

OCT 13 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard W. Starostecki, Director
Division of Project and Resident Programs
NRC Region I

FROM: Karl V. Seyfrit, Chief
Reactor Operations Analysis Branch
Office for Analysis and Evaluation
of Operational Data

SUBJECT: EVALUATION OF SALEM 1 & 2 LERs COVERING THE PERIOD
OCTOBER 1, 1982 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1983 FOR SALP INPUT

In support of the upcoming SALP review of the Public Service Electric and Gas Company in regard to their performance as licensee of the Salem 1 and 2 Plants, AEOD has assessed the licensee event reports (LERs). Our review focused on the adequacy of the narrative descriptions and the corrective actions taken by the licensee. Fifty one LERs on Salem 1 and ninety LERs on Salem 2 were retrieved from our data base with event dates from October 1, 1982 to August 25, 1983.

Our evaluation found that the licensee provides accurate and complete LERs including attachments of additional information. During the period March 26, 1983 through May 10, 1983, the licensee failed to submit timely LERs. (See IE inspection reports 50-272/83-12 and 50-311/83-13 for the period 83-03-26 to 05-10). The descriptions were sufficiently detailed to understand the event and the cause of the event was usually identified. The LER forms were accurately coded and supplemental information was provided when appropriate. Follow-up information was for the most part submitted as promised in revised LERs 82-090/01T on unit 1 was an exception. The licensee identified repetitive events most of the times except in the cases of LERs 82-128/01T, 82-141/03L and 82-145/03X on unit 2 where previous similar occurrences were not properly referenced. The licensee has indicated that all component failures were reported to NPRDS. A sample review of the LERs showed no multiple events reported in a single LER.

Salem Unit 1

The largest percentage (33%) of LERs submitted for Unit 1 were attributed to procedural or personnel errors. In most of the cases the procedures were improved or the personnel involved were counselled. The most serious events involved the reactor trip breakers that failed to open automatically (LERs 83-011/01X, 83-012/01T) on receipt of a low-low steam generator level reactor trip signal in both cases. Subsequent investigation revealed that the failure of the breakers to open automatically was caused by the mechanical binding of the latch mechanism due to friction in undervoltage trip attachment of the breakers. Following detailed investigation of the above event, all reactor trip and bypass breaker undervoltage trip attachments were replaced with new

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devices and extensive maintenance and testing of the breakers was performed. Generic letter 83-16 was sent to all light water plant licensees and applicants regarding transmittal of NUREG-0977 relative to ATWS events at Salem 1.

LER 82-006/03L identified an oversight of installing non-seismically qualified components on seismically qualified feeds on Diesel Generator safety bus, which is considered to be a significant design deficiency.

Salem Unit 2

The largest percentage (20%) of LERs submitted for Unit 2 were attributed to procedural or personnel errors.

General Comments on Both Units

It appears that personnel and procedural errors may present the major area where improvement could be made.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Harinder Trehan of my staff. Mr. Trehan can be reached on FTS-492-4435.

Karl V. Seyfrit, Chief
Reactor Operations Analysis Branch
Office for Analysis and Evaluation
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cc: L. J. Worrholm, SRI
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