



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

JAN 09 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: A. Herdt, Chief, Engineering Program Branch

THRU: J. Olshinski, Director  
Division of Engineering and Operational Programs

FROM: B. Uryc, Investigation/Allegation Coordinator

SUBJECT: CATAWBA: ALLEGATIONS MADE TO ASLB HEARING ON CATAWBA

CASE NO: RII-84-A-0004

During an interview with alleger number four, he expressed the following concerns with regard to the Catawba facility. A partial annotated copy of the results of interview is enclosed.

1. Stiffeners on the containment wall: The alleger stated that in January 1978, he was inspecting stiffeners on the containment wall. His initial inspection involved checking the fit up during which he found problems with the tack welds which included slag and voids at the tack welds. He said he also found rollovers, bad undercuts, lack of fusion and excessive tack welds. He said he subsequently wrote an NCI and placed red tags on the stiffeners to stop the work. After logging the NCI into QA, a welding engineer came to the reactor and told him to remove the tags and let the welders continue on with the welding on the stiffeners. (see pages 5 and 6 of the enclosure)
2. Improperly welded pipe flange in Auxillary Building: The alleger stated that in February 1978, he became aware of a problem with a 30 inch pipe which came off the Auxillary Building on the number 2 reactor side. This pipe passed through a sleeve which was embedded in a concrete wall at the fourth level. A problem resulted with concrete settling around the pipe sleeve in that the concrete did not completely settle behind a flange on the pipe sleeve. The flange was removed and the concrete repaired. When attempts were made to reinstall the flange it could only be welded from the front. Construction drawings required the flange to be welded from both sides. (see page 7)
3. Laminations in containment wall: The alleger stated that in early February 1978, he was inspecting the containment on the second level where a walkway was being installed. He observed some laminations in the steel containment wall near the walkway. This area was approximately two inches square near a lug which was used to lower the steel wall section into place. He said the area was ground out for repair and filled with weld metal. He wrote an NCI because the ground out area was too deep. He took the NCI to his supervisor who refused to permit him to file the NCI. (see page 8)

8502120347 840808  
PDR FOIA  
GARDEB4-A-26 PDR


A. Herdt

January 9, 1984

4. Improper preheat on airlock: The allegor stated that in early 1978, he was inspecting an airlock installation on the number 2 reactor which he identified as "PAL 215". The airlock ring was approximately one and a half inches thick and the containment wall approximately three quarters inch thick. The ring was being welded into the containment wall. He said that the welders were supposed to preheat both sides of the metal and apply heat to one side while the tack welds were being made. When inspectors were on the scene, proper preheat was applied. When inspectors were not there, the welders would not preheat. He subsequently wrote an NCI and when he took it to his supervisor he was asked a lot of questions which he felt bordered on intimidation. After logging in the NCI, a welding engineer came to him and told him that the welders did not have to preheat. (see pages 9 and 10)

Please note that the enclosure contains the full identity of the allegor. Every effort must be made to preclude the premature or inadvertent disclosure of this identifying information. Pages 1 thru 4, and 11 have not been included as they do not contain information pertinent to the above concerns. It should also be noted that this allegor's concerns, although not given in camera, are being handled in the same manner as the actual in camera allegors.

Your assistance and cooperation is appreciated.

  
Bruno Uryc, Jr.

Enclosure: a/s

LANGLEY related another incident where he wrote an NCI that was not approved by DAVISON. He stated that in early February 1978, he was inspecting in the containment on the second level where a walkway was being installed. He said he noted that there were ~~some~~ tears in the steel containment wall near the walkway. He said these tears were laminations in the steel which were detected when the area <sup>was</sup> inspected with the magnetic particle test (MT). He said the area was approximately two inches square near a lug which was used to lower the steel containment wall section into place. He said the small area of lamination was subsequently ground out and filled with weld metal. He stated that he prepared an NCI because the ground out area was deeper than allowed by the specifications. He said that when he took the NCI to DAVISON, DAVISON would not permit him to file the NCI after giving him a lot of harassment over the NCI. LANGLEY said that he just threw the NCI away.

LAMINATIONS (NO. 3)

LANGLEY related there were several instances when he was notified in advance that an inspector would be looking at a particular weld. He stated that he would find process control sheets in his mail box which were asterisked at a certain point which indicated a hold point for an inspector. He stated that sometimes these inspectors were insurance inspectors. He stated that he would also get notes in his mailbox that said an inspector would be looking at some welds. He stated that he never had information that an NRC inspector would be coming to examine a specific weld, although he was told on occasions that NRC inspectors would be at the site. He said that when he was told that NRC inspectors were coming he would usually see them that day or the next. He said he never received information in advance of two or three days. He said for example that he would be told that NRC would be at the site on a Monday and then he would see them on the following Wednesday.

PRENOTIFICATION RE NRC

APPLICANTS' TESTIMONY ON THE LANGLEY ALLEGATIONS

I. Prenotification of NRC Inspections

- (1) L. R. Davison
- (2) D. L. Freeze
- (3) R. A. Morgan
- (4) Lindsay Harris

II. Intimidation of Inspectors

- (1) L. R. Davison
- (2) Thomas H. Mullinax
- (3) Lindsay Harris

III. Laminations in Knuckleplates *missed*

- (1) David H. Llewellyn
- (2) Ronald P. Ruth
- (3) John M. McConaghy

11/12/83  
10-25-83  
0097

STATE OF INTERVIEW WITH HARRY F. LANGLEY

25, 1983 AS PREPARED BY BRUNO URYC, JR.

On October 25, 1983, Harry F. LANGLEY, a former Quality Control (QC) Welding Inspector at the Duke Power Company's Catawba Nuclear Plant, Rockhill, SC, was interviewed by Bruno Uryc, Jr., Inspector, USNRC Region II, Atlanta, GA, with the assistance of Jack BRYANT, USNRC Region II Resident Inspector, Oconee Nuclear Plant, Seneca, SC. This interview was conducted at the Ramada Inn, Rockhill, SC in the presence of the following individuals: B. JONES, Regional Counsel, USNRC Region II; R. GUILD, Attorney for the Palmetto Alliance, Raleigh, NC; and B. GARDE, a representative of the Government Accountability Project, Washington, DC. These individuals were present at the interview at the request of LANGLEY, and he provided the following information in substance:

LANGLEY said he was formerly employed at the Catawba Nuclear Plant during the period April 6, 1977 to April 6, 1978. He said he was initially hired as a welder's helper and that he held this position until May 29, 1977, at which time he was certified as a welder. He said that in July 1977 he was assigned to the Pipe Fabrication Shop as a welder where he remained until mid-October 1977, at which time he was placed in a QC welding inspector's class. LANGLEY stated that prior to working at the Catawba Nuclear Plant he worked as a welder at the Westinghouse plant in Charlotte, NC, during the period 1969 to 1974. LANGLEY stated that during the period 1974 to 1976, he was attending college and studying for a degree in business.



LANGLEY stated that when he was initially hired on at Catawba he was offered a job as a welding helper. He said that this job entailed helping on the welding crew and did not involve welding, although he did know how to weld from his previous employment at Westinghouse. LANGLEY stated that he was eventually permitted to take a welding test which he passed. He said that he attended only four hours of welding class and that he was given a practical test in only one welding position before he was certified. He said that on May 29, 1977, he was officially certified as a welder and his name appeared on the list of certified welders at the Catawba Nuclear Plant. He said that after his certification he was primarily involved in welding braces on fresh water tanks. LANGLEY stated that in early June 1977, he was assigned to the Pipe Fabrication Shop and that he worked for a foreman named Deacon JONES. He said he was welding various sections of pipe for use throughout the plant and that the pipe was primarily carbon steel for stainless steel pipe. LANGLEY said that he received many compliments about his work by the lead inspector, Larry RUDESEAL (phonetic), who began to talk to him about the possibility of becoming a welding inspector. LANGLEY stated that he eventually talked with another inspector named Bo ROSS who was able to get him assigned to a welding inspector class in mid-October 1977.

LANGLEY said that in mid-October 1977, he entered the QC Welding Inspector class with 11 other individuals from the plant. Three of these individuals were other welders and eight were mechanical inspectors. He declined to identify the other individuals by name, stating that a review of the class roster would identify all the individuals in the class. LANGLEY stated that to the best of his recollection the class lasted for approximately six to eight weeks. During the first week of the class, they were given instructions concerning the processing of

metals beginning with the ore being removed from the earth. The class went on through various metallurgical processes into an examination and study of weld defects. LANGLEY stated that at the end of each week of class they were given a written test covering the material presented in class during the previous week. He said that everyone did poorly on the first test which involved basic material and information. He said that on the Thursday before their second test which was to be given the next day, a Friday, the class returned to the classroom from lunch and as he was going through his class notebook, he found a copy of an examination with the answers filled in inside his notebook. He asked several of the other individuals in the class if they also had such an examination in their notebooks and when they looked they also found a copy of the test in their notebooks. LANGLEY stated that everyone in the class had a copy of the test and answers. He said that the next day they were tested and it was the same test that they had received a copy of on the previous day. LANGLEY stated that this continued for the rest of the weekly examinations in the course. He said that he did not know who put the copies of the test in the notebooks, but he assumed it was one of the instructors who he identified as Larry DAVISON, Charles BALDWIN and Bo ROSS. He said that inasmuch as everyone was getting copies of the test that everyone did very well in the class. He said that they (the students) needed at least a cumulative average of 80 percent to pass the course and overall the class far exceeded the minimum required score. The tests usually contained 30 to 40 questions and he assumed that all the previous classes also received this help because he was occasionally asked by other QC inspectors who were certified, if he was getting any help. He said that judging from the way they asked, it appeared they knew the class was getting the test and answers.



LANGLEY stated that in the class every questioned this practice and they assumed that this practice and they went along with it. LANGLEY stated that had it not been for this practice, several of the students in the class would not have finished the course. He said that they even intentionally lowered their grades during one phase of instruction (structural steel) so that they would not have grades which appeared too good. LANGLEY stated that at the end of the course they were also given an oral examination. He said that for this test, the first student tested came out and provided the questions and answers to the rest of the students. He said that the course ended sometime around Thanksgiving (1977) and in January 1978, he was officially certified as a welding inspector. During the period between the end of the course and the official certification, he accompanied certified inspectors for on-the-job training. LANGLEY stated that he did not know who placed the tests and answers in the classroom notebooks. He said that he never observed anyone doing it, nor did the class generally discuss the matter among themselves. He said that everyone just accepted it as being a routine thing. He also estimated that at least half of the class would have failed the course had it not been for the tests and answers they received before actually taking the tests. LANGLEY stated that after he was certified, he spent most of his inspection time working in the number two reactor on the day shift. He stated that to the best of his knowledge, he did not pass any welds that were not acceptable. He also added that he felt qualified to be an inspector based on his extensive welding experience, but he wondered about the other individuals in his class who did not have a welding background.

LANGLEY related that during the time he was a welding inspector he had occasion to write several nonconformance items (NCI). He explained that an NCI document describes those items that do not pass inspection and provides an explanation as to why the item did not pass inspection. He stated that sometime in January 1978 he was inspecting the stiffeners on the reactor walls. He said his inspection procedure involved checking the area where the weld would be made for cleanliness. He explained that stiffeners were strips of steel measuring on the average six to eight feet in length, four to six inches in width, and approximately a quarter to a half inch thick. He said that the stiffeners were tack welded to the containment wall to add strength to the walls. He said that the area of the weld was supposed to be cleaned a half inch on both sides of the weld and that the stiffener was to fit flush against the wall. He said his initial inspection activity involved an inspection of the fit-up prior to the weld being made around the entire stiffener. He said that after his inspection of the fit-up, the entire weld would be made around the stiffener. He said he did find some problems with the tack welds which included slag and voids at the tack welds. He said that initially he would help the welders clean up the slag, but after two or three days, he noticed that the fit-ups were getting worse. He said he found rollovers, bad undercuts, lack of fusion, and excessive tack welds. LANGLEY stated he then decided to write an NCI because the problem was continuing. He said that in addition to writing the NCI, he also placed red tags on all the stiffeners to stop additional work from being done. He said he wrote the NCI citing the M24 procedure on fit-ups as not being complied with. He said he recalled that trapped slag behind the stiffener was a particularly bad problem. LANGLEY said he took his NCI to Bo ROSS, his immediate supervisor, who reviewed it and said it was correct. LANGLEY said that ROSS told him to take the NCI to

STIFFENERS (No. 1)

and approval, and when DAVISON reviewed the NCI he told  
that it should not have been written because there could be gaps  
and snag on the stiffeners. LANGLEY said that he explained to DAVISON that there  
was more than a small problem with the stiffeners and he felt that the problem  
should be documented. LANGLEY stated that DAVISON had a habit of making the  
inspectors feel intimidated every time they took an NCI to him for review.  
LANGLEY said that he often felt as if DAVISON was trying to intimidate and harass  
him because he was doing his job. He said that DAVISON finally signed the NCI on  
the stiffeners and he (LANGLEY) took the signed NCI to Document Control and logged  
it into Quality Assurance (QA). LANGLEY stated that until the NCI was logged  
into QA, there was never any way to officially track the status of an NCI, in  
effect, it did not officially exist. He said that once it was logged, it was  
then an official record and had to be tracked. He said that within the hour  
after he logged the NCI into QA, a welding engineer (who LANGLEY believed to be  
an individual identified as LEWELLYN (phonetic)) came to the reactor and told him  
to remove the red tags and let the welders continue with their work. LANGLEY  
stated that LEWELLYN also told him to go to QA and clear the NCI he wrote from  
the log. LANGLEY stated that he did remove the red tags and subsequently went to  
QA and cleared the NCI by signing it off with his own signature. LANGLEY stated  
that, in effect, his signature meant that the NCI was cleared by him when it  
really was not. LANGLEY stated that he signed off the NCI because he was told to  
do so by the welding engineer, who should have been the person that signed off  
the NCI in the QA Document control log.

STIFFENERS (NO.1)

LANGLEY stated that DAVISON was the only CA manager who always gave the inspectors a hard time about NCIs. LANGLEY related that DAVISON told him that the number two reactor was not going to be like the number one reactor. He said that DAVISON said that it took a long time to clear the NCIs on number one reactor and that it was not going to take that long for number two reactor, even if he had to get different inspectors to do it. LANGLEY said that the meaning of this statement was very clear to him and he took it to mean that DAVISON was going to closely review every NCI he signed to see if it was really valid.

LANGLEY related another incident which occurred when he wrote an NCI. He said that there was a 30 inch pipe which came off the Auxiliary Building on the number two reactor side. He said that a pipe passed through a sleeve which was embedded in a concrete wall at the fourth level. He recalled that there was a problem with the concrete settling around the pipe sleeve and that the concrete did not completely settle behind a flange on the pipe sleeve. He said that when this problem was found, the flange was removed and the holes in the concrete were chipped and patched. He said that the removal of the flange caused some problems when they tried to put the flange back on the pipe sleeve. He said that when the construction welders tried to put the flange back on they could only weld the flange from the front because they could not get behind the flange because it was flush against the concrete wall. He said the construction drawings called for the flange to be welded from behind also, but this was impossible to do. He said he wrote an NCI on the problem because there was no weld on the back side of the flange. He said that when he took the NCI to DAVISON, he was told to forget it and DAVISON refused to sign the NCI. LANGLEY stated that to the best of his knowledge this incident occurred in February 1978.

PIPE FLANGE (No. 2)



LANGLEY related another incident where he wrote an NCI that was not approved by DAVISON. He stated that in early February 1978, he was inspecting in the containment on the second level where a walkway was being installed. He said he noted that there were some tears in the steel containment wall near the walkway. He said these tears were laminations in the steel which were detected when the area<sup>was</sup> inspected with the magnetic particle test (MT). He said the area was approximately two inches square near a lug which was used to lower the steel containment wall section into place. He said the small area of lamination was subsequently ground out and filled with weld metal. He stated that he prepared an NCI because the ground out area was deeper than allowed by the specifications. He said that when he took the NCI to DAVISON, DAVISON would not permit him to file the NCI after giving him a lot of harassment over the NCI. LANGLEY said that he just threw the NCI away.

LANGLEY estimated that he took approximately five NCIs to DAVISON for approval. Of these five, he was able to get three of them approved and logged into QA; however, after some of them were logged, he was subsequently told that his NCI was incorrect or that it was not justified, so he was instructed to go back to QA to clear the log. LANGLEY stated that he cleared the QA log based on verbal instructions received from the welding engineers. He pointed out that when he was told that his NCIs were inappropriate, he had to clear them and not the individuals who told him to do so. In effect, when he signed the log clearing the NCI, his signature indicated that he resolved the problem, which was not the case. LANGLEY stated that the proper procedure would have been for the individual who told him to clear the NCI log to sign the log himself.

LAMINATIONS (NO. 3)



LANGLEY related another incident which occurred in early 1978. He said this incident involved work on the number two reactor which he identified as "PAL 215." He said the ring that was being installed in the containment wall was approximately one and a half inches thick, and the containment wall was approximately three quarters of an inch thick. The large ring was to be welded inside an opening to the containment wall and form the air lock. The specifications called for both sides of the weld area to be preheated. He said that the welders and steelworkers who were tacking the large ring into the opening in the containment wall were not preheating the surfaces for the tack welds and as a result the tack welds were cracking. LANGLEY said that they were supposed to be heating the back side of the metal when the tack welds were being made. LANGLEY said that when the QC inspectors were on the scene, the welders would preheat the surfaces, but when the inspectors left the area, the welders would stop preheating. He said that he knew this because when he came back to the area he would see that the welders were not preheating as required. LANGLEY stated that he was with another QC inspector named Lindsey HARRIS. LANGLEY estimated that a major portion of the required tack welds were not preheated. He said he wrote an NCI which identified the problem and when he took it to DAVISON for approval and signature, DAVISON asked him a lot of questions which he (LANGLEY) felt bordered on intimidation. LANGLEY said that he insisted that the NCI was correct and that it should be logged into QA. He said DAVISON finally signed the NCI "after a lot of hassle" and he took it to QA and logged it in. LANGLEY said that in only a matter of minutes (he estimated approximately 10 minutes), LEWELLYN, the welding engineer, came to see him and advised him that he had researched the problem in the welding procedures and found that the welders could weld at a minimum

PREHEAT (NO. 4)

temperature of 40 degrees and that they did not have to preheat. LANGLEY stated that LEWELLYN told him to go to QA and clear the log of the NCI he entered. LANGLEY said that he did go to QA and clear the log based on the instructions of LEWELLYN. He said that this was another example of his having to sign off and clear an NCI on the instructions of another individuals.

LANGLEY related an incident involving the forgery of a welding document. He said that this incident occurred in late February 1978 and he said he believed it was documented in NCI Number 2664. He said that a welder, who he would identify only by the individual's welding number k-34, came to him and asked him to change the date on a process control sheet because he (the welder) did not have an inspector sign off hold point on a preheat required for a weld. LANGLEY stated that he told the welder that he would not falsify a document that was already signed. LANGLEY stated that he observed the name of Charles D. CRISP on the document and when he told the welder to go and get CRISP to date the document, the welder told him that he signed CRISP's name to the document. He said he discussed the matter with the welder and they decided to inform construction management of the incident. LANGLEY stated that inasmuch as the welder went to management himself with the issue, he was given a "B" violation and an NCI was prepared to document the incident.

LANGLEY stated that the welder involved was a good worker and he just made a serious judgment error when he signed CRISP's name to the process control sheet. He stated that the welder was too concerned about getting into trouble for missing the preheat hold point. He stated that he was not aware of any other forgery issues.

DOCUMENT (NO. 4)

several instances when he was notified in advance that  
ing at a particular weld. He stated that he would find  
process in his mail box which were asterisked at a certain point  
which indicated a hold point for an inspector. He stated that sometimes these  
inspectors were insurance inspectors. He stated that he would also get notes in  
his mailbox that said an inspector would be looking at some welds. He stated  
that he never had information that an NRC inspector would be coming to examine a  
specific weld, although he was told on occasions that NRC inspectors would be at  
the site. He said that when he was told that NRC inspectors were coming he would  
usually see them that day or the next. He said he never received information in  
advance of two or three days. He said for example that he would be told that NRC  
would be at the site on a Monday and then he would see them on the following  
Wednesday.

PRENOTIFICATION RE NRC

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT

Institute for Policy Studies  
1901 Que Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009

(202) 234-9382

January 18, 1984

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION  
ACT REQUEST

FOIA-84-48  
REC'd 1-19-84

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST

Director  
Office of Administration  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

To Whom It May Concern:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552, the Government Accountability Project (GAP) of the Institute for Policy Studies, requests copies of any and all agency records and information, including but not limited to notes, letters, memoranda, drafts, minutes, diaries, logs, calendars, tapes, transcripts, summaries, interview reports, procedures, instructions, engineering analyses, drawings, files, graphs, charts, maps, photographs, agreements, handwritten notes, studies, data sheets, notebooks, books, telephone messages, computations, voice recordings, and any other data compilations, interim and/or final reports, status reports, and any and all other records generated in connection with Region II and/or the Office of Investigations inspection/investigation of the issues raised by Mr. Harry Langley and the three in camera witnesses who testified in the Catawba licensing proceeding.

This FOIA request is being served by Express Mail to Region II Administrator, Mr. James P. O'Reilly, on this date and hand-delivered to the Bethesda FOIA Office in anticipation of a January 20, 1984, closure date for Region II's inspection efforts.

If any of the material covered by this request has been destroyed and/or removed, please provide all surrounding documentation, including but not limited to a description of the action(s) taken, relevant date(s), and justification(s) for the actions.

GAP requests that fees be waived, because "finding information can be considered as primarily benefitting the general public," 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(4)(A). The Government Accountability Project is a non-profit, non-partisan public interest organization concerned with honest and open government. Through legal representation, advice, national conferences, films, publications and public outreach, the Project promotes whistleblowers as agents of government accountability. Through its Citizens Clinic, GAP offers assistance to local public interest and citizens groups who seek to ensure the health and safety of their communities. The Citizens Clinic is currently assisting several citizens groups, local governments, and intervenors in the South Carolina area concerning the Catawba Nuclear Power Plant.


We are requesting the above information as part of an ongoing monitoring project on the adequacy of the NRC's efforts to protect public safety and health at nuclear power plants.

~~8404040017~~

For any documents or portions that you deny due to a specific FOIA exemption, please provide an index itemizing and describing the documents or portions of documents withheld. The index should provide a detailed justification of your grounds for claiming each exemption, explaining why each exemption is relevant to the document or portion of the document withheld. This index is required under Vaughn v. Rosen (I), 484 F.2d 820 (D.C.Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).

We look forward to your response to this request within ten days.

Very truly yours,



Billie Pirner Garde  
Citizens Clinic Director

BPG:me

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly - Express Mail  
FOIA Office/Bethesda - Hand-Delivered



Subj

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT

Institute for Policy Studies  
1901 Que Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009

(202) 234-9382

February 8, 1984

APPEAL OF INITIAL FOIA DECISION

84-A-24E (83-699)

84-A-25E (83-700)

84-A-26E (84-48)

Rec'd 2-13-84

Mr. William J. Dircks  
Executive Director of Operations  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Appeal from Initial Response

Dear Mr. Dircks:


Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act Request, 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(6)(A)(i), we appeal the effective denial of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the following requests filed by our organization pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) about activities at the Catawba Nuclear Station:

1. FOIA 83-699, November 21, 1983, for all Agency records into (1) the allegations raised by William R. McAfee in connection with Catawba for the period of March, 1977-March, 1979; (2) the open conference held by the NRC at the Catawba site in November, 1979; (3) all NRC staff discussions of Duke Power Company's Topical Quality Assurance Manual.
2. FOIA 83-700, November 21, 1983, for all information generated with allegations raised by Nolan R. Hoopingarner.
3. FOIA 84-48, January 18, 1984, for all Agency records generated in connection with Region II and/or the OI inspection/investigation of the issues raised by Mr. Harry Langley, and the three in camera witnesses who testified in the Catawba licensing proceedings.

We expect your response within 20 working days of receipt, §552(a)(6)(A)(ii). Please comply with our initial requests regarding the production of a Vaughn index, and explanations of any relevant documents that have been destroyed.

Thank you for your immediate handling of this appeal.

Yours truly



Billie Pirner Garde  
Citizens Clinic Director

BPG:me

PDR - ~~84-1190066~~

# GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT

Institute for Policy Studies  
1901 Que Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009

(202) 234-9382

January 18, 1984

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION  
ACT REQUEST

## FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST

FOIA-84-48  
REC'd 1-19-84

Director  
Office of Administration  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

To Whom It May Concern:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552, the Government Accountability Project (GAP) of the Institute for Policy Studies, requests copies of any and all agency records and information, including but not limited to notes, letters, memoranda, drafts, minutes, diaries, logs, calendars, tapes, transcripts, summaries, interview reports, procedures, instructions, engineering analyses, drawings, files, graphs, charts, maps, photographs, agreements, handwritten notes, studies, data sheets, notebooks, books, telephone messages, computations, voice recordings, and any other data compilations, interim and/or final reports, status reports, and any and all other records generated in connection with Region II and/or the Office of Investigations inspection/investigation of the issues raised by Mr. Harry Langley and the three in camera witnesses who testified in the Catawba licensing proceeding.

This FOIA request is being served by Express Mail to Region II Administrator, Mr. James P. O'Reilly, on this date and hand-delivered to the Bethesda FOIA Office in anticipation of a January 20, 1984, closure date for Region II's inspection efforts.

If any of the material covered by this request has been destroyed and/or removed, please provide all surrounding documentation, including but not limited to a description of the action(s) taken, relevant date(s), and justification(s) for the actions.

GAP requests that fees be waived, because "finding information can be considered as primarily benefitting the general public," 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(4)(A). The Government Accountability Project is a non-profit, non-partisan public interest organization concerned with honest and open government. Through legal representation, advice, national conferences, films, publications and public outreach, the Project promotes whistleblowers as agents of government accountability. Through its Citizens Clinic, GAP offers assistance to local public interest and citizens groups who seek to ensure the health and safety of their communities. The Citizens Clinic is currently assisting several citizens groups, local governments, and intervenors in the South Carolina area concerning the Catawba Nuclear Power Plant.

We are requesting the above information as part of an ongoing monitoring project on the adequacy of the NRC's efforts to protect public safety and health at nuclear power plants.


~~PDR 84 04 04 00 17~~

January 18, 1984

For any documents or portions that you deny due to a specific FOIA exemption, please provide an index itemizing and describing the documents or portions of documents withheld. The index should provide a detailed justification of your grounds for claiming each exemption, explaining why each exemption is relevant to the document or portion of the document withheld. This index is required under Vaughn v. Rosen (I), 484 F.2d 820 (D.C.Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).

We look forward to your response to this request within ten days.

Very truly yours,



Billie Pirner Garde  
Citizens Clinic Director

BPG:me

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly - Express Mail  
FOIA Office/Bethesda - Hand-Delivered