

NOTICE OF DEVIATION

Toledo Edison Company  
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Docket No. 50-346  
License No. PPF-3


Based on the results of the NRC inspection and investigation completed on October 6, 1992, certain of your activities appeared to deviate from your written response to an NRC request for additional information about safe shutdown methodology, as indicated below:

By letter to the NRC, dated October 11, 1989, Serial No. 1718, the licensee responded to an NRC request to confirm that a station blackout would not be created in implementing procedural steps for post fire safe shutdown. The licensee's response specified that the procedural steps taken to isolate offsite power in case of a significant fire would not cause a station blackout because at least one diesel generator would automatically start on low voltage signal and sequentially load essential safeguards buses.

Contrary to the above, during a post fire safe shutdown inspection conducted May 21-24, 1990, the NRC identified that a station blackout could have been created during certain conditions when implementing the post fire safe shutdown procedure. Abnormal Procedure DB-OP-02519, "Serious Control Room Fire," Revision 1, dated May 18, 1990, directed the operators to first open offsite power breakers and then to shut down emergency diesel generators No. 1-1 and 1-2 in the event that no component cooling water flow was evident. This combined loss of onsite and offsite power would create a self-induced station blackout.

Results of the inspection showed that previous action had been taken by the licensee to correct this deviation, consequently, no reply to the deviation is required.

Dated at Glen Ellyn, Illinois,  
this 3rd day of November, 1992

  
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H. J. Miller, Director  
Division of Reactor Safety