

The Light company

Houston Lighting & Power South Texas Project Electric Generating Station P. O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483

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South Texas Project
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499
Updates to the Level 2 Probabilistic Safety
Assessment and Individual Plant Examination

Reference: Letter ST-HL-AE-4193 from S. L. Rosen
to Document Control Desk dated
August 28, 1992.

Enclosed are pages to be added to the "South Texas Project
Electric Generating Station Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment
and Individual Plant Examination" (L2 PSA) transmitted to you by
the above referenced letter. The complete attachment is to be
inserted after page iii (Table of Contents) of PSA Volume 1.

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South Texas Project Electric Generating Station

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TABLES

1.2-1	Definition of Safety Functions	1.2.2-12
1.4.2-1	Analysis of Top-Ranking Sequence Contributing to Mean Core Damage Frequency	1.4.2-6
1.4.2-2	Top 5 Core Damage Sequences	1.4.2-7
1.4.2-3	Core Damage Frequency Breakdown by Major Plant Damage State Groups	1.4.2-9
1.4.2-4	Risk Importance Factors for STPEGS Systems	1.4.2-10
1.4.2-5	Risk Importance Factors for STP Operator Actions	1.4.2-11
1.4.2-6	Risk Achievement Worth for STP Equipment and Operator Actions	1.4.2-12
1.4.2-7	3 Top-Ranking External Event Sequences	1.4.2-13
1.4.3-1	Comparison of STP and Zion NUREG-1150 Results	1.4.3-3
1.4.4-1	Top 5 Sequences Contributing to Group: RELI Frequency	1.4.4-2
1.8-1	NUREG/CR-5474 Candidate Accident Management Screening	1.8-2
2.2-1	Cross Reference to NUREG-1407, Table C.1; STP Level 1 PSA; and STP Level 2 PSA/IPE	2.2-2
2.3-1	References for PLG Technical Approach to PSA	2.3.8-4
2.3-2	Basic Steps and Key Products of a PSA	2.3.8-5
2.3-3	Types of Dependent Failures Encountered in Probabilistic Risk Assessment	2.3.8-7
2.3-4	Treatment of Dependent Events in PSA	2.3.8-8
2.3-5	Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of STP System or Subsystem-Induced Initiating Events	2.3.8-10
2.3-6	Summary of Example Success Criteria for General Transients	2.3.8-11
2.3-7	Component Types and Failures Normally Considered for Common Cause Groups	2.3.8-12
2.3-8	Typical Database Component Boundaries	1.2.8-13
2.3-9	Generic PWR Plant Damage State Matrix	2.3.8-15
2.4-1	STPEGS Specific Information Sources	2.4.1-2
3.1.2-1	Initiating Event Categories Selected for Quantification of the South Texas Project Risk Model	3.1.2-11
3.1.2-2	Cross-Reference Table for Preliminary Initiating Event Categories Identified Using the MLD and HBFT Methods	3.1.2-12
3.1.2-3	External Events and Physical Interactions Identified as Common Cause Initiating Event and Selected for Full Risk Model Quantification	3.1.2-18
3.1.2-4	Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of STP System or Subsystem-Induced Initiating Events	3.1.2-19
3.1.2-5	STP Systems That Are Nonevent Initiators	3.1.2-28
3.1.2-6	Cross-Reference of South Texas Project Initiating Events Identified by the HBFT Method, With Other Published Lists of Initiating Events	3.1.2-32
3.1.2-7	Qualitative Analysis and Grouping of Initiating Event Categories Identified by the HBFT Method	3.1.2-41
3.1.2-8	Final Initiating Event Categories with Cross-Reference to Heat Balance Fault Tree, Master Logic Diagram Categories, and FMEA	3.1.2-46
3.1.3-1	Initiating Event Categories Selected for Quantification of the South Texas Project Risk Model	3.1.3-28
3.1.3-2	General Transient Event Block Success Criteria	3.1.3-30
3.1.3-3	Grouping of General Transient ESD Event Blocks into Event Tree Top Events	3.1.3-35
3.1.3-4	Summary of Steam Generator Heat Removal Top Events CD, AF, S2, and S1	3.1.3-41
3.1.3-5	General Transient Event Split Fractions	3.1.3-42
3.1.4-1	Grouping of SGTR ESD Event Blocks into Event Tree Top Events	3.1.4-26
3.1.4-2	SGTR Event Tree Top Event Split Fractions	3.1.4-30
3.1.5-1	Grouping of Small LOCA ESD Event Blocks into Event Tree Top Events	3.1.5-17
3.1.5-2	Small LOCA Event Tree Top Event Split Fractions	3.1.5-20
3.1.6-1	Grouping of Medium LOCA ESD Event Blocks into Event Tree	3.1.6-13
3.1.6-2	Medium LOCA Event Tree Top Event Split Fractions	3.1.6-15
3.1.7-1	Grouping of Large LOCA ESD Event Blocks Into Event Tree Top Events	3.1.7- 8
3.1.7-2	Large LOCA Event Tree Top Event Split Fractions	3.1.7-10
3.1.8-1	Estimated Peak Pressure for STP ATWS Events	3.1.8-30
3.1.8-2	Grouping of ATWS ESD Event Blocks Into Event Tree Top Events	3.1.8-31

3.1.8-3	ATWS Event Tree Top Event Split Fractions	3.1.8-35
3.1.10-1	Support-to-Support System Dependency Matrix	3.1.10-10
3.1.10-2	Support-to-Frontline System Dependency Matrix	3.1.10-14
3.1.10-3	Electric Power Event Tree Top Event Split Fractions	3.1.10-18
3.1.10-4	Mechanical Support Systems Tree Top Event Split Fractions - ECW System	3.1.10-31
3.1.10-5	Mechanical Support Systems Tree Top Event Split Fractions - ECH System	3.1.10-34
3.1.10-6	Mechanical Support Systems Tree Top Event Split Fractions - EAB HVAC Fans	3.1.10-38
3.1.10-7	Mechanical Support Systems Tree Top Event Split Fractions - Smoke Purge Dampers	3.1.10-43
3.1.10-8	Mechanical Support Systems Tree Top Event Split Fractions - CCW System	3.1.10-44
3.1.10-9	MACRO Event Tree Top Events	3.1.10-48
3.1.11-1	Grouping of Long-Term Plant Response ESD Event Blocks into Event Tree Top Events	3.1.11-2
3.1.11-2	Long-Term Plant Response Event Tree Top Event Split Fractions	3.1.11-4
3.1.11-3	Grouping of LT2 ESD Event Blocks into Event Tree Top Events	3.1.11-11
3.1.11-4	Long Term Response (Core Melt) Event Tree Top Event Split Fractions	3.1.11-12
3.2.1-1	Comparison of Current System Models with Those in STP PSA	3.2.1-15
3.2.1-2	STP Frontline and support Systems Analyzed in Detail	3.2.1-16
3.2.1-3	Split Fractions for Component Cooling Water System Top Events	3.2.1-17
3.2.1-4	Component Block Descriptions for Component Cooling Water System	3.2.1-18
3.2.1-5	STPEGS System Fault Tree Component Type Designators	3.2.1-19
3.2.1-6	STP System Fault Tree Failure Modes Designators	3.2.1-21
3.2.1-7	Common Cause Failures Typically Modeled in STPEGS Systems Analysis	3.2.1-22
3.2.1-8	RISKMAN* Common Cause Model Report on Component Cooling Water System	3.2.1-23
3.2.1-9	RISKMAN* Alignment Report for STPEGS Component Cooling Water System	3.2.1-25
3.2.1-10	RISKMAN* Basic Event Unavailability Model Report for STPEGS Component Cooling Water System	3.2.1-26
3.2.1-11	RISKMAN* Cause Table Report CCW Split Fraction KA1	3.2.1-33
3.2.1-12	RISKMAN* Split Fraction Report for All CCW System Fault Tree Top Events	3.2.1-34
3.2.1-13	RISKMAN* Split Fraction Report for All CCW System Event Tree Split Fractions	3.2.1-36
3.2.1-14	RISKMAN* Report for Alignment Contributions to CCW System Split Fractions	3.2.1-40
3.2.1-15	STPEGS Common Cause Modeling Scope	3.2.1-43
3.2.3-1	Systems Considered for STP PSA	3.2.3-2
3.2.3.1-1	Electric Power System Split Fractions	3.2.3-8
3.2.3.2-1	SSPS and ESFAS Split Fractions	3.2.3-15
3.2.3.3-1	Reactor Trip Split Fractions	3.2.3-19
3.2.3.4-1	Essential Cooling Water System Split Fractions	3.2.3-22
3.2.3.5-1	Essential Chilled Water System Split Fractions	3.2.3-24
3.2.3.6-1	EAB HVAC Fans Split Fractions	3.2.3-27
3.2.3.6-2	Smoke Purge Dampers Split Fractions	3.2.3-28
3.2.3.7-1	Component Cooling Water System Split Fractions	3.2.3-32
3.2.3.8-1	Main Steam Isolation Split Fractions	3.2.3-36
3.2.3.9-1	AFW Split Fractions for General Transients and LOSP	3.2.3-42
3.2.3.9-2	AFW Split Fractions for Steam Line Break Event	3.2.3-43
3.2.3.9-3	AFW Split Fractions for ATWS Events	3.2.3-43
3.2.3.9-4	Main Steam Relief Split Fractions	3.2.3-43
3.2.3.10-1	Primary Relief Split Fractions	3.2.3-47
3.2.3.11-1	Chemical and Volume Control System Split Fractions	3.2.3-52
3.2.3.12-1	Pressurizer Spray Split Fractions	3.2.3-60
3.2.3.13-1	Safety Injection Common Equipment Split Fractions	3.2.3-63
3.2.3.14-1	High Head Safety Injection Split Fractions	3.2.3-66
3.2.3.15-1	Low Head Safety Injection Split Fractions	3.2.3-69
3.2.3.16-1	Safety Injection Recirculation Phase Common Equipment Split Fractions	3.2.3-72
3.2.3.17-1	Containment Spray System Split Fractions (Two of Three Pumps Successful)	3.2.3-75
3.2.3.17-2	Containment Spray System Split Fractions (One of Three Pumps Successful)	3.2.3-75
3.2.3.18-1	Reactor Containment Fan Coolers Split Fractions	3.2.3-79
3.2.3.19-1	Residual Heat Removal System Split Fractions	3.2.3-82
3.2.3.20-1	Containment Isolation Split Fractions	3.2.3-86

3.3.1-1	Event Trees Used for Each Initiator	3.3.1-13
3.3.1-2	Sequence Truncation Limits for Level 2 PSA	3.3.1-14
3.3.1-3	Level 2 PSA Master Frequency File	3.3.1-16
3.3.2-1	Component Failure Frequency Distributions	3.3.2-36
3.3.2-2	Formulas for Mapping Down Event Impact Vectors	3.3.2-46
3.3.2-3	Formulas for Upward Mapping of Events Classified as Nonlethal Shocks	3.3.2-47
3.3.2-4	STP-Specific Common Cause Events Statistics and Prior and Posterior Distribution Parameters	3.3.2-48
3.3.2-5	PWR Component Population	3.3.2-50
3.3.2-6	BWR Plants Component Population	3.3.2-57
3.3.2-7	Average Number of Components per Plant for Each Component Type of Interest	3.3.2-60
3.3.2-8	Number of Components for Each Component Type in STP	3.3.2-61
3.3.2-9	Main Characteristics of the MGL Parameter Distributions Used in the STP PSA	3.3.2-63
3.3.2-10	Basic Characteristics of the Component Maintenance Frequency Distributions	3.3.2-80
3.3.2-11	Basic Characteristics of the Component Maintenance Mean Time Distributions	3.3.2-83
3.3.2-12	Updated STP Initiating Events Data Summary	3.3.2-87
3.3.3-1	STP Unit 1 Reactor Trip Data for Initiating Event Update	3.3.3-3
3.3.3-2	STP Unit 2 Reactor Trip Data for Initiating Event Update	3.3.3-4
3.3.3-3	STP Updated Initiating Events Comparison with Generic Data	3.3.3-5
3.3.3-4	STP Updated Initiating Events Comparison with Generic Data	3.3.3-7
3.3.3-5	Updated STP Plant Specific Initiating Events - Comparison with Previous Distributions	3.3.3-8
3.3.4-1	Scenario Sheet Form	3.3.4-25
3.3.4-2	Performance-Shaping Factors and Scaling Guidance	3.3.4-26
3.3.4-3	Human Action Scenarios Evaluation Form	3.3.4-33
3.3.4-4	Errors of Omission	3.3.4-34
3.3.4-5	Errors of Omission	3.3.4-35
3.3.4-6	Error Rates	3.3.4-36
3.3.4-7	Final Results of Human Actions Analysis	3.3.4-37
3.3.4-8	Scenario Sheet for Human Action HECH01	3.3.4-38
3.3.4-9	Grouping of HERs by Similar Average Weights	3.3.4-39
3.3.4-10	Dynamic Actions Human Error Rates	3.3.4-41
3.3.4-11	Recovery Actions Human Error Rates	3.3.4-43
3.3.4-12	Seal LOCA Flow Rates (GPM) with and Without Primary Depressurization	3.3.4-44
3.3.4.12A	Uncertainty Distribution for RCP Seal LOCA Flow Rates (GPM) for New Type of O-Ring Seals	3.3.4-45
3.3.4-13	Base Analysis (Old O-Ring Seals and NUREG/CR-5032 Offsite Power Data) Electric Power Recovery Scenarios and Results	3.3.4-46
3.3.4-13A	Sensitivity Analysis 1 (New O-Ring Seals and NUREG/CR-5032 Offsite Power Data) Electric Power Recovery Scenarios and Results	3.3.4-47
3.3.4-13B	Sensitivity Analysis 2 (Old O-Ring Seals and Best Estimate Only of NUREG/CR-5032 Offsite Power Recovery Data) Electric Power Recovery Scenarios and Results	3.3.4-48
3.3.4-13C	Sensitivity Analysis 3 (New O-Ring Seals and Best Estimate Only of NUREG/CR-5032 Offsite Power Recovery Data) Electric Power Recovery Scenarios and Results	3.3.4-49
3.3.4-13D	Comparison of Base Case Recovery Factors With Original STP PSA Results	3.3.4-50
3.3.4-14A	Scenario Sheet Form for Level 2 PSA Update	3.3.4-51
3.3.4-14B	Human Action Scenario Evaluation Form for Level 2 PSA Update	3.3.4-54
3.3.6-1	Comparison of V-Sequence Event Frequencies from Selected PSAs	3.3.6-15
3.3.6-2	Piping Systems Connected to the RCS	3.3.6-16
3.4-1	IPEEE Survey for STPEGS Design Basis/Regulatory Guides/Standard Review Plan	3.4-2
3.4-2	Characteristics of Tornado-Generated Missiles (UFSAR Table 3.5-9)	3.4-5
3.4.1-1	Potential Environmental and External Hazards for STPEGS	3.4.1-24
3.4.1-2	Types of Hazards Addressed in the Spatial Interaction Analysis	3.4.1-27
3.4.1-3	List of Locations Considered in Spatial Interaction Analysis	3.4.1-28
3.4.1-4	Hazards Associated with Equipment	3.4.1-35
3.4.1-5	A Sample of PRA Equipment List Used in Spatial Interaction (From Appendix D, Table D-1 of the LI PSA)	3.4.1-38

3.4.1-6	Hazard Mitigation Types	3.4.1-39
3.4.1-7	Equipment Susceptibility	3.4.1-41
3.4.1-8	List of References Used as Information Sources for Different Databases	3.4.1-42
3.4.1-9	A Sample of Equipment-Location Cross-Reference (From Appendix D, Table D-2 of the L1 PSA)	3.4.1-43
3.4.1-10	A Sample of Other Sources of Hazard-Location Cross-Reference (From Appendix D, Table D-3 of the L1 PSA)	3.4.1-44
3.4.1-11	A Sample of Source of Hazard Compilation-Location Cross-Reference (From Appendix D, Table D-4 of the L1 PSA)	3.4.1-45
3.4.1-12	A Sample of Hazard-Mitigation-Location Cross-Reference (From Appendix D, Table D-5 of the L1 PSA)	3.4.1-46
3.4.1-13	A Sample of Scenario Table (From Appendix D, Table D-5 of the L1 PSA)	3.4.1-47
3.4.1-14	South Texas Nuclear Plant Fire Frequency Evaluation	3.4.1-49
3.4.1-15	Flood Frequencies, by Building, Used for STPEGS spatial Interaction Analysis	3.4.1-57
3.4.1-16	Turbine Building Fires	3.4.1-58
3.4.1-17	Level 2 Screening: Evaluation of Dominant Additional Failures to Cause Core Damage From Turbine Building Fires That Disable All Normal 13.8-kV Power	3.4.1-59
3.4.1-18	Scenarios That May Lead to Core Damage	3.4.1-64
3.4.1-19	Scenarios That Belong to Class 1	3.4.1-65
3.4.1-20	Scenarios That Belong to Impact Classes 1 and 2	3.4.1-66
3.4.1-21	Scenarios That Belong to Impact Classes 1 and 3	3.4.1-68
3.4.1-22	Scenarios That Belong to Impact Class 2	3.4.1-74
3.4.1-23	Scenarios That Belong to Impact Class 3	3.4.1-80
3.4.1-24	List of Important Hazard Scenarios for Further Analysis in STP PSA	3.4.1-85
3.4.1-25	Summary of Sequences Initiated by Fire	3.4.1-88
3.4.2-1	Summary of Results of STP Fire Analysis	3.4.2-37
3.4.2-2	Geometric and Severity Factors and Reduction for Fire Scenario Z052-FS-01	3.4.2-38
3.4.2-3	Sensitivity Study Fire Scenarios That Do Not Meet Screening Criteria Before Application of Fire Zone Geometry and Severity Factors	3.4.2-39
3.4.2-4	Fire Scenario Z004-FS-01	3.4.2-40
3.4.2-5	Open Circuit Effects for Fire Scenario Z004-FS-01	3.4.2-44
3.4.2-6	Short Circuit Effects for Fire Scenario Z004-FS-01	3.4.2-45
3.4.2-7	Assumptions and Thoughts Underlying the Failures Noted for Fire Scenario Z004-FS-01	3.4.2-46
3.4.2-8	Frequencies of Internal Events With the Same Combined Impact as Fire Scenario Z004-FS-01	3.4.2-48
3.4.2-9	Bas-line Failures for Fire Scenario Z004-FS-01	3.4.2-49
3.4.2-10	Event Tree End State Impacts for Fire Scenario Z004-FS-01	3.4.2-50
3.4.2-11	Level 1 Screening: Equivalent Internal Event Impacts for End States from Fire Scenario Z004-FS-01	3.4.2-51
3.4.2-12	Annual End State Impact Frequencies for Fire Scenario Z004-FS-01 (Total Fire Scenario Frequency: 1.33E-03/yr)	3.4.2-52
3.4.2-13	Level 2 Screening: Evaluation of Dominant Additional Failures to Cause Core Damage From Fire Scenario Z004-FS-01 End State 11	3.4.2-53
3.4.2-14	Level 2 Screening: Evaluation of dominant Additional Failures to Cause Core Damage From Fire Scenario Z004-FS-01 End State 19	3.4.2-55
3.4.2-15	Identification of Fire Frequency Reduction Factors for Fire Scenario Z004-FS-01 End States 11 and 12	3.4.2-58
3.4.2-16	Fire Frequency Reduction Factors for Fire Scenario Z004-FS-01 End States 11 & 12	3.4.2-60
3.4.3-17	Level 3 Screening: Evaluation of Dominant Additional Failures to Cause Core Damage From Fire Scenario Z004-FS-01 End State 11	3.4.2-61
3.4.2-18	Estimated Core Damage Frequencies of Control Room Fire Scenarios	3.4.2-64
3.4.2-19	Control Room Fire, Scenario 6, Values for Δ_{RI} and I_{RI}	3.4.2-66
3.4.2-20	Relay and Electrical Panel Fires in the PLG Database	3.4.2-67
3.4.2-21	Mean Reduction Factors Used in the STP Control Room Fire Analysis	3.4.2-68
3.4.2-22	Mean Reduction Factors Used in the Diablo Canyon PRA Control Room Fire Analysis Reference 6)	3.4.2-69

3.4.2-23	Summary of Control Room Fire Scenarios	3.4.2-70
3.4.3-1	Summary of the Scenarios from Spatial Interaction Analysis Requiring Detailed Evaluation	3.4.3- 7
3.4.3-2	Scenarios Screened Out in the First Step of Reanalysis	3.4.3- 9
3.4.3-3	Scenarios for Which Core Damage Frequency is Estimated	3.4.3-10
3.4.4-1	South Texas Annual Probability of Exceedance for Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) ..	3.4.4- 9
3.4.4-2	Discrete Annual acceleration Frequencies (Initiating Events)	3.4.4-10
3.4.4-3	Seismic Capacity of Structures	3.4.4-11
3.4.4-4	Equipment Fragilities	3.4.4-12
3.4.4-5	Seismic Fragilities	3.4.4-13
3.4.4-6	Seismic Impacts	3.4.4-14
3.4.4-7	Conditional Mean Seismic Failure Fraction for Key Components	3.4.4-15
3.4.4-8	Mean Frequency of Seismic Failures	3.4.4-16
3.4.4-9	Mean Plant Level Fragility Curve For Seismic Core Damage	3.4.4-17
3.4.4-10	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Arithmetic Mean) Discrete Annual Acceleration Frequencies (Initiating Events)	3.4.4-18
3.4.5-1	Single-Train HVAC Heatup Analysis	3.4.5- 8
3.4.5-2	Switchgear and Distribution Rooms Heatup Analyses During 27 Hours of Smoke Purge Mode of HVAC Operation	3.4.5- 9
3.4.5-3	Maximum Room Temperature Distribution Under Various Degraded Modes of HVAC Operation	3.4.5-10
3.4.5-4	7.5-kVA Inverter Failure Frequency at Different Thermal Fragility Curve Mean Values ..	3.4.5-11
3.4.5-5	Failure Frequencies of Critical EAB Equipment under Various Degraded Modes of HVAC Operation	3.4.5-12
3.4.5-6	Mean Room Temperatures of the Switchgear and Distribution Rooms Used in the Room Heatup Calculations	3.4.5-13
3.4.5-7	Maximum Room Temperature Distribution Under Various Degraded Modes of HVAC Operation (Using Updated EAB Room Temperature)	3.4.5-14
3.4.6-1	Failure Rates of Dams in the United States and the World	3.4.6-32
3.4.6-2	Continued USCOLD (1975)-Babb and Mermel (1963) Listings of Failures of Post-1940 Dams Used by Baecher to Determine the Generic Failure Rate	3.4.6-33
3.4.6-3	Failure Rate of Main Cooling Reservoir	3.4.6-34
3.4.6-4	Causes of Dam Incidents	3.4.6-35
3.4.6-5	Indicators and Causes of Piping/Seepage Defects	3.4.6-36
3.4.6-6	Flood Scenarios That Impact the STP Site	3.4.6-37
3.4.7-1	Aircraft Accidents and Accident Rates: U.S. Air Carriers, 1970 through 1979	3.4.7-12
3.4.7-2	Fatal Aircraft Rates for U.S. General Aviation Aircraft	3.4.7-13
3.4.7-3	Probabilities I_2 and I_3 of Targets Due to Units 1 and 2 Turbine Missiles (Shear Failure) ..	3.4.7-14
3.4.7-4	Probabilities I_2 and I_3 of Targets Due to Units 1 and 2 Turbine Missiles (Shear and Rotation Failure)	3.4.7-15
3.5.1.1-1	Highest Frequency Plant Damage States	3.5.1- 2
3.5.1.1-2	Top 100 Core Damage Sequences	3.5.1- 4
3.5.1.2-1	Top-Ranking External Event Sequences $\geq 10^{-7}$	3.5.1-38
3.5.1.2-2	The Three Top-Ranking Fire Sequences	3.5.1-40
3.5.1.2-3	Three Top-Ranking Seismic Sequences	3.5.1-42
3.5.1.2-4	Three Top-Ranking Flooding Sequences	3.5.1-44
3.5.2-1	Point Estimate Core Damage Frequency	3.5.2-3
3.5.2-2	Breakdown by Event Sequence Frequency Range	3.5.2-4
3.5.2-3	Summary of Important Core Damage Event Sequences	3.5.2-5
3.5.2-4	Primary IPE Core Damage Evaluation Process	3.5.2-7
3.5.2-5	Primary IPE Containment Bypass Evaluation Process	3.5.2-8
3.5.3-1	Breakdown: by Initiating Event Category	3.5.3-4
3.5.3-2	STP System/Top Event Importance	3.5.3-5
3.5.3-3	Importance of STP Split Fractions	3.5.3-6
3.5.4-1	Top Event Importance for the Decay Heat Removal Function	3.5.4-3

3.5.5-1	Current USIs and GSIs Amenable to Resolution	3.5.5-2
3.5.5-2	Current USIs and SSIs Covered by this PSA	3.5.5-12
3.5.5-3	Current USIs and GSIs Resolved by this PSA	3.5.5-15
4.1.1-1	Comparison of Zion and STPEGS Containment Designs	4.1.1-3
4.1.4-1	Selected Equipment for IDCOR Degraded Core Sequence Survivability	4.1.4-5
4.1.4-2	South Texas Project Equipment Qualification Data	4.1.4-6
4.1.4-3	Equipment Survivability Comparison for IDCOR Sequences	4.1.4-10
4.1.4-4	Equipment Survivability Estimate for IDCOR Sequences	4.1.4-11
4.3.3-1	Assignment of RCS Pressure at the Time of Core Damage for Sequences with Reactor Trip Successful	4.3.3-4
4.5-1	Applicability of NUREG-1150 Zion APET Top Events to the South Texas Project	4.5-2
4.5.2-1	Containment Event Tree Top Event Descriptions	4.5.2-8
4.7.2-1	Description of MACROS Used in STPEGS Containment Event Tree	4.7.2-13
4.7.2-2	Failure Fractions for STPEGS Containment Event Tree	4.7.2-15
4.7.2-3	Baseline Pressure Distributions Used in STADIC Model for Containment Failure at Vessel Breach	4.7.2-29
4.7.2-4	Split Fractions for STP Containment Failure at Vessel Breach (VB)	4.7.2-30
4.8.1-1	General Release Category Considerations for Large, Dry Containment PWRs	4.8.1-5
4.8.1-2	Release Category Assignment Matrix for South Texas	4.8.1-6
4.8.2-1	Summary of Release Category Frequencies and General Grouping	4.8.2-4
4.8.3-1	Radionuclide Groups	4.8.3-3
4.8.3-2	Description of the Twelve Letter "Bin" Used to Characterize the ZION Apet Sequences	4.8.3-4
4.8.3-3	ZISOR Release Times, Heights, and Energies for Selected South Texas Project Release Categories	4.8.3-6
4.8.3-4	South Texas Project Release Category Source Terms (Fraction of Core Inventory)	4.8.3-7
4.9.2-1	Top 25 Sequences Contributing to Group: RELI Frequency	4.9.2-2
4.9.3-1	Top-Ranking Sequences Contributing to Group: RELI Frequency	4.9.3-2
4.9.4-1	Top 25 Sequences Contributing to Group: RELII Frequency	4.9.4-2
4.9.5-1	Top Event Importance for Release Category I	4.9.5-2
4.9.5-2	Split Fraction Importance for Release Category I	4.9.5-5
4.9.5-3	Top Event Importance for Release Category II	4.9.5-8
4.9.5-4	Split Fraction Importance for Release Category II	4.9.5-12
4.9.5-5	Top Event Importance for Release Category III	4.9.5-15
4.9.5-6	Split Fraction Importance for Release Category III	4.9.5-17
5.1-1	Utility PSA Development Activities	5.1-3
5.1-2	Applications of Probabilistic Risk Assessment	5.1-5
5.3-1	Review and Sign-Off Responsibilities	5.3-2
5.5-1	Accident Management Assessment Committee Working Group	5.5-2
5.5-2	AMACWG Objectives	5.5-2
5.5-3	Table of Contents - AMAC Working Group Guidance	5.5-3
5.5-4	Definition of Vulnerability	5.5-4
5.5-5	NUREG/CR-5474 Candidate Accident Management Screening	5.5-5
6.1-1	Important Operator Actions and Associated Initiating Events	6.1-3
7-1	Current USIs and GSIs Closed by the Level 2 PSA	7-2

FIGURES

1.1-1	Major Elements of STP Living PSA Program	1.1.1-3
1.2-1	General Design Philosophy of STPEGS Safety Features	1.2.2-13
1.2-2	STPEGS Essential System	1.2.2-14
1.2-3	STPEGS Design Comparison	1.2.2-15
1.2-4	Site Layout	1.2.2-16
1.2-5	Plot Plan	1.2.2-17
1.2-6	Classes of Safety Functions At A Nuclear Power Plant	1.2.2-18
1.3-1	Framework for Defining Accident Sequences	1.3-3
1.4.1-1	Probability Distribution for Core Damage Frequency	1.4.1-4
1.4.2-1	Major Initiating Event Grps Contribution to Core Damage Frequency	1.4.2-15
1.4.2-2	Specific Initiating Events Contribution to Core Damage Frequency	1.4.2-16
1.4.2-3	Results of Updated Level 2 PSA Results at Time of Core Damage	1.4.2-17
1.4.2-4	Comparison of Updated Level 1 Results with STP PSA	1.4.2-18
1.4.3-1	Results of STP Level 2 PSA at the End of Accident	1.4.3-4
1.4.3-2	Comparison of Containment Status at Core Damage & End of Accident	1.4.3-5
1.4.4-1	Major Contributions to Large Early Release Frequency	1.4.4-5
1.4.4-2	Major Contributions to Small Early Release Frequency	1.4.4-6
1.4.4-3	Major Contributions to Late Release Frequency	1.4.4-7
2.3-1	Framework for Defining Accident Sequences	2.3.8-16
2.3-2	Interpreted Treatment of Accident Sequences in a Level 2 PSA	2.3.8-17
2.3-3	Modularized Event Tree Structure for STP Level 2 PSA	2.3.8-18
2.3-4	Master Logic Diagram for Defining Initiating Events in STP PSA	2.3.8-19
2.3-5	HBFT Developed to Level Indicating Changes in Principal Energy Transfer Processes ..	2.3.8-20
2.3-6	ESD Symbology	2.3.8-21
2.3-7	General Transient Event Sequence Diagram	2.3.8-22
2.3-8	Example Medium LOCA Event Tree Structure	2.3.8-23
2.3-9	Flow Chart for Level 1 Quantification	2.3.8-24
2.3-10	Use of Conditional Event Tree Split Fractions in Event Sequence Quantification	2.3.8-25
2.3-11	RISKMAN® Development of Common Cause Event Subtrees for Common Cause Group (A, B, C)	2.3.8-26
2.3-12	Flow Chart of Systems Analysis Steps Using RISKMAN®	2.3.8-27
2.3-13	PSA Database Development Process Flow Chart	2.3.8-28
2.3-14	Application of RISKMAN® To Develop Generic Distribution for MOV Failure Rates ..	2.3.8-29
2.3-15	Plant Specific Updates of MOV Failure Rate	2.3.8-30
2.3-16	Plant Specific Updates for MOV with Zero Failures	2.3.8-31
2.3-17	Example RISKMAN® Report of Ranking Sequences to Core Melt	2.3.8-32
2.3-18	Example RISKMAN® Report Top Event Importance	2.3.8-33
2.3-19	Example RISKMAN® Split Fraction Importance Report	2.3.8-34
2.3-20	Example RISKMAN® Basic Event Importance Report	2.3.8-35
2.3-21	PRA Quantification Flow Chart for Point Estimates and Uncertainties	2.3.8-36
2.3-22	Typical Containment Failure Probability Distributions for Leak Failure, Gross Failure, and Total Failure	2.3.8-37
2.3-23	PWR Containment Event Tree	2.3.8-38
3.1.1-1	Modularized Event Tree Structure for STPEGS Level 2 PSA	3.1.1-3
3.1.2-1	Major Logic Diagram	3.1.2-49
3.1.2-2	Principal Heat Transport Paths That Directly Influence Reactor Core Thermal Equilibrium	3.1.2-50
3.1.2-3	Heat Balance Fault Tree Developed to Level Indicating Changes in Principal Energy Transfer Process	3.1.2-51
3.1.2-4	Heat Balance Fault Subtrees for Increase and Decrease in RCS Core Heat Generation ..	3.1.2-52
3.1.2-5	Heat Balance Fault Subtrees for Increase and Decrease in RCS Heat Removal from Core	3.1.2-53
3.1.2-6	Heat Balance Fault Subtrees for Increase and Decrease in RCS Heat Transfer to SCS ..	3.1.2-54
3.1.2-7	Heat Balance Fault Subtrees for Increase and Decrease in RCS Heat Removal from RCS	3.1.2-55
3.1.2-8	Heat Balance Fault Subtrees for Increase and Decrease in SCS Energy Transfer to	

	Plant Output	3.1.2-56
3.1.2-9	Heat Balance Fault Subtrees for Increase and Decrease in Plant Electrical Output	3.1.2-57
3.1.2-10	Heat Balance Fault Subtrees for Increase and Decrease in Thermal Output	3.1.2-58
3.1.3-1	Event Sequence Diagram Symbols	3.1.3-54
3.1.3-2	General Transient Event Sequence Diagram	3.1.3-55
3.1.3-3	General Transient Event Tree	3.1.3-63
3.1.3-4	General Transient Long Term Response Event Tree	3.1.3-76
3.1.4-1	Steam Generator Tube Rupture Event Sequence Diagram	3.1.4-37
3.1.4-2	"Early" Steam Generator Tube Rupture Event Tree Model	3.1.4-47
3.1.4-3	"Late" Steam Generator Tube Rupture Event Tree Model	3.1.4-57
3.1.5-1	Small Break LOCA Event Sequence Diagram	3.1.5-24
3.1.5-2	Small LOCA Early Response Event Tree	3.1.5-29
3.1.5-3	Small LOCA Late Response Event Tree	3.1.5-32
3.1.6-1	Medium Break LOCA Event Sequence Diagram	3.1.6-18
3.1.6-2	Medium LOCA Early Response Event Tree	3.1.6-20
3.1.6-3	Medium LOCA Late Response Event Tree	3.1.6-22
3.1.7-1	Large Break LOCA Event Sequence Diagram	3.1.7-17
3.1.7-2	Large LOCA Event Tree	3.1.7-18
3.1.7-3	Effect of Accumulators, Two Phase Water Level in the Reactor Vessel	3.1.7-23
3.1.7-4	Effect of Accumulators, Hottest Core Node	3.1.7-24
3.1.7-5	Effect of Accumulators, Mass of Intact Core	3.1.7-25
3.1.8-1	Anticipated Transient Without Scram Event Sequence Diagram	3.1.8-42
3.1.8-2	Top Event Tree Legend ATWS	3.1.8-45
3.1.8-3	Top Event Tree Legend LTATWS	3.1.8-55
3.1.10-1	STPEGS Electric Power Event Tree - Offsite Power Available	3.1.10-49
3.1.10-2	STPEGS Electric Power Event Tree - Loss of offsite Power	3.1.10-50
3.1.10-3	Event Tree Logic for Top Events BF, BG and BH	3.1.10-55
3.1.10-4	Mechanical Support Systems Event Tree	3.1.10-56
3.1.11-1	Long Term Response Event Sequence Diagram	3.1.11-19
3.2.1-1	Quantification of Event Trees Using Conditional Split Fractions	3.2.1-58
3.2.1-2	General Definition of Split Fractions for a Three-Train System with Separate Top Events	3.2.1-59
3.2.1-3	Component Cooling Water System Block Diagram (from STP PSA)	3.2.1-60
3.2.1-4	Fault Tree for CCW Top Event KXA and KXB	3.2.1-61
3.2.1-5	Flow Chart of Systems Analysis Steps Using RISKMAN*	3.2.1-64
3.2.3-1	STP PSA Plant Event Tree Model	3.2.3-4
3.2.3.1-1	Logic Block Diagram, 13.8 kV Power Supply, Top Events BF, BG and BH, Electric Power System	3.2.3-10
3.2.3.1-2	Logic Block Diagram, Top Events EB, EB and EC, Electric Power System	3.2.3-11
3.2.3.1-3	Logic Block Diagram, Top Events DA, DB and DC, Electric Power System	3.2.3-12
3.2.3.1-4	Logic Block Diagram, Diesel Generator, Top Events GA, GB and GC, Electric Power System	3.2.3-14
3.2.3.2-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Events SS, Solid State Protection System	3.2.3-16
3.2.3.2-2	Logic Block Diagram, Top Events IA, IB and IC, ESFAS Actuation Train A (Trains B and C Similar)	3.2.3-17
3.2.3.3-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event RT, Reactor Protection System	3.2.3-20
3.2.3.4-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Events WA, WB and WC, Essential Cooling Water System	3.2.3-23
3.2.3.5-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event CL, Essential Chilled Water System	3.2.3-25
3.2.3.6-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Events FA, FB and FC, EAB HVAC Fans	3.2.3-29
3.2.3.6-2	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event DM, EAB HVAC Smoke Purge Dampers	3.2.3-30
3.2.3.7-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Events KA, KB and KC, Component Cooling Water System	3.2.3-33
3.2.3.7-2	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event IN, Component Cooling Water System	3.2.3-34
3.2.3.8-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event TT, Main Steam Isolation (General Transients)	3.2.3-37
3.2.3.8-2	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event TT, Main Steam Isolation (Steam Line Break)	3.2.3-38
3.2.3.8-3	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event SL, Main Steam Isolation (SGTR)	3.2.3-39
3.2.3.9-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Events AF and CD, Auxiliary Feedwater System	3.2.3-44
3.2.3.9-2	Logic Block Diagram, Top Events S2, S1 and SV, Main Steam Relief	3.2.3-45

3.2.3.10-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event PR, Primary Relief	3.2.3-48
3.2.3.10-2	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event PO, Primary Relief (ATWS)	3.2.3-49
3.2.3.10-3	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event OB, Bleed and Feed Cooling	3.2.3-50
3.2.3.11-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event CH, Chemical and Volume Control System	3.2.3-54
3.2.3.11-2	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event PD, Positive Displacement Pump	3.2.3-55
3.2.3.11-3	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event LI, CVCS Letdown and Seal Return Lines Isolation	3.2.3-56
3.2.3.11-4	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event SE, RCPs Seal Injection and Thermal Barrier Cooling	3.2.3-57
3.2.3.11-5	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event LO, CVCS Letdown Line Containment Isolation Valves	3.2.3-58
3.2.3.12-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event SP, Pressurizer Spray System	3.2.3-61
3.2.3.13-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Events PA, PB and PZ, Safety Injection Common Equipment	3.2.3-64
3.2.3.14-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Events HA, HB and HC, High Head Injection System	3.2.3-67
3.2.3.15-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Events LA, LB and LC, Low Head Injection System	3.2.3-70
3.2.3.16-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Events RA, RB and RC, Safety Injection Recirculation	3.2.3-73
3.2.3.17-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Events CS and WI, Containment Spray System	3.2.3-76
3.2.3.17-2	Logic Block Diagram, Containment Spray Actuation	3.2.3-77
3.2.3.18-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event CF, Reactor Containment Fan Coolers	3.2.3-80
3.2.3.19-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event OC, Residual Heat Removal System	3.2.3-83
3.2.3.19-2	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event RX, Residual Heat Removal System	3.2.3-84
3.2.3.20-1	Logic Block Diagram, Top Events CP, Containment Supplementary Purge Lines Isolation	3.2.3-87
3.2.3.20-2	Logic Block Diagram, Top Event CI, Containment Isolation System	3.2.3-88
3.3.2-1	Population Variability of the Failure Rate	3.2.3-89
3.3.2-2	State-of-Knowledge Distribution Over the Set of Frequency Distributions	3.2.3-89
3.3.2-3	Posterior Distribution for the Parameters of the Distribution of Pumps' Failure to Start on Demand Rates	3.3.2-90
3.3.2-4	The Relation Between the Population Variability Curve and Uncertainty about Individual Estimates	3.3.2-90
3.3.2-5	Example of Event Classification and Impact Assessment - Event Classification	3.3.2-91
3.3.2-6	Example of Event Classification and Impact Assessment - Event Impact Assessment	3.3.2-91
3.3.2-7	Example of the Assessment of Impact Vectors Involving Multiple Interpretation of Event - Event Classification	3.3.2-91
3.3.2-8	Example of the Assessment of Impact Vectors Involving Multiple Interpretation of Event - Multiple Hypothesis Impact Vector Assessment	3.3.2-92
3.3.2-9	Categorization of Component Types for Generic Maintenance Frequency Distributions	3.3.2-93
3.3.2-10	Categorization of Component Technical Specification for Generic Mean Maintenance Duration Distributions	3.3.2-94
3.3.2-11	RISKMAN2 Equations for Loss of 125V DC Bus E1A11 and E1B11 Initiating Events	3.3.2-95
3.3.2-12	RISKMAN2 Equations for Loss of ECW System Initiating Events	3.3.2-96
3.3.2-13	RISKMAN2 Equations for Loss of CCW System Initiating Events	3.3.2-98
3.3.2-14	RISKMAN2 Equations for Loss of EAB HVAC System Initiating Events	3.3.2-100
3.3.2-15	RISKMAN2 Equations for Loss of Main Control Room HVAC System Initiating Events	3.3.2-105
3.3.4-1	Histogram of Calibration Error Rates	3.3.4-57
3.3.4-2	Nonrecovery of Offsite Power	3.3.4-58
3.3.4-3	Nonrecovery of Single Diesel Generator	3.3.4-59
3.3.4-4	Nonrecovery of One Out of Two Diesel Generators	3.3.4-60
3.3.4-5	Nonrecovery of One Out of Three Diesel Generators	3.3.4-61
3.3.6-1	High/Low Pressure Piping Interface (Trains B and C Identical)	3.3.6-21
3.3.6-2	Frequency of check Valve Leakage Events	3.3.6-22
3.3.6-3	RCS Depressurization Transient for a 6" break	3.3.6-23
3.4-1	Recommended IPEEE Approach for Winds, Floods, and Others	3.4-6
3.4.1-1	Overview of Spatial Interactions Methodology	3.4.1-90
3.4.2-1	Event Tree for Fire Scenario Z004-FS-01	3.4.2-71
3.4.2-2	$I_{(R)}$ For Control Room Fires (from STP PSA, Figure 9.4-1)	3.4.2-75
3.4.2-3	Comparison of Panel Fire Severity Factors from Original STP PSA Analysis and Rancho Seco Fire Sensitivity Study	3.4.2-76
3.4.2-4	Event Tree for Control Room Fire Scenarios 2 through 6 (from STP PSA, Figure 9.4-2)	3.4.2-77
3.4.2-5	Obtaining $I_{(S64.2.2.3)}$ for Control Room Fire Scenario 6 (from STP PSA, Figure 9.4-3)	3.4.2-78

3.4.4-1	Seismic Analysis Approach	3.4.4-19
3.4.4-2	Annual Probability of Exceedance of Peak Ground Acceleration: South Texas Site	3.4.4-20
3.4.4-3	Typical Fragility Curve	3.4.4-21
3.4.4-4	Seismic Event Tree	3.4.4-22
3.4.4-5	LLNL Best Estimate and Arithmetic Mean Hazard Curves	3.4.4-25
3.4.4-6	First Three Sequences Using LLNL Seismic Hazard	3.4.4-26
3.4.5-1	South Texas Project Maximum Temperature	3.4.5-15
3.4.5-2	Average Daily Temperature Cycle (Fourier Approximation)	3.4.5-16
3.4.5-3	Train A Distribution Room: Air Temperature versus Time	3.4.5-17
3.4.5-4	Distribution for the maximum Temperature of "Lumped" Train C Distribution - Switchgear Room under Various "Smoke Purge" Modes of HVAC Operation	3.4.5-18
3.4.5-5	Distributions for the Maximum Temperature of Train A Distributions	3.4.5-19
3.4.5-6	Distribution for the Maximum Temperature of Train A Electrical Distribution Room and the Thermal Fragility Curve for the Battery Charger	3.4.5-20
3.4.5-7	Distribution for the Maximum Temperature of Train A Electrical Distribution Room and the Thermal Fragility Curve for the 7.5-kVA Inverter	3.4.5-21
3.4.5-8	Maximum Temperature Distributions for "Lumped" Train C Distribution	3.4.5-22
3.4.6-1	Typical Section Through Plant	3.4.6-38
3.4.6-2	Area-Capacity Curve of Mean Cooling Reservoir	3.4.6-39
3.4.6-3	MCR Spillway Rating Curve	3.4.6-40
3.4.6-4	Discharge Rating at STP Site Associated with Breach of Upstream Buchanan and Mansfield Dams	3.4.6-41
3.4.6-5	Number of Dam Failures per Year	3.4.6-42
3.4.6-6	Failure Rate Distribution for Time after Completion of Dams	3.4.6-43
3.4.6-7	Maximum Flow Profiles through the Plant	3.4.6-44
3.4.6-8	Cooling Reservoir Embankment and Interior Dikes Typical Sections	3.4.6-45
3.4.6-9	Typical Section of Florida Power and Light Martin County Power Plant Cooling Reservoir	3.4.6-46
3.4.6-10	Breach Length versus Model No. 1 Analysis Runup on Plant Structures	3.4.6-47
3.4.6-11	Failure Rate Distribution of the Main Cooling Reservoir	3.4.6-48
3.4.6-12	Essential Cooling Pond Sections and Detail	3.4.6-12
3.4.7-1	Geometry for Impact Probability Model	3.4.7-16
3.4.7-2	Tornado Target - ECW Pond	3.4.7-17
3.5.1.1-1	RCS Pressure Status at the Time of Core Damage	3.5.1-35
3.5.1.1-2	Containment Integrity Status at the Time of Core Damage	3.5.1-36
3.5.2-1	Probability Distribution for Core Damage Frequency	3.5.2-9
4-1	STP PSA Plant Event Tree Model	4-3
4.1.1-1	Cross-Section for the Zion Containment	4.1.1-12
4.1.1-2	Reactor Containment Building - Sideview	4.1.1-13
4.1.1-3	Reactor Containment Building - EL -11'3"	4.1.1-14
4.1.1-4	Reactor Containment Building - EL 37'3"	4.1.1-15
4.1.1-5	Reactor Containment Building - EL 68'0"	4.1.1-16
4.1.1-6	Reactor Cavity Cross Sectional View	4.1.1-17
4.1.1-7	Reactor Cavity and Lower Compartment	4.1.1-18
4.1.1-8	Containment Spray	4.1.1-19
4.1.1-9	Engineered Safeguards Systems	4.1.1-20
4.1.1-10	Auxiliary Feedwater System	4.1.1-21
4.1.2-1	Ventilation Hole in Secondary Shield Wall	4.1.2-4
4.1.2-2	Gap between Reactor Vessel Insulation and Biological Shield Wall	4.1.2-4
4.1.2-3	Reactor Cavity Keyway View from Cavity	4.1.2-5
4.1.2-4	Reactor Cavity and Support Subsystem Duct View from Keyway	4.1.2-5
4.1.2-5	Incore Instrumentation Tubes in Reactor Cavity	4.1.2-6
4.1.2-6	Incore Instrumentation Tubes Entering Cavity Wall	4.1.2-6
4.1.2-7	Welded Seal between Reactor Vessel Flange and Refueling Cavity Liner	4.1.2-7
4.1.2-8	Same as Previous Figure (right side of picture)	4.1.2-8
4.1.4-1	Sequence S2HF - Pressure in Upper & Lower Compartments	4.1.4-14

4.1.4-2	Sequence S2HF - Temperature of Gas in Lower Compartment	4.1.4-15
4.1.4-3	Sequence S2HF - Gas Temperature in Upper Compartment	4.1.4-16
4.1.4-4	Sequence TMLB - Pressure in Upper & Lower Compartments	4.1.4-17
4.1.4-5	Sequence TMLB - Temperature of Gas in Lower Compartment	4.1.4-18
4.1.4-6	Sequence TMLB - Gas Temperature in Upper Compartment	4.1.4-19
4.1.4-7	Sequence AHF - Pressure in Upper & Lower Compartments	4.1.4-20
4.1.4-8	Sequence AHF - Temperature of Gas in Lower Compartment	4.1.4-21
4.1.4-9	Sequence AHF - Gas Temperature in Upper Compartment	4.1.4-22
4.1.4-10	Sequence TQHF - Pressure in Upper & Lower Compartments	4.1.4-23
4.1.4-11	Sequence TQHF - Temperature of Gas in Lower Compartment	4.1.4-24
4.1.4-12	Sequence TQHF - Gas Temperature in Upper Compartment	4.1.4-25
4.1.4-13	Sequence ADF - Pressure in Upper & Lower Compartments	4.1.4-26
4.1.4-14	Sequence ADF - Temperature of Gas in Lower Compartment	4.1.4-27
4.1.4-15	Sequence ADF - Gas Temperature in Upper Compartment	4.1.4-28
4.2.2-1	MAAP Containment NodPrization	4.2.2-5
4.2.2-2	Upper Compartment Pressure Spike as a Function of FENTR and FCMDCH	4.2.2-6
4.2.2-3	Fast Station Blackout , Max DCH with Forced Burn, Pressure in the Upper Compartment	4.2.2-7
4.2.2-4	Fast Station Blackout , Max DCH with Forced Burn, Gas Temperature in the Upper Compartment	4.2.2-8
4.2.2-5	Effects of Lower Compartment Volume & Curb, Pressure in the Upper Compartment	4.2.2-9
4.2.2-6	Effect of Lower Compartment Volume & Curb, Gas Temperature in Upper Compartment	4.2.2-10
4.2.2-7	Area of Corium Pool in Lower Compartment, Concrete Ablation Depth in Cavity	4.2.2-11
4.3.3-1	South Texas Project Plant Damage State Matrix	4.3.3-5
4.5.2-1	STPEGS Containment Event Tree	4.5.2-9
4.6.2-1	127 MAAP Output for Accident Sequences	4.6.2-5
4.7.2-1	South Texas Early Containment Failure	4.7.2-31
4.7.2-2	Comparison of MAAP DCH Predictions with NUREG/CR-4551 Distributions	4.7.2-32
4.7.2-3	Stress-Strength Interference Theory	4.7.2-33
4.7.2-4	Cumulative Probability Distributions for STP Containment Failure Modes	4.7.2-34
4.7.2-5	Containment Failure at Vessel Breach	4.7.2-35
4.7.2-6	Pressure Rise at Vessel Breach - Low Pressure Case	4.7.2-36
4.7.2-7	Pressure Rise at Vessel Breach - Medium Pressure Case	4.7.2-37
4.7.2-8	Pressure Rise at Vessel Breach - High Pressure Case	4.7.2-38
4.7.2-9	Fraction of Core Ejected at Vessel Breach	4.7.2-39
4.7.2-10	Probability Dist. for In-Vessel Hydrogen Generation	4.7.2-40
4.7.2-11	Cum. Probability Dist. for H2 Mole Frac in "Dry" Air	4.7.2-41
4.7.2-12	Probability of Containment Failure vs Pressure (Slow Pressurization)	4.7.2-42
4.8.2-1	Release Category Group I	4.8.2-8
4.8.2-2	Release Category Group II	4.8.2-9
4.8.2-3	Release Category Group IIIA	4.8.2-10
4.9.1-2	Probability Distribution for Release Groups I-III	4.9.1-2
4.9.2-1	Initiator Contribution to Release Category Group I	4.9.2-11
4.9.2-2	Probability Distribution for Release Category Group I	4.9.2-12
4.9.3-1	Initiator Contribution to Release Category Group II	4.9.3-12
4.9.3-2	Probability Distribution for Release Category Group II	4.9.3-13
4.9.4-1	Initiator Contribution to Release Category Group III	4.9.4-14
4.9.4-2	Probability Distribution for Release Category Group III	4.9.4-15
5.1-1	IPE Organizational Structure	5.1-7