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the southern electric system

L. T. Gucwa
Manager Nuclear Engineering
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NED-84-559

October 23, 1984

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. John F. Stolz, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4
Division of Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC DOCKET 50-321
OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1
CORRECTION OF PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION
PROGRAM JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CONTINUED OPERATION

Gentlemen:

By letter dated October 19, 1984 (NED-84-550) Georgia Power Company (GPC) responded to your October 12, 1984 request for additional information regarding GPC's requested schedular relief from certain environmental qualification requirements. As part of the response to NRC Item No. 4, GPC submitted a new Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) as part of Enclosure 5 to that submittal. In the instructions included with Enclosure 5, GPC stated that the newly submitted JCO should be used to replace the previously submitted JCO on page 46 (of Attachment 2 to NED-84-508, dated September 26, 1984). Instead the original page 46 should have remained intact and the new JCO should have been added to Attachment 2 as page 47.

Enclosed with this submittal are copies of both JCOs in question. These two JCOs should be added to Attachment 2 of NED-84-508 as pages 46 and 47. Any JCOs now in that Attachment numbered as page 46 should be discarded. Note that the new page 47 contains corrections of typographical errors which have been found in the JCO contained in Enclosure 5 to NED-84-550.

Very truly yours,

L. T. Gucwa

CBS/mb
Enclosures
xc: J. T. Beckham, Jr.
H. C. Nix, Jr.
J. P. O'Reilly (NRC- Region II)
Senior Resident Inspector

A046
1/1

ATTACHMENT 2

E41-C002 (LS-4)

This limit switch is attached to the HPCI Turbine stop valve and controls the signal which opens the HPCI system discharge valve as well as activates the turbine regulator ramp generator on HPCI turbine start.

The limit switch is not required for a HELB in the HPCI room which is a rupture of the HPCI steam supply line. No credit is taken for the operation of the HPCI turbine to mitigate the consequences of a HPCI steam line break.

The limit switch could be subjected to a harsh environment due to radiation after a LOCA. The limit switch is a NAMCO Model D200G-ST-2 and does not have any documented radiation exposure test data. The manufacturer has provided a list of non-mettallic parts which are used in the subject switch. Each part has been reviewed to determine its radiation damage threshold value. The results of the evaluation have demonstrated that the most susceptible part has a threshold value 5 times higher than the maximum expected total integrated dose in the HPCI room; therefore, the switch is expected to operate as designed. 1

Based on the above, continued operation is justified.

ATTACHMENT 2

E41-C002 (SV1)

E41-C002 is the HPCI Turbine and auxiliaries [including Solenoid Valve E41-C002(SV1)].

The HPCI Turbine could be subjected to a harsh environment due to temperature after a HPCI steam line break, but no credit is taken for the operation of the HPCI Turbine following a rupture of its steam supply line.

In the event of a large break LOCA for which the HPCI system cannot maintain RPV level, the HPCI Turbine may be subjected to high radiation. However, in this case the HPCI System is not required since the RPV will be depressurized by the break and/or the actuation of the ADS System. Adequate core cooling is then provided by the low pressure ECCS systems.

In the event of a small break LOCA for which the HPCI can maintain RPV level, the core never uncovers and hence core cooling is maintained and the high radiation environment is not present. 2

This piece of equipment has been used during normal operation in plants similar to Hatch 1 for the past eleven (11) years. To date, no age related common mode failures have been reported. These devices have experienced relatively limited service in Hatch 1 as they have been used during normal operation for only five (5) years. With this limited service this equipment is not expected to fail before replacement.

Based on the above, continued operation is justified.