of my review of the licensee's environmental monitoring program. This inspection was conducted primarily as a follow-up to an earlier inspection (RO Inspection Report 50-219/73-03) at which time 13 violations were identified. This current inspection revealed that corrective actions had been taken as stated by the licensee in his letter dated May 22, 1973. No new violations were identified during this inspection.

The inspector noted that although no violations were identified, the monitoring programs themselves were unchanged and as such, remained deficient. The licensee stated that an upgraded environmental program was scheduled to be included with an upcoming submission of Environmental Technical Specifications on November 1, 1973. This new environmental program should be evaluated rather closely to insure that it meets current standards.

The major problem identified during this inspection was the supervision and evaluation being provided by the licensee with respect to the current programs existing at the OC site. If this level of supervision and evaluation are allowed to continue without change into the upgraded program, many of the objectives of this program may be negated. The individual in charge of the program is extremely conscientious and as such can see that the samples are taken as required. As far as the evaluation of resultant data, no individual at the site possesses sufficient depth in this area to provide any meaningful evaluation and from my observations and discussions with licensee personnel, no one at the corporate level (JCPL or GPU) has shown any concern or interest in this area.

It appears that although the outer compliance with Technical Specification has been achieved, at least for the present, management attitude remains apathetic. This attitude may change with the upgraded program but I saw no evidence of any change at this time. The Station Superintendent and

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Technical Supervisor were both responsive to our inquiries but neither has the proper background to handle this problem without support from higher corporate management. It is recommended that this matter be reviewed in greater detail subsequent to the submission of the upgraded program.

for Dr. Charles O. Gallina
Radiation Specialist

Jersey Central Power & Light Company

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MEMBER OF THE General GPU ELECTRIC POWER COMPANIES SYSTEM Public Utilities Corporation

November 13, 1973

Mr. A. Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station
Docket No. 50-219
Hydraulic Shock and Sway Arrestor Failure

This letter serves to report a failure of one (1) hydraulic shock and sway arrestor unit (HSSA) on the steam line for isolation condenser NE01B. found while performing a monthly check of all units in the reactor building external to the drywell, as recommended by the Plant Operations Review Committee. This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraphs 1.15B and D. Notification of this event, as required by the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.6.2.a, was made to AEC Region 1, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, by telephone on Saturday, November 3, 1973, and by telecopier on Monday, November 5, 1973.

While conducting an inspection of the hydraulic shock and sway arrestors (snubbers) located on various systems in the reactor building, but outside of the drywell, the accumulator on one unit on the steam line to the "B" isolation condenser was found to be devoid of fluid.

Additionally, another unit on the steam line to the "A" isolation condenser was initially reported to be failed, but further inspection and evaluation by the mechanical maintenance foreman and the maintenance engineer resulted in the unit being considered to be operable but low in accumulator fluid level.

Upon disassembly and inspection of the accumulator installed on the "B" isolation condenser, the spring loaded piston ring was found to be failed. Although no deterioration or other unusual conditions could be visually determined, the U-cup on the accumulator piston head apparently was degraded to a point where it allowed the fluid to leak out. The unit had not been rebuilt during either the Spring 1973 Refueling/Turbine Generator Inspection nor during the September 1973 Snubber/Turbine Control Valve Outage.

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Pertinent data is as follows:

Manufacturer: Bergen Paterson Pipe Support Company
Type: HSSA-10
Serial No.: 469946

The initial inspection report indicated that one unit on the steam line for the "A" isolation condenser and one unit on the "B" isolation condenser were inoperable. Consequently, as per the requirements of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.8.D, an orderly plant shutdown was commenced upon notification of the situation. Meanwhile, an immediate reinspection was made on both snubbers with results as previously indicated. Nevertheless, preparations for an orderly shutdown continued until the accumulator for the snubber on the "A" isolation condenser could be filled to a satisfactory level. This action was completed by 1845 Friday, November 2, 1973. The load drop which had been started was halted, and the plant returned to its previous operating level of 595 MWe(g). Follow-up action included replacement of the accumulator on the snubber installed on the "B" isolation condenser steam line, then replacement of the entire snubber unit on the "A" isolation condenser steam line, since it had been leaking. This action was completed by 1910 Friday evening. A follow-up check was then made on Saturday evening to insure that no further fluid loss was occurring.

Amendment 67 to the FDSAR details the requirements for at least one isolation condenser to be available as a heat sink in the event of a loss of coolant accident. Both condensers would have been able to perform this function; however, had an earthquake occurred which would have required proper functioning of all installed snubbers, the steam line to the "B" condenser may not have been able to withstand the anticipated forces. Consequently, should a rupture then have occurred, a release of reactor steam to the secondary containment would have resulted. Analysis of this accident has been made assuming a valve closure time of 60 seconds after the break, and found to be less severe than a rupture of the main steam line and subsequent closure of the main steam isolation valves. The significance of this event then is the increased probability of steam release to the secondary containment which, had that occurred with subsequent unit isolation, then would have resulted in a loss of redundancy of the isolation condensers to act as a heat sink.

In lieu of waiting an additional month to reinspect snubbers located in the reactor building, this reinspection will be conducted within the next two weeks. Based upon the inspection findings, a determination will be made as to an acceptable future inspection frequency.

In addition, four snubbers previously not included in the inspection program, two of which are located on the No. 2 containment spray system and two on the No. 1 core spray system, will be inspected promptly and will be included in subsequent inspections.

It is further intended that the ethylene propylene seal procurement effort be continued such that any units rebuilt in the future would contain seals of this material.

Enclosed are forty (40) copies of this report.

Very truly yours,

Donald A. Ross

Donald A. Ross
Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations

DAR:cs
Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I