This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on September 9, 1992. This meeting concerned activities authorized at your Sequoyah facility. The issues discussed at this conference concerned the inoperability of one of your safety injection pumps for a period of time in excess of the Technical Specification allowable outage times. A list of attendees and a copy of your handout are enclosed. We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the appropriate enforcement action.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

(Original signed by J. Johnson)

Ellis W. Merschoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosures:
1. List of Attendees
2. SI Pump Breaker Trip Button Handout

cc w/encls: (See page 2)

JEOI 1

TVA Representative Tennessee Valley Authority Rockville Office 11921 Rockville Pike Suite 402 Rockville, MD 20852

General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority ET 11H 400 West Summit Hill Drive Knoxville, TN 37902

Mr. J. R. Bynum, Vice President Nuclear Operations Tennessee Valley Authority 3B Lookout Place 101 Market Street Chattanocga, TN 37402-2801

Ms. Marci Cooper, Site Licensing Manager Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379

Mr. Jack Wilson, Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 2

Mr. M. J. Burzynski, Manager Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Tennessee Valley Authority 5B Lookout Place Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-280

Mr. Michael H. Mobley, Director Division of Radiological Health T.E.R.R.A. Building 6th Floor 150 9th Avenue North Nashville, TN 37219-5404

County Judge Hamilton County Courthouse Chattanooga, TN 37402

State of Tennessee

bcc w/encls: (See page 3)

bcc w/encls:

J. R. Johnson, RII

G. C. Lainas, NRR F. J. Hebdon, NRR

P. J. Kellogg, RII D. E. Labarge, NRR NRC Document Control Desk

NRC Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2600 Igou Ferry Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379

DRP/RII

PKellogg

DRP/RII

BWilson 9/10/92

DRP/RII

JJohnson 9/ 1/92

ENCLOSURE 1

LIST OF ATTENDEES

NRC

S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II, (RII)

E. W. Merschoff, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII

A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RII

F. J. Hebdon, Director, Project Directorate II-4, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS),

RII

B. A. Wilson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4, DRP, RII

P. J. Kellogg, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 4A, DRP, RII

W. E. Holland, Senior Resident Inspector, RII D. E. LaBarge, Senior Project Manager, NRR

B. Uryc, Senior Enforcement Specialist, EICS, RII

C. F. Evans, Regional Counsel, RII

TVA

J. R. Bynum, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

J. L. Wilson, Vice President, Sequoyah

R. J. Beecken, Plant Manager

M. A. Cooper, Site Licensing Manager

J. P. Maciejewski, General Manager Nuclear Assurance

T. A. Flippo, Site Quality Manager L. S. Bryant, Manager, Maintenance C. Carey, Engineering Specialist

R. M. Eytchison, Management Trainee

R. R. Thompson, Manager, Compliance Licensing

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE PRESENTATION SI PUMP BREAKER TRIP BUTTON

SEPTEMBER 9, 1992

AGENDA

I. INTRODUCTION	I.	INTRODUCTION
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- II. CHRONOLOGY/FACTUAL BASIS
- III. POTENTIAL CAUSES/CONTRIBUTORS
- IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
 - IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS SI PUMP BREAKER
 - OVERALL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PMT PROCESS
- V. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
- VI. LICENSING PERSPECTIVES
- VII. CLOSING REMARKS/CONCLUSIONS

I. CHRONOLOGY/FACTUAL BASIS

FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

ELECTRICAL OPEN/CLOSE SWITCHES

CHARGING SPRINGS

MANUAL TRIP BUTTON

RERACKING PROCEDURES

6.9 kV BREAKER RACKING PROCEDURE


Each Specified Step Followed

INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION

Consistent Verification With Racking Procedure

WORK ORDER PROCESS

Additional Cycling Specified



II. CHRONOLOGY/FACTUAL BASIS (Continued)

CHRONOLOGY

JULY 31

INSPECTION OF 18-B SAFETY INJECTION BREAKER CHARGING SPRING MOTOR

REPLACEMENT OF MOTOR NECESS/TATED BY UNRELATED FAILURE

CRAFT VERIFICATION OF OPER BILITY FOLLOWING MOTOR REPLACEMENT

ASOS VERIFICATION IN RACKING PROCESS

- Ensure Spring Charging Taggle ON
- Ensure Charging Spring Charged
- Verify Breaker Open (Position Flag)
- Ensure Racking Latch Down (Connect Position)

INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF BREAKERS

- Ensure Control Power (External Indicators)
- Ensure Racked In (Connect Position)
- Ensure Closing (Charging) Springs Charged
- Ensure Cubicle Door in Good Condition

BREAKER RETURNED TO SERVICE

AUGUST 3-7

VARIOUS MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES ON TRAIN A COMPONENTS

AUGUST 10

QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE ON TRAIN B SAFETY INJECTION PUMP

REPORT TO NRC IN ACCORDANCE WITH 50.72

INVESTIGATION INITIATED

III. POTENTIAL CAUSES/CONTRIBUTORS

SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO ROOT CAUSE REVIEW

LACK OF ATTENTIVENESS

Individual Aware of Function - Exercised Care

Independent Verifier - Reviewed Principal Indicators

Likely Contributor

MECHANICAL FAILURE/DESIGN WEAKNESS

Actual Breaker Testing

Manufacturer Involvement

Sticking Observed - Not Actual Conditions

Likely Contributor

UNAUTHORIZED WORK ON BREAKER

Records Reviewed

Considered Unlikely Cause

TAMPERING

Considered Unlikely Cause

LIKELY CAUSES - DESIGN WEAKNESS ALLOWED FOR STYCKING COUPLED WITH LACK OF ATTENTIVENESS (MANUAL TRIP BUTTON STATUS)

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS REGARDING SI PUMP BREAKER

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Proper Alignment of Specific Breaker

- Completed Pump Surveillance

Inspected 6.9 kV Safety-Related Breakers On Both Units

Replaced Breaker - Ran SI Pump Following Installation

Notice To Operations Regarding Trip Button

ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Breaker Racking - Appropriate End Device Testing

Breaker Tear Down - With Vendor

Evaluating Design Change Options

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Continued)

OVERALL CURRECTIVE ACTIONS

FOCUS ON BROAD EFFORTS TO ENHANCE PA'T PROCESS

M my Elements Already Underway at Time of Event

INTERIM MEASURES

Maintenance Directive

- Emphasis on Appropriate PMT and Verification

Guidance to Operators

- Focus on Appropriate PMT Requirements

Guidance to Planners

- Technical Paview of PMT Matrix
- Emphasis on Appropriate PMT

Consideration of Direction Regarding Non-Maintenance Activities

LONG TERM ACTIONS

Procedural Enhancements

Several Changes Regarding PMT and Verification

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

- Ongoing Plant Actions

V. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

ACTUAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE MINIMAL

LICENSING BASIS ANALYSIS REQUIRES SINGLE TRAIN ECCS AVAILABLE

SI Pumps Required For Limited Range Of Break Sizes

SINGLE COMPONENTS OF OPPOSITE TRAIN ECCS DESIGNATED "INOPERABLE" BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

SI Pump On Two Occasions

ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING ANALYSES SHOWS ACCEPTABLE CORE PARAMETERS ASSUMING TIMELY OPERATOR ACTION

SI PUMP ADMINISTRATIVELY "INOPERABLE" - SURVEILLANCE ON AUGUST 5

Pump Running

Valve Alignment For Miniflow (17 Minutes)

Operators Aware Of Alignment

Operator Response By Emergency Procedure (E-0, Step 5) Within Required Time Frame

VI. LICENSING PERSPECTIVES

CONDITION OUTSIDE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS - SECTION 3.5.2

ECCS CAPABLE OF PERFORMING INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION - MINIMAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND REPORTING AFTER TVA DISCOVERY

COMPREHENSIVE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS RELATED TO BREAKER PRACTICES AND OVERALL PMT PROCESS

Extensive Actions Already Planned in Response to RHR Event

VII. CLOSING REMARKS/CONCLUSION

RECOGNIZE POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE

EXTENSIVE ONGOING EFFORTS - HEADED IN RIGHT DIRECTION

COMPREHENSIVE ACTIONS REFLECT COMMITMENT TO ASSURING QUALITY

EXTENSIVE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO ADDRESS UNDERLYING ISSUES