UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY
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ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI

DONALD F. SCHNELL
VICE PRESIDENT

MAILING ADDRESS:
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ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 63166

October 18, 1984

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Denton: ULNRC-953

DOCKET NUMBER 50-483
CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AFFIRMATION AND PROPOSED FSAR CHANGES

1) ULNRC-792 dated April 9, 1984
2) ULNRC-816 dated May 11, 1984
3) ULNRC-835 dated May 31, 1984
4) ULNRC-842 dated June 11, 1984

The referenced correspondence affirmed the accuracy of the Callaway Technical Specifications which were issued as Appendix A to the Callaway Facility Operating License NPF-25. In conjunction with issuance of the Callaway full power license, proposed revisions to the Technical Specifications were reviewed by members of my staff and discussed with me. In my judgement the changes do not affect my previous affirmation given in References 1 through 4.

In addition, the attached pages represent differences between the as-built plant and the FSAR. These will be included in the next revision to the FSAR.

Very truly yours,

Donald F. Schnell

Donald F. Schnell

ACP/drs

A001
1/1

STATE OF MISSOURI)
) S S
CITY OF ST. LOUIS)

Donald F. Schnell, of lawful age, being first duly sworn upon oath says that he is Vice President - Nuclear for Union Electric Company; that he has read the foregoing document and knows the content thereof; that he has executed the same for and on the behalf of said company with full power and authority to do so; and that the facts therein stated are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

By Donald F. Schnell
Donald F. Schnell
Vice President - Nuclear

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this day of , 1984

Peggy L. Bernhardt, Notary Public, State of Missouri
My commission expires September 4, 1988

Peggy L. Bernhardt

cc: Glenn L. Koester
Vice President
Operations
Kansas Gas & Electric
P.O. Box 208
Wichita, Kansas 67201

Donald T. McPhee
Vice President
Kansas City Power and Light Company
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Bruce Little
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Steedman, Missouri 65077

The counting room fan-coil unit and filter unit operate in a continuous recirculation mode to provide the necessary cooling, filtration, and humidity control of the counting room atmosphere to maintain a suitable ambience for the electronic equipment and personnel in the room.

The amount of cooling is controlled by a temperature controller located in the return air duct to the unit. The controller functions to maintain the space air temperature at or below 74 F.

A moisture switch, located in the counting room fan-coil unit return air duct, senses the relative humidity of the return air and operates the humidifier, as required, to maintain the space relative humidity between 40 and 60 percent.

A HEPA and prefilter filter unit are provided upstream of the fan coil unit to minimize the airborne particulates in the space.

The control building supply air unit intake, the control building exhaust system, control room pressurization, and the access control exhaust system contain dampers capable of withstanding the effects of extreme wind or tornado conditions (3 psi total at a rate of 2 psi/second per Regulatory Guide 1.76). These dampers close with a tornado or high winds and are considered passive since they do not have actuation devices. The dampers located in the exhaust systems are spring loaded to prevent closure during normal system operations.

Based on the outside air design conditions, design space heat loads and operation of the control building HVAC systems, as described above, no area of the control building (except for the laundry and locker areas of the access control area) will exceed a relative humidity of 70 percent.

EMERGENCY OPERATION - Located downstream in the control building supply system ductwork, ~~upstream~~ of the supply unit, are redundant radiation monitors, ~~redundant chlorine monitors~~, and a smoke detector. These monitors sense contaminants in the influent and alarm in the control room when limits are exceeded. The high radiation and chlorine monitors (chlorine concentrations of 5.0 ppm or greater) initiate isolation of the control building normal supply and exhaust systems. The chlorine monitors comply with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.78, as discussed in Table 6.4-1. Chlorine monitors are not required for the Callaway plant per Section 2.2.3.1.3 of the Callaway Site Addendum.

C-A



BLIND NOTE:
ORG AREA H-1

BECHTEL

GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND

SNUPPS

PIPING AND INSTRUMENTATION DIAGRAM CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

THIS DRAWING APPLICABLE TO SNUPPS UNIT 2 ONLY	UTILITY DRAWING NO.	REV
	FSAR Figure 9.4-6, Sheet 1	A

JOB NO.	BECHTEL DRAWING NO.	REV
10466	M-22GN01(Q)	Q

DRAWING APPLICABLE TO UNITS: 2

1 34x44 "E" SIZE

VALVE NO.	LINE/ VALVE SIZE, IN.	INSIDE/ OUTSIDE CONT.	NORMAL FLOW DIRECTION	VALVE TYPE	VALVE OPERATOR	POWER SOURCE	PRIMARY ACTUATION SIGNAL	SECONDARY ACTUATION SIGNAL	MAXIMUM CLOSURE TIME (SEC.)	VALVE POSITION				
										NORMAL	SHUTDOWN	FAIL	PRIMARY	SECONDARY
PRESS TRANS.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

ASSOCIATED WITH A SAFETY FEATURES SYS. YES [X] NO [ ]

FLUID CONTAINED: WATER

LENGTH OF PIPING TO OUTERMOST ISOLATION VALVE: N/A

APPLICABLE GDC NO. 56





GENERAL COMMENTS:

PT-934, 935, 936 AND 937

THERE ARE FOUR INSTRUMENT LINES WHICH PENETRATE THE CONTAINMENT AND WHICH ARE REQUIRED TO REMAIN FUNCTIONAL FOLLOWING A LOCA OR STEAM BREAK. THESE LINES SENSE THE PRESSURE OF CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE ON THE INSIDE AND ARE CONNECTED TO PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS ON THE OUTSIDE. SIGNALS FROM THESE TRANSMITTERS CAN INITIATE SAFETY INJECTION AND CONTAINMENT ISOLATION ON HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE. THEY ALSO, UPON HI-HI CONTAINMENT PRESSURE, PRODUCE THE ONLY SIGNAL TO INITIATE CONTAINMENT SPRAY. IN VIEW OF THIS FUNCTION, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE LINE REMAIN OPEN AND NOT BE ISOLATED FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT. BASED ON THIS REQUIREMENT, A SEALED SENSING LINE, AS DESCRIBED BELOW, IS USED.

PT-938 AND PT-939 ARE THE WIDE RANGE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS REQUIRED BY NUREG-0737 AND REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97.

EACH OF THE FOUR CHANNELS HAS A SEPARATE PENETRATION, AND EACH PRESSURE TRANSMITTER IS LOCATED IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE OUTSIDE OF THE CONTAINMENT WALL. IT IS CONNECTED TO A SEALED BELLOWS, LOCATED IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE INSIDE CONTAINMENT WALL, BY MEANS OF A SEALED FLUID FILLED TUBE. THIS TUBING, ALONG WITH THE TRANSMITTER AND BELLOWS, IS CONSERVATIVELY DESIGNED AND SUBJECT TO STRICT QUALITY CONTROL AND TO REGULAR IN-SERVICE INSPECTIONS TO ASSURE ITS INTEGRITY. THIS ARRANGEMENT PROVIDES A DOUBLE BARRIER (ONE INSIDE AND ONE OUTSIDE) BETWEEN THE CONTAINMENT AND THE OUTSIDE ATMOSPHERE. SHOULD A LEAK OCCUR OUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT, THE SEALED BELLOWS INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND FULL CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESSURE, WILL PREVENT THE ESCAPE OF THE CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE. SHOULD A LEAK OCCUR INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT, THE DIAPHRAGM IN THE TRANSMITTER, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND FULL CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESSURE, WILL PREVENT ANY ESCAPE FROM THE CONTAINMENT. THIS ARRANGEMENT PROVIDES AUTOMATIC DOUBLE-BARRIER ISOLATION WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION AND WITHOUT SACRIFICING ANY RELIABILITY. BOTH THE BELLOWS AND TUBING INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT ARE ENCLOSED BY PROTECTIVE SHIELDING. THIS SHIELDING (BOX, CHANNEL OR GUARD PIPE, ETC.) PREVENT MECHANICAL DAMAGE TO THE COMPONENTS FROM MISSILES, WATER JETS, DROPPED TOOLS, ETC.

BECAUSE OF THIS SEALED FLUID FILLED SYSTEM, A POSTULATED SEVERANCE OF THE LINE DURING EITHER NORMAL OPERATION OR ACCIDENT CONDITIONS WILL NOT RESULT IN ANY RELEASE FROM THE CONTAINMENT.

APPENDIX J REQUIREMENT

TYPE A [X]
B [ ]
C [ ]
NONE [ ]

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION NO. ~~P-99, 101~~, 103 & 104 / ~~E-256, 261~~ E-256
DESCRIPTION: CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS

C-A
Rev. ~~10~~ 8/82

REFERENCE SECTION (S) 6.3, 9.4

SNUPPS – C

CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS
FIGURE 6.2.4-1
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