



Commonwealth Edison  
1400 Opus Place  
Downers Grove, Illinois 60516

September 16, 1992

Dr. Thomas E. Murley  
Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attn: Document Control Clerk

Subject: LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2  
Lowering of the CRD Support Structure  
NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

Dear Dr. Murley,

During the upcoming Unit 1 and Unit 2 refuel outages, (L1R05 and L2R05) Commonwealth Edison (CECo) plans on lowering the Control Rod Drive (CRD) support structures to facilitate maintenance work under the vessel, and thereby reducing radiation exposure to plant personnel.

The CRD support structure limits the downward motion of a control rod following a postulated CRD housing failure so that any resulting nuclear transient will not cause fuel damage. The clearance between the CRD housings and the support plate must be sufficient to prevent vertical contact stresses due to thermal expansion during plant operation.

With the current design, the maximum deflection of the support steel due to a drive housing failure is 3 inches, as discussed in UFSAR section 4.6.2.3.1.2.1. As evaluated in UFSAR section 4.6.2.3.3.1, "Sudden withdrawal of any control rod through a distance of one drive notch at any position in the core does not produce a transient sufficient to damage any radioactive material barrier." Therefore, the current 3 inch deflection due to housing failure is bounded by the consequences of the 6 inch rod withdrawal. Section 3/4.1.3 of both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Bases state that the maximum deflection of the support plate is 3 inches, and draws a comparison to the consequences of a normal withdrawal increment.

After the lowering of the support plate, the maximum deflection of the support steel due to a drive housing failure has been calculated to be 3.65 inches, which is still bounded by the 6 inch criteria for sudden rod withdrawal.

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CECo has performed a Safety Analysis per 10 CFR 50.59, and determined that an Unreviewed Safety Question does not exist as a result of this design change. Copies of these evaluations are included as Attachment A. A marked-up copy of each unit's Technical Specification Bases, showing the requested revision of the maximum support steel movement due to a CRD housing failure, is included as Attachment B. It is requested that these pages be revised to reflect the modifications. As part of the modification process, the UFSAR will be revised to reflect this design change.

If there are any questions, please contact this office.

Respectfully,



JoAnn Shields  
Nuclear Licensing Administrator

Attachments: Attachment A - Safety Evaluations  
Attachment B - Marked-up Bases pages

cc: A.B. Davis, Regional Administrator - RIII  
B.L. Siegel, Project Manager - NRR  
D.L. Hills, Senior Resident Inspector - LSCS  
Office of Nuclear Safety - IDNS

ATTACHMENT A  
SAFETY EVALUATIONS

ATTACHMENT B  
MARKED-UP BASES PAGES