

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) **Davis-Besse Unit 1** DOCKET NUMBER (2) **05000346** PAGE (3) **1 OF 03**

TITLE (4) **INADVERTENT TURBINE TRIP FROM 70 per cent FULL POWER**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES
09	11	18	4	84					
									DOCKET NUMBER(S) 050000
									050000

OPERATING MODE (9) **070** THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50. (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(b)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(c)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 308A)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(viii)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(ix)	<input type="checkbox"/>		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME **Jan Stotz, Technical Section, Ext. 372** TELEPHONE NUMBER **4119 25191-151010**

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
A	J I	I L S	M 0 4 0	N					
X	S B	I P S V	C 6 0 0	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

Davis-Besse was operating at approximately 70% of full power during the power coastdown of Cycle 4. The refueling outage was scheduled to begin on September 14, and Maintenance personnel were positioning the rotor lifting beam onto the turbine deck in preparation for the outage. A 12" x 12" timber being used as dunnage was inadvertently slid into the piping supporting the Moisture Separator Reheater (MSR) High Water Level Switch. The switch activated, tripping the turbine at 1235:17 hours. The ARTS tripped the reactor in response to the turbine trip.

The post trip plant response was as expected. Since the unit was in the outage burnup window, it was decided to begin the refueling outage. A plant cooldown was initiated.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	0 1 3	-	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Description of Occurrence: On September 11, 1984 at 1235 hours, Davis-Besse experienced a turbine trip from 70 per cent full power. The turbine trip initiated an Anticipatory Reactor Trip System, ARTS, (JD) trip of the reactor. The post trip response was normal for a trip from 70 per cent full power. Pressurizer (PZR) level remained on scale, and minimum Reactor Coolant System, RCS, (AB) pressure was about 1880 psig. The Power Operated Relief Valve, PORV, (PSV) was not operated. Adequate subcooling margin existed at all times. The #1 Atmospheric Vent Valve, AVV (PSV) did not fully reseal on its own and operators had to lower steam header pressure to get it to reseal.

Since the unit was in the outage burnup window it was decided to begin the refueling outage. A Plant cooldown was initiated.

Later in the cooldown, in Mode 3, with one Reactor Coolant Pump, RCP (P) shutdown, operators had difficulty balancing pressure in the two Once Through Steam Generators, OTSG. At 0109 hours on September 12, 1984, the station received a Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System SFRCS, (JB) trip from low pressure in OTSG #1. This initiated another ARTS trip of the reactor.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of the trip was an error by personnel positioning a rotor lifting beam on the turbine deck in preparation for the refueling outage turbine work. A 12 x 12 inch timber being used as dunnage was inadvertently slid into the piping which supports the Moisture Separator Reheater, MSR, (SB) High Water Level Switch (LS). The bump caused the switch to actuate. The switch is intended to cause the turbine to be isolated when the water level gets too high in the MSR. This is to protect the turbine from damage that would occur if water hit the blades. The switch caused the turbine to trip which initiated an ARTS trip of the Reactor.

The cause of the #1 AVV not fully resealing was determined to be in the valve control circuit specifically the air control solenoids which are in need of replacement or refurbishment.

The cause of the SFRCS trip on September 12, 1984 was that the Plant Shutdown and Cooldown Procedure PP 1102.10 did not adequately cover an RCS cooldown using the Main Feed Pump Turbine, MFPT (SJ). This change in method of shutting down is due to not being able to use the Startup Feedpump due to pipe break criteria, (See LER 84-009.)

Analysis of Occurrence: The reactor was tripped by ARTS before any Reactor Protection System, RPS (JD) trip setpoint was reached. The PORV was not challenged. Adequate subcooling margin existed at all times. OTSG water levels were properly controlled. The AVV failure to fully reseal did not have a significant safety consideration since the valve was only slightly open. The leakage was not sufficient to affect steam pressure.

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		84	-013	-00	03	OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

Corrective Action: The maintenance workers who actuated the switch were counseled on being more careful around operating equipment. The station is working with engineering to place some type of removable guard around the MSR High Level Switches. Engineering will also review the possibility of adding a redundant switch to increase the reliability of the unit.

The AVV will be repaired during the 1984 refueling outage. The soldenoids will be replaced with a new type per the equipment qualification program.

Failure Data: The previous occurrence of this level switch being bumped causing a turbine trip was not reportable per the guidelines in effect prior to 1984.

Report No: NP-33-84-13

DVR No(s): 84-142, 84-143



October 11, 1984

Log No. K84-1283
File: RR 2 (NP-33-84-13)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

LER No. 84-013
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Date of Occurrence: September 11, 1984

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 84-013, which is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73, to provide 30 day written notification of the subject occurrence.

Yours truly,

Stephen M. Quennoz
Plant Manager
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

SMQ/bec

Enclosure

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