U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) DOCKET NUMBER (2) FACILITY NAME (1) OF 0 12 0 15 10 10 10 13 10 1 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant TITLE (A) Inadvertent Actuation of Train "B" Zone SV OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) EVENT DATE (6) FR NUMBER (8) REPORT DATE (7) DOCKET NUMBER(S) SEQUENTIAL NUMBER MONTH BACKS THE DEV VEAR VEAH 0 |5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | NA 0 15 10 10 10 0 9 1 4 8 14 8 4 0 0 1 0 1 2 8 4 0 1 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR & (Check one or more of the forlowing) (11) OPERATING 73.71(b) N 80 73(e)(2)(iv) 20.402(b) 20.406(e) 73.71(c) 80 36(e)(1) 50 73(a)(2)(v) 20 408(+)(1)(0 OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Follows) 80 73(a)(2)(vii) 1,0,0 20 406(a)(1)(iii 50 36(+)(2) 20 405(a)(1)(iii) 50 73(+1(2)(1) 50 73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 80 73(a)(2)(iii) 50 73(a)(2)(viii)(8) 20.408(a)(1)(iv) 80 73(a)(2)(a) 20.406(a)(1)(v) 80 7 7(a)(2)((iii) LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) TELEPHONE NUMBER HAME AREA COOF Sherry Bernhoft - Technical Support Engineer 41114 318181-12151610 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED !! THIS REPORT [13] REPORTABLE MANUFAC TO NPROS MANUFAC COMPONENT CAUSE SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENT A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

On September 14, 1984, with the plant at 100% power operation, Train "B" of the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System (ABSV) was inadvertently started by an Instrument & Controls person performing a work request on RM-14, the Auxiliary Building Vent Radiation Monitor. Investigation of the work request led him to believe that there was a loose connection in the control room instrument drawer. In order to examine the connection, he pulled the control and power cable out of the instrument drawer. This action, unknown to him at the time, generated a trip signal on the radiation monitor which automatically started Train "B" of the ABSV system. The control room operators, after verifying the cause of the start, secured the system and realigned it for normal operation.

A copy of this event has been routed to the different work groups in the plant to stress the importance of proper communications before work is performed.

The ventilation system performed as designed, and this event resulted in no impact on the health and safety of the public.

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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 speces is approximately fifteen single spece typewritten

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO 3150-G104

	EXPIRES 8/31/85										
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant	DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)					PAGE (3)			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

On September 14, 1984, with the plant at 100% power operation, Train "B" of the Auxiliary Building Special Vent System (VJ) was inadvertently started by an I&C person performing a work request on RM-14, the Auxiliary Building Vent Radiation Monitor (MON). Investigation of the work request led him to believe that there was a loose connection (CON) in the control room instrument drawer (CAB). In order to examine the connection he pulled the control and power cable (CBL) out of the instrument drawer. This action, unknown to him at the time, generated a trip signal in the radiation monitor which automatically started Train "B" of the ABSV system. The control room operators, after verifying the cause of the start, secured the system and realigned it for normal operation.

The ABSV system is designed to collect any potential containment vessel (VSL) leakage which might bypass the Shield Building Annulus (VC) and cause it to pass through charcoal filters (FLT) before reaching the environment. It also provides emergency ventilation in certain zones of the Auxiliary Building. The system will automatically start on a safety injection signal, high radiation signal from the Auxiliary Building vent radiation monitors and a steam exclusion signal. There are two redundant trains to the system; radiation monitor RM-13 provides a signal to Train "A" and RM-14 actuates Train "B".

The loose connection is a ribbon type connector which is secured in place by small fingers. Over time these fingers have broken off allowing the connector to vibrate loose. The same connector is used for other radiation monitors in the plant and is exhibiting the same failure mode. Past attempts to locate spare parts have been unsuccessful. Following this incident the Westinghouse Site Services Manager was contacted to assist in locating spare parts. If this attempt is unsuccessful, a design change will be initiated to purchase and install replacement connectors.

The person involved was made aware of his error. A copy of the incident report has been routed to the different work groups in the plant to stress the importance of proper communications before work is started.

The ventilation system performed as designed, and this event resulted in no impact on the health and safety of the public.

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION



P.O. Box 1200, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305

October 12, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Docket 50-305 Operating License DPR-43 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Reportable Occurrence 84-016-00

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 "Licensee Event Report System", the attached Licensee Event Report for reportable occurrence 84-016-00 is being submitted.

Very truly yours,

D. C. Hintz

SING

Manager - Nuclear Power

JGT/js

Attach.

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Suite 1500, 1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339
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