UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 86 TO FACILITY OPERATING

LICENSE NO. DPR-59

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

1.0 Introduction

By letter dated October 9, 1984, the Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) proposed certain changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) to correct a typographical error found in Table 3.2-7 of Appendix A.

As the existing table is written, instruments used to detect high reactor pressure for the purpose of initiating a recirculation pump trip are required to have a setpoint "greater than or equal to 1120 psig" rather than a setpoint "less than or equal to 1120 psig." This incorrectly establishes a lower limit instead of an upper limit for this setpoint.

2.0 Evaluation

The intent of a recirculation pump trip is to provide a means of reducing reactor power in the event of a failure-to-scram. Table 3.2-7 should correctly establish an upper limit for the reactor pressure trip setpoint; exceeding this setpoint should trip the recirculation pumps, thereby reducing reactor power and, consequently, reactor pressure.

In the Final Safety Analysis Report, Appendix E, Section E.32, the licensee, with reference to General Electric topical report NEDO-10349, "Analysis of Anticipated Transients Without Scram," committed to making design changes which would provide for tripping the recirculation pumps on a high reactor pressure event. The NEDO-10349 report concluded that tripping the recirculation pumps when reactor pressure was greater than or equal to 1150 psig was effective in keeping reactor power, pressures, and temperatures below safety limits and for allowing time for appropriate operator action. The licensee had historically used a setpoint value of 1135 psig until discovery of the error in August 1984. Shortly after discovery, the setpoint was readjusted to a value below 1120 psig.

Although the licensee failed to recognize the error in the TS until August 1984 we find that no significant safety hazard existed prior to its discovery and subsequent readjustment of the setpoint because plant procedures assured that at no time was the 1150 psig setpoint upper limit referenced in NEDO-10349 exceeded.

We conclude that the licensee's proposed amendment provides a necessary correction to the TS and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.0 Environmental Consideration

This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

4.0 Conclusions

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Dated: January 30, 1985