

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

REGULATORY COMMISSION

INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE

601 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 300
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76010

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REPORT OF INQUIRY

SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION;
ALLEGED IMPROPER CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES

REPORT NUMBER: Q4-84-016

1. On February 28, 1984, the Region IV OI Field Office received a telephone call from Scott SEAHORN, a former Brown & Root, Inc., electrician at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES). SEAHORN claimed he was in possession of documents, photographs and tape recordings containing enough information to close down CPSES with regard to improper construction practices. SEAHORN agreed to provide specific information during personal interview, and agreed to meet with Region IV OI Field Office on February 29, 1984. SEAHORN related that he worked for Brown & Root for about 4 years and was terminated by Brown & Root, Inc., on February 20, 1984.

Results of Interview with

3. On February 29, 1984, SEAHORN was interviewed by NRC investigators Richard K. FRK and Wendel E. FROST at [redacted]. Results of interview with SEAHORN is included with this report of inquiry as Exhibit (2).

4. SEAHORN provided the following information during his interview:

- (a) SEAHORN's first major concern related to the possible damage of stainless steel rods, approximately 15 feet in length and 2 1/2 inches in diameter, that are located in the upper internals behind a missile shield in the core of the nuclear reactor in the Reactor Building. SEAHORN claimed that two of the stainless steel bars had been bent out of shape approximately 1 foot from the ends during an accident with either a fork lift or a crane. SEAHORN alleged that the bars had been pulled back into shape by placing a rope from the crane, and that the damage had never been properly reported or documented.
- (b) SEAHORN's second concern involved cracks in the concrete pad at the bottom of the reactor core.

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located at the top of the reactor vessel. When the polycrystalline
aluminum was removed, the steel bars were located in the
concrete below the reactor vessel. Called out a pile
of steel bars, they had been removed from the
reactor vessel.

On March 1, 1984, the three technical issues stemming from SEAHORN's
interview were forwarded to Region IV. Region IV
informed the OI Field Office that problems with the polycrystalline
problems with cracking in the concrete below the reactor vessel were old
issues that the NRC had addressed previously in inspection reports.
Region IV however did request an immediate inspection of the possibility
of having damaged stainless steel bars located in the upper internals of
the reactor vessel. Subsequently, an inspection was performed by
Region IV personnel to determine if any damage existed. A visual
inspection resulted in no damage being observed, and information received
from the resident site inspectors indicated that this also had been an old
issue that the NRC had previously addressed. An incident involving damage
to the upper internals had previously been reported by the utility and
properly repaired and dispositioned. Findings of the inspection conducted
by Region IV personnel are located in the Monthly Regional Inspector's
Report for the month of March 1984. Due to the fact that the three
technical allegations stemming from the SEAHORN interview have been
properly addressed by Region IV, this inquiry is CLOSED.

- Exhibit (1) Results of Interview with Wassel LEWIS, Ph.D., M.D. 2-29-84
- Exhibit (2) Results of Interview with Scott SEAHORN 2-29-84


FORWARDED BY: Wendel E. Frost
Wendel E. Frost, Investigator
OI Field Office
Region IV

APPROVED BY: Richard B. Herr
Richard B. Herr, Director
OI Field Office
Region IV

- cc: E. C. Gilbert ✓ w/o exhibits
- J. T. Collins w/exhibits
- T. F. Westerman w/o exhibits

23. RECORDS OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535



END OF RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH



SIGNATURE:

Wendell E. Frost

Wendell E. Frost, Investigator
of the Bureau

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION
TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF MENDEL E. FROST
ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984

On February 29, 1984, Scott SEAHORN, a former electrical engineer employed by Brown & Root, Inc., at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), was interviewed at [REDACTED] by the investigators Richard L. HITT and Mendel E. FROST. SEAHORN advised that he had been employed as an electrician for Brown & Root at CPSES for about 4 years and was terminated on February 20, 1984. SEAHORN related that he had become afraid for his life because he had refused to include employees of Brown & Root in a construction project in which he was building log cabins for sale. SEAHORN related that he had [REDACTED] at the site in order to protect himself from Brown & Root employees.

SEAHORN was especially afraid of Charlie BRITT, Superintendent, Brown & Root. BRITT had previously come to SEAHORN's home selling life insurance. SEAHORN believed that if he did not buy life insurance from Charlie BRITT, that he would lose his job at CPSES. SEAHORN was also fearful of Elaine BRITT because SEAHORN had been involved in the theft of electrical equipment and tools from Brown & Root with BRITT's knowledge. SEAHORN related how [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SEAHORN's main technical concerns involved the following three areas:

- (a) SEAHORN's first major concern related to damage to 15 foot long, 2 1/2 inch stainless steel bars located in the upper internals in the reactor vessel located in the Reactor Building. SEAHORN was concerned that two of the stainless steel bars have been bent 1 foot from the top with either a fork lift or crane. SEAHORN contended that a rope had been placed on the stainless steel bars and pulled by the crane in order to straighten it. SEAHORN related that no documentation was ever acquired in order to show that the damage had occurred.

(1) Search of the reactor vessel area for evidence of a possible leak of radioactive material under the reactor vessel of the Reactor Building.

(2) Check the three concrete pillars supporting the crane located on top of the reactor vessel. SEAHORN was advised that when the polar crane failed, it caused the wire hangers that hold the reactor in that area. SEAHORN also related that festume cables located on the polar crane were defective because they contained broken internal wiring.

SEAHORN was unable to furnish detailed information involving names, dates or places. SEAHORN's information was only of a general nature. SEAHORN had previously indicated he had obtained documents, photographs and tape recordings that could close CPSES down. SEAHORN, however, refused release any documents, photographs or tape recordings to investigators. SEAHORN contended that he was in possession of such evidence; however, he refused to turn any evidence over to the Office of Investigations or reveal the hidden location of the evidence.

END OF RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH SCOTT SEAHORN ON FEBRUARY 23, 1964.

SIGNATURE: Wanda E. Frost
Wanda E. Frost, Investigator
of Field Office