



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

OCT 4 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard C. Lewis, Director
Division of Project and Resident Programs
NRC Region II

FROM: Karl V. Seyfrit, Chief
Reactor Operations Analysis Branch
Office for Analysis and Evaluation
of Operational Data

SUBJECT: SALP INPUT FOR VIRGINIA ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY FOR THE
PERIOD OCTOBER 1, 1982 THROUGH AUGUST 31, 1983

Surry Power Station Unit 1

AEOD evaluated the LERs for this unit for clarity and adequacy of description. Sixty LERs were retrieved from our data bases with event dates from October 2, 1982 to August 2, 1983. Five were not found in the DCS. The description of each event was good with adequate supplemental information provided in all cases. One updated LER was submitted. The root cause was unknown for four of the events. Investigations were continuing to determine the causes but revised LERs had not been submitted. One PNO was submitted which described an inadvertent safety injection caused by the loss of a vital bus. It appears that this event should have been reported in an LER. In addition, six other LER revisions were submitted during the appraisal period. The event dates which ranged from 1980 to 1982 did not fall within the appraisal period but the reports were submitted during that time. No reason was given for the inordinate delay in the revised submittals.

The largest percentage (55%) of LERs was due to component error. Personnel error and the "others" category each made up 17% of the events. The "procedures" category made up 8% of the events and design, manufacturing, or construction deficiencies account for 3% of the events. Nine events were reported to NPRDS.

Very few repetitive events were mentioned. The most serious repetitive problem involved the heat tracing system. Five events were attributed to problems in this system, which is scheduled to be modified. No other significant or unresolved problems were found.

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Richard C. Lewis

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Distribution:
DCS
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ROAB SF
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Surry Power Station Unit 2

AEOD evaluated the LERs from this unit for completeness and accuracy. Fifty-six LERs were retrieved from our data bases with event dates from October 2, 1982 through August 13, 1983. Six LERs were not found in the DCS. The description of each event was good with adequate supplemental information provided in all cases. No supplemental LERs were submitted even though the causes of some of the events had not been determined. In addition, two revised LERs were submitted during the assessment period; these LERs covered events which occurred in 1980 and 1981. No explanation was given for the long delay in submitting the revisions. Two PNOs were submitted. One involved possible steam generator girth weld degradation and the other involved steam generator J-tube degradation. It is possible that followup LERs were submitted for these events but have not made it into the data base.

The largest percentage of LERs (68%) was attributed to component failure. The next largest group was "others" with 18% of the total. Personnel errors accounted for 8% of the reports. Design, manufacturing, and construction problems made up 4% of the reports, and 2% of the reports were due to inadequate or faulty procedures. Twenty-two events were reported to NPRDS beginning in February 1983. Reporting, however, was inconsistent.

Repetitive events involving similar or related occurrences were not mentioned. The most prevalent unresolved repetitive event involved the heat tracing system; fifteen LERs were submitted on failures in this system and no previous LER was mentioned. This system is scheduled to be modified. No other significant or unresolved problems were found.

Summary

In general the licensee contributed adequate descriptions of the events in a timely manner. Repetitive events need to be tracked better and participation in the NPRDS system should be improved. In conclusion, the licensee's submittals are acceptable.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Dorothy Zukor of my staff. Ms. Zukor can be reached on FTS-492-4431.

Karl V. Seyfrit, Chief
Reactor Operations Analysis Branch
Office for Analysis and Evaluation
of Operational Data

cc: J. Heltemes
T. Ippolito

OFFICE ▶	ROAB <i>[Signature]</i>	ROAB <i>[Signature]</i>	ROAB <i>[Signature]</i>			
NAME ▶	DJZukor:gt	WDLanning	KVSeifrit			
DATE ▶	10/4/83	10/4/83	10/4/83			

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
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