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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

MEMORANDUM FOR: Cecil O. Thomas, Chief  
Standardization & Special Projects Branch  
Division of Licensing

THRU: Steven A. Varga, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #1  
Division of Licensing

FROM: Daniel G. McDonald, Jr. Project Manager  
Operating Reactors Branch #1  
Division of Licensing

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW AND  
VITAL AREA VALIDATION - TURKEY POINT PLANT  
UNITS 3 AND 4

By memorandum dated August 29, 1983, I provided comments on the Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) and Vital Area Validation (VAV) reports for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. The following comments are applicable to the revised reports.

The primary concern initially identified in the August 29 memorandum is still applicable. The RER report and transmittal letter state that deficiencies requiring prompt corrective action exist. It is indicated that NMSS reviewed the existing Physical Security Plan to determine commitments to the items identified and that the plan does not come up to standards that would be applicable to new licensees under current interpretation of the applicable regulations. It further states, at the same time the manner in which it is implemented brings into question its effectiveness in practice.

Attachment C identifies and provides details to support the findings in respect to the approved security plan or existing regulations, however, this is not being sent to the licensee. In addition, the recommendations should be reviewed in accordance with the Commissions current backfit procedures.

The revised plan still indicates that deficiencies exist requiring prompt corrective action by the licensee. This report did remove the word remedial from the action statement. However, the finding of no potential sabotage vulnerabilities requiring immediate corrective actions exist. Section 2.2 indicates that the conditions identified in this section, if allowed to continue, could degrade to a sabotage vulnerability. The perimeter detection system and vital area barriers are approved in the existing plan. Attachment C indicates they are unacceptable now. The question of allowing their continued use might result in or degrade to a sabotage vulnerability appears inappropriate. They are either acceptable or unacceptable now.


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Appendix A of the VAV reports identifies new vital areas for both units. It appears the identification of deficiencies requiring prompt corrective actions and identification of new vital areas are backfit requirements and should be handled in accordance with the interim procedures of SECY 83-321 as indicated in the Denton Memorandum dated October 25, 1983 and NRR Office Letter No. 39, Revision 2, dated January 13, 1984. As stated in Table III of the NRR Office Letter, mechanisms used to communicate requirements are, among others, site visits and special reports.

The RER/VAV efforts and the reports fall into these categories. Therefore, I am identifying the RER/VAV programs and the Turkey Point reports as actions that may be considered to be a backfit and should be handled in accordance with SECY 83-321. Attachment 1 contains my initial comments and considerations for continuing the program(s).



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Attachment:  
As stated