May 6, 1992

Mr. Herman Alderman
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: ACRS Subcommittee meeting on Control Room Design for the GE
ABWR

Dear Mr. Alderman,

On May 5, I attended an ACRS Subcommittee meeting on the above subject, and this letter presents comments based on information provided prior to or during the meeting. In addition to my comments provided during the meeting, I have only the following concern:

In a previous ACRS subcommittee meeting held to discuss safety analysis topics for the ABWR, both the NRC Staff and I noted what appeared to be potentially significant shortcomings in the ABWR PRA (these are definiated in the minutes of the meeting prepared by Medhat E1-Zeftawy dated April 28, 1992). It was not clear to me how, usen, or if GE was intending to redress these shortcomings. Of concern here is the intended use of the PRA to make major decisions influencing the control room design as noted by GE during the May 5 meeting. If the PRA enhancements are not completed in a timely manner, or if they are not done at all, it is possible that misleading information could be used to make the related control room design decisions. It may be appropriate to monitor the progress of this issue to be certain that the PRA has the appropriate fidelity to allow appropriate control room design decisions.

If you have any questions, please call.

DESIGNATED PROCESSO.

Certified By Ship

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Sincerely,

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cc: Hal Lewis, ACRS

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