


VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION



P.O. Box 157, Governor Hunt Road
Vernon, Vermont 05354-0157
(802) 257-7711

March 14, 1996

BVY 96-28

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555


REFERENCE: Operating License DPR-28
Docket No. 50-271
Reportable Occurrence No. LER 96-006

Dear Sirs:

As defined by 10 CFR 50.73, we are reporting the attached Reportable Occurrence as LER 96-006.

Very truly yours,

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION


for RJW
Robert J. Wanczyk
Plant Manager

cc: Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

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ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20566-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION	DOCKET NUMBER ()	PAGE (3)
		05000271	01 OF 03

TITLE (4) Potentially Inoperable Residual Heat Removal Service Water Valves due to the Bolts Holding the Valve Operators being Insufficiently Tight

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NO.(S)
02	14	96	96	-- 006 --	00	03	14	96	N/A	05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: CHECK ONE OR MORE (11)								
POWER LEVEL (10)	100	20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)					
		20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)					
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71					
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER					
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.36(c)(1)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)	(Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A)					
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)	
NAME	TELEPHONE NO. (Include Area Code)
ROBERT J. WANCZYK, PLANT MANAGER	802-257-7711

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
NA					NA				
NA					NA				

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)			MO	DAY	YEAR	
X	YES	(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)		NO				09	30	96

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
 On February 14, 1996, with the plant at 100% power, during the planning process to repair a slightly loose valve operator on the "B" Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Heat Exchanger outlet isolation valve, a Planner discovered that the same condition existed on the "A" RHRSW Heat Exchanger outlet isolation valve. In each case the bolts holding the valve operator onto the valve bonnets had loosened slightly. The RHRSW system is required to be operational following a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). It is conservatively postulated that with the system continuously running the bolts would be subjected to normal system vibration and could loosen such that the operators become detached from the valves. The design of the valve would allow flow to close the valves with the operators detached, with the loss of Service Water (SW) flow to the RHR heat exchanger. Containment Cooling and Shutdown Cooling could be lost and not be immediately repaired. The radiation levels following a LOCA could prohibit entry into the Reactor Building to repair the valves, for an extended period of time. As this system is used to remove residual heat and could have potentially not fulfilled its safety function it is reportable under 50.73(a)(2)(v).
 The root cause investigation is in progress. A supplemental LER will be submitted once the root cause has been determined. The immediate corrective action was to inspect and retighten the bolts that attach the valve operators. As the valves were functional during the period that the bolts were slightly loose and there was no LOCA, there was no danger to the health and safety of the public and no safety consequences resulted from this event.

NRC Form 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20566-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.				
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)						
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION		05000271	YEAR 96	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER -- 006 --	REV # 00	02 OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On February 14, 1996, at 1015 hours, with the plant at 100% power, during the maintenance planning process to repair a slightly loose valve operator on the "B" Residual Heat Removal Service Water (EHS = BS) (RHRSW) Heat Exchanger outlet isolation valve, a Planner discovered that the same condition existed on the "A" RHRSW Heat Exchanger outlet isolation valve. At 1015 hours, on 2/14/96, a priority Work Order was written to repair the valves and the RHRSW A and B subsystems were declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.C.4, (24 hour Limiting Condition for Operations [LCO]), Containment Cooling subsystems A and B were declared inoperable per TS 3.5.B.2 (24 hour LCO) and the Alternate Cooling subsystem was declared inoperable per TS 3.5.D.3 (7 day LCO). The "B" RHRSW loop was tagged out and repairs made to the valve operator in that loop. At 1407 hours, on 2/14/96, the "B" RHRSW loop was restored to service and the "A" RHRSW loop was tagged out and repairs made to the valve operator in that loop. At 1455 hours, on 2/14/96, the RHRSW "A" loop was returned to service. At 1500 hours on 2/14/96, following post maintenance testing, the "A" and "B" RHRSW loops, the "A" and "B" Containment Cooling loops and the Alternate Cooling System was declared operable.

The bolts holding the manual valve operators to the valve bonnets had loosened slightly but not sufficiently to prevent operation of the valve operators. The valves remained functional during the time that the bolts were slightly loose such that Containment Cooling and Shutdown Cooling were functional. The design of the valves is such that if the operators became detached, the direction of flow through the valves could cause them to shut and stop cooling water flow to the RHR heat exchangers. This could result in a loss of Containment and Shutdown cooling.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The root cause of this event is under investigation. A supplemental LER will be submitted once the root cause has been determined.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The RHRSW System is designed to provide cooling water for the RHR System during normal shutdown conditions and during a loss of off-site power. Its safety function is to provide sufficient cooling capacity for the RHR System during a design basis accident and minimize the probability of a release of radioactive contaminants to the environs. Contrary to the above, it was determined that the heat exchanger discharge isolation valves would close if the operators became detached from the valves and the system would subsequently become inoperable. Should the valves become inoperable post-LOCA, the dose rates in the Reactor Building could make it inaccessible for an extended period of time thereby preventing any corrective maintenance to return the valves to service. This would prevent the containment from being cooled using the RHRSW System. Alternate means to provide cooling are addressed in the plant emergency operating procedures which would be used by the operators.

During the period that the bolts were slightly loose, the valves remained operable and no events occurred to warrant the use of Containment or Torus cooling.

At no time was there any danger to the health and safety of the public and no safety consequences resulted from this event.

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20566-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV #	
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION	05000271	96	-- 006 --	00	03 OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediate

- 1) An Event Report was immediately written on this event which will provide a follow-up investigation and root cause determination.
- 2) Priority Work Orders were written to inspect and retighten the bolts on the valves. This activity was completed on 2/14/96

Long Term

- 1) A Work Order has been written to recheck the bolt torque of these valves by 6/15/96.
- 2) Any additional long term corrective actions that are identified when the root cause is completed will be noted in the Supplemental LER.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

No similar event have been reported to the Commission in the last five years.