



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

SEP 8 1992

Report Nos.: 50-321/92-20 and 50-366/92-20

Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201

Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366

License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: August 17-19, 1992

Inspector: R. B. Shortridge 9/8/92
R. B. Shortridge Date Signed

Approved by: John P. Potter 9/8/92
John P. Potter, Chief Date Signed
Facilities Radiation Protection Section
Radiological Protection and Emergency
Preparedness Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope:

This inspection was performed as a followup to the licensee notifying the NRC of the discovery of a High Radiation Area door being left open and unlocked on July 3, 1992. The inspection also reviewed the circumstances involved in repeated events where locked high radiation area doors (LHRADs) were left open and unattended. In addition, the inspection included a review of the circumstances surrounding the shipment of a spent fuel shipping cask that was received at another licensee facility above contamination limits.

Results:

During the course of the inspection, the inspector determined that there had been 16 examples of unlocked High Radiation Area doors since May 23, 1990. All of the examples had been identified by the licensee. Of the 16 examples, 10 had been previously discussed with the NRC; however, the inspector found from review of licensee records that at least six cases had not been previously discussed with the NRC. It was also determined that the licensee's system for tracking and followup on unlocked High Radiation Area doors was cumbersome. This recurring situation was characterized as an apparent repeat violation (Paragraph 2). A second apparent repeat violation was identified which involved two examples of personnel entering a High Radiation Area without meeting Technical Specification requirements (Paragraph 2.d).

A third apparent violation was identified when an operations person failed to exit the radiologically controlled area of the plant in accordance with Technical Specification/procedure requirements (Paragraph 3).

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *J. Bennett, Superintendent, Chemistry
- *P. Fornel, Manager, Maintenance
- *O. Fraser, Site Supervisor, SAER
- *J. Hammonds, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
- *L. Lawrence, Nuclear Specialist, SAER
- *J. Lewis, Manager, Operations
- *M. Link, Supervisor, Health Physics
- *C. Moore, Assistant General Plant Manager
- *R. Ott, Supervisor, Training
- *J. Payne, Senior Plant Engineer
- *D. Pendry, Supervisor, Operations Engineering
- *D. Read, Assistant General Plant Manager, Operations
- *P. Roberts, Acting Manager, Outages and Planning
- *J. Robertson Jr., Acting Manager, Plant Maintenance and Support
- *D. Smith, Superintendent, Health Physics
- *L. Sumner, Plant General Manager
- *S. Tipps, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Compliance
- *P. Wells, Unit Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted during the inspection included engineers, craftsmen, and administrative personnel.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- *L. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector
- *R. Musser, Resident Inspector

*Attended Exit Meeting

2. Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Non-Routine Event (92700)

a. Background

During an inspection from February 19-22, 1991 at Plant Hatch the NRC reviewed four events where locked high radiation area doors (LHRADs) were left open and unattended. The events were all identified by the licensee and were characterized by the NRC in Inspector Report (IR) 91-05, dated April 15, 1991 as four examples of a violation of 10 CFR 20.203(c)(2)(iii), failure to maintain a high radiation area locked except when access to the area was required with positive control over each individual entry (91-05-03). The root cause for all four events were identified as hardware problems and deficiency cards (DCs) were written and the problems were corrected. Also, as a result of this event the licensee implemented a program to perform quarterly LHRAD checks to assure the doors were maintained in good material condition. They supplemented a program implemented in 1988 to check each door daily to ensure it was closed. The licensee has performed daily surveillance on the 45 to 50 LHRADs since that time. Another root

cause identified the failure of the user to ensure the subject LHRADs were closed and locked after use.

In addition, as a result of these events the high radiation area key signout form in procedure RP-RAD-016-0S, High Radiation Area Access Control, was revised. A signature block and a note were added to the form. The signature block serves to document the key user and the note to indicate the user's responsibility and understanding of the requirements.

Subsequent to the violation the licensee assigned a corporate engineer responsible for fire door design to evaluate LHRADs throughout the plant for upgrades.

Resident Inspector IR 91-33 dated December 30, 1991, documented a LHRAD found open and unattended on December 2, 1991. The event was licensee identified and Health Physics (HP) was identified as leaving the door unlocked for several hours. The Resident Inspector reviewed the licensee's continuing corrective actions of the actual replacement of some doors and characterized the event as an additional example of violation 91-05-03.

An inspection was conducted by Regional based inspectors, IR 92-07, dated March 24, 1992, however, no additional examples of LHRADs were noted. The inspectors, in attempting to monitor the trend, had difficulty in obtaining comprehensive information from the licensee's computerized deficiency card system. This had been the case since the licensee decided to incorporate radiological deficiencies and problems of poor performance in the plant's system for reporting all deficiencies.

IR 92-12, dated June 23, 1992, issued by the Resident Inspector, characterized as non-cited violation (NCV), two unlocked LHRADs on April 12, 1992. Subsequent to the event both the resident inspector and licensee ascertained that the LHRADs were functioning properly with no mechanical problems. In addition to the two events on April 12, 1992, the licensee also identified to the Resident Inspector that LHRADs were discovered unlocked and unattended on February 12, 1992 and March 19, 1992.

The Resident Inspector reviewed licensee corrective actions and noted that in none of the documented events was anyone observed entering an unlocked, unattended high radiation area. In addition to counseling plant personnel stressing the importance of high radiation controls, General Employee Training (GET) was also revised to include the responsibilities of an individual signing out a high radiation area key by having each employee sign a statement to this effect during training. Additionally, the licensee was in the process of upgrading 52 LHRADs. Approximately 26 have been replaced in Unit 1 with another 26 scheduled for replacement in the Unit 2 refueling outage late 1992. The four unlocked and unattended high radiation area doors were characterized as a violation of

10 CFR 20.203(c)(2)(iii) and an additional example of violation 91-05-03. However, due to the corrective actions taken by the licensee the violation was documented as NCV 92-12-05.

b. Inspection Results

The inspector, early in the data review, had indications that more than nine events where LHRADs had been left open and unattended had occurred. The licensee readily assisted the inspector in attempts to review all data for LHRADs over a two year period. This included all related deficiency cards and significant occurrence reports (SORs). In addition to the LHRAD events documented, the inspector identified, since the June 23, 1990 event, six events that the NRC was not aware of. Due to the difficulty in retrieving DC data, the inspector determined that HP was apparently not aware of all the events for analysis and trending either. The following is a list of events in a two year period as determined by the inspector.

Date	Door	
6-23-90	IT-13	N. Condenser Bay
*7-11-90	IR-32	Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger
8-14-90	IR-32	Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger
8-14-90	IT-29	N. Main Turbine Building
*9-26-90	2T-37	S. W. Main Turbine Building
12-9-90	IT-13	N. Condenser Bay
*9-10-91	2R-55	Reactor Water Cleanup Valve Nest
*10-10-91	Kelly Bldg	Hot Machine Shop
*11-14-91	2T-36	S. E. Main Turbine Building
12-2-91	Kelly Bldg	Hot Machine Shop
*2-4-92	2T-36	S. E. Main Turbine Building
2-12-92	1R-32	Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger
3-19-92	IR-32	Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger
4-12-92	2R-39	Reactor Water Cleanup "B" Pump Room
4-12-92	1R-32	Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger
7-31-92	IR-32	Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger

*Identified during inspection 92-20

The licensee identified that on July 31, 1992, as part of normal surveillance, LHRAD #1R-32 was found open and unattended. A radiation level of 1000 mr/hr at 18" was noted in the area. The LHRAD was checked after the entry by the Health Physics Shift Supervisor and found to be operating satisfactorily. Interviews with the user indicated that the person failed to ensure the door was locked after exiting the area.

Based on a review of records and discussion with licensee personnel the inspector could not determine if repeat offenders were involved in any of the events. The licensee stated that for each of the events no one was known to have entered the LHRAD during the period it was open and unattended. In some events LHRADs were open for 13 hours. No known exposure was attributed to any LHRAD event.

The inspector made a back shift tour of the Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Building and checked LHRADs to ensure they were closed and locked. No discrepancies were noted. Also, the inspector toured the areas with the corporate engineer responsible for LHRAD upgrades. Corrective action for prior violations have included retraining, disciplinary actions, and hardware modifications. New upgrade replacement doors recently installed have a red light come on when the door is opened. The new doors, in most cases, have grating installed around the door area to prevent easy access over or around the door. Many of the ladders in areas adjacent to high radiation areas have grating with lock plates installed. In addition LHRADs are upgraded with automatic door closures which are designed to minimize human factor errors.

c. Regulatory Implications

10 CFR 20.203(c)(2)(iii) requires that each access point to a high radiation area be maintained locked except during periods when access to the area is required, with positive control over each individual entry.

Technical Specification (TS) 6.12.2 requires, in addition to the requirements of 6.12.1, each high radiation area in which the intensity of radiation is greater than 1,000 mrem/hr to have locked doors to prevent unauthorized entry into such areas with keys maintained under the administrative control of the shift supervisor on duty or the laboratory foreman on duty.

Licensee Administrative Control Procedure, 60AC-HPX-004-0S, "Radiation and Contamination Control," Revision 11, dated July 7, 1992, in Step 8.1.3.4, requires that each High Radiation Area in which the intensity of radiation is greater than 1000 mr/hr shall be locked to prevent unauthorized entry into such areas.

The inspector identified that the LHRAD event of July 31, 1992, would be the 16th event in approximately two years, (see above) including newly inspector tabulated events where a LHRAD door was left open and unattended. It was also noted that LHRAD 1R-32 and 1R-32 has been left open in six of the 16 events, including four out of the last five. The inspector therefore characterized the event as a apparent repeat violation of 10 CFR 20.203(c)(2)(iii). 50-361/92-20-01 and 50-366/92-20-01.

d. External Exposure Controls

TS 6.12.1 states "In lieu of the control device or alarm signal required by paragraph 20.203(c)(2) of 10 CFR 20, each high radiation area in which the intensity of radiation is greater than 100 mrem/hr but less than 1,000 mrem/hr shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a high radiation area and entrance thereto shall be controlled by requiring issuance of a Radiation Work Permit. Any group of individuals permitted to enter such areas shall be provided with or accompanied by one of the following:

- A radiation monitoring device which continuously indicates the radiation dose rate in the area.
- A radiation monitoring device which continuously integrates the radiation dose rate in the area and alarms when a preset integrated dose is received. Entry into such areas with this monitoring device may be made after the dose rate level in the area has been established and personnel have been made knowledgeable of them.
- An individual qualified in radiation protection procedures who is equipped with a radiation dose rate monitoring device. This individual shall be responsible for providing positive control over the activities within the area and shall perform periodic radiation surveillance at the frequency specified by the facility Health Physics supervision in the Radiation Work Permit.

Licensee Administrative Control Procedure 60 AC-HPX-004-0S, "Radiation and Contamination Control," Revision 11, dated July 7, 1992 in Step 8.1.3.3, repeats the above listed requirements.

The inspector identified during a data review that the licensee had experienced several events where personnel had entered high radiation areas without meeting TS requirements.

In IR 91-05 dated April 15, 1991, three events were documented as violations where plant personnel had entered High Radiation Areas without meeting TS requirements. One of these events was identified by the Resident Inspector.

IR 92-13, dated June 17, 1991, documented four more events as violations where personnel had entered High Radiation Areas without meeting TS requirements. Subsequent to the events listed below, the licensee took corrective actions as listed.

Date	Area
8-28-90	U ₂ Reactor Building, 185' elevation
8-29-90	U ₂ Fuel Pool Heat Exchange Room

11-9-90	U ₁ Reactor Building
3-25-91	U ₁ RICI Pump Room
4-3-91	U ₂ Reactor Building, 185' elevation
4-23-91	U ₂ Control Rod Drive Upper Catwalk
4-24-91	U ₁ Reactor Building Autoclave

Upon notification of the fourth event, the plant general manager issued a memo suspending all work in High Radiation Areas at 1400 EST on April 25, 1991. The memo also stated requirements that all personnel must meet before re-entry into such areas was to be allowed. Personnel were required to be re-trained on the requirements of High Radiation Area entries and each individual signed a statement indicating understanding of the entry requirements. An Event Review Team was also formed to investigate root causes and recommend corrective actions to the problem.

The inspectors discussed with licensee personnel and management the details of each of the aforementioned events and the recommended corrective actions proposed by the Event Review Team. The Event Review Team indicated several reasons for the High Radiation Area entries, lack of uniqueness of barriers and signs, a general willingness based on past practices, and miscommunications between the workers involved and the HP staff. Licensee management identified the following corrective actions as to be completed in the near future:

- Purchase signs of different shapes to uniquely identify Very High Radiation and High Radiation Areas. The licensee has reviewed and ordered such signs. The Very High Radiation sign will be in the shape of a stop sign (octagon) with supplemental warnings and wordings on the sign. A yield sign (triangle) will be used for High Radiation Areas with similar wordings.
- Install permanent shielding around piping to reduce source term radiation, thus reducing the number of High Radiation Areas in overhead spaces.
- Doors leading immediately to High Radiation Areas will be locked and included on routine door surveillance.
- Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) for High Radiation Areas will be written such that they will not be confused with general RWPs.
- Sign-offs will be added to system operating procedures, which require posting a High Radiation Area, prior to the equipment being run. These sign-offs are to ensure that HP has been contacted to post the specific area and that such posting had been performed.
- Signs leading to the RCIC and HPCI diagonals shall be

conspicuously posted to inform workers of potential high radiation levels when equipment is in operation.

- A letter requiring specific High Radiation Area training (with worker's signature) prior to being allowed to work in such an area.
- Improve vendor HP technician training to ensure full understanding of responsibilities and authority.
- Modify the way areas are roped off to allow for only one area for entry and exit.
- A Problem Solving Team has been initiated to investigate apparent communication problems between HP staff and the general work force.
- Purchase 100 additional digital alarming dosimeters.
- Consult with other utilities for ideas and methods that are effective in resolving the problem.

The licensee identified in DC and SOR that on:

May 15, 1991 a person was observed by HP to enter the Unit 2 Torus Bats 8 and 9, a posted High Radiation Area, without meeting TS requirements and after being instructed not to by HP.

January 23, 1992, personnel entered Unit 2 Condenser Bay, elevation 112 feet, a posted High Radiation Area, without meeting TS requirements.

The inspector was told by licensee HP that in none of the nine High Radiation Area events did anyone receive an unplanned exposure.

The inspector discussed the effectiveness of corrective actions with licensee personnel and was told that the increased use of digital alarming dosimeters, as well as other corrective actions, have been responsible for the reverse in the adverse trend of people entering High Radiation Areas without meeting TS requirements. The inspector informed licensee management that the two most recent High Radiation Area entries would be characterized as an apparent violation of 10 CFR 20.203(c)(2)(iii). 50-361/92-20-02 and 50-366/92-20-02).

3. Surveys Monitoring, and Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination (83726)

TS 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities referenced in the applicable procedure recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Paragraph 7.e.4 of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires that licensee's have procedures for contamination control.

Licensee Administrative Control Procedure, 60 AC-APX-004-05, "Radiation and Contamination Control," Revision 11, dated July 7, 1992, Step 8.3.2.5, requires that HP be notified whenever contamination is detected on any individual or their personal articles. Paper booties and latex gloves will normally be found in the sides of the frisker box. Put these on and go to the nearest phone and contact HP. Personnel are to remain at the location from where they contacted HP and attempt not to spread the contamination. HP will come to that area and survey the person(s) and or area for contamination. Inform HP of the location and nature of the contamination.

In IR 92-07 dated March 24, 1992, the inspector made direct observations of individuals exiting the RCA with regard to whole body frisking and hand carried items (lunch boxes, coolers, tools, etc.). The inspector discussed minor discrepancies noted with the licensee after observing personnel exiting the RCA. The licensee has three automated, state-of-the-art, whole body friskers at the egress to the RCA. During this inspection, the inspector observed a person with a lunch cooler pass by two tool monitors, failing to survey the material prior to exiting the area. The individual then entered all three friskers and found that a contamination alarm sounded each time. The person then retried two of the friskers and again got contamination alarms. The inspector observed the worker proceed to go over to the hand held frisker, perform a cursory frisk and exit the RCA.

The inspector informed licensee management of the event and that it would be considered an apparent violation of TS 6.8.1 and licensee procedures 60-AC-HDX-004-05 (50-361/92-20-03 and 50-366/92-20-03). The inspector also discussed that similar events had been observed by outside evaluations as well as internally performed surveillances.

4. Exit Meeting

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on August 19, 1992. The events regarding LHRADs being unlocked and unattended were characterized as an apparent repeat violation. The events regarding personnel entries to High Radiation Areas without meeting TS requirements was an apparent repeat violation. A third apparent violation, where a person did not comply with TS and HP procedure requirements, was discussed.

<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Description or Reference</u>
50-361 and 50-366/92-20-01	VIO - Repeated occurrence of iHRADs left open and unattended in a two year period (Paragraph 2).
50-361 and 50-366/92-20-02	VIO - High Radiation Area entries made without meeting TS requirements (Paragraph 2.d).
50-361 and 50-366/92-20-03	VIO - Failure of a person exiting the radiologically controlled area to comply with licensee procedure for frisking requirements (Paragraph 3).

ADDITIONAL: Send comments to: The Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch.

Hand deliver comments to: One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD between 7:45 a.m. to 4:15 p.m., Federal workdays.

Copies of comments may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW, (Lower Level), Washington, DC

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Lieberstein, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 (301-406-2741).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Background

The NRC's current policy on enforcement conferences is addressed in Section V of the latest revision to the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement Policy) 10 CFR part 2, appendix C that was published on February 18, 1992 (57 FR 8791). The Enforcement Policy states that, "enforcement conferences will not normally be open to the public." However, the Commission has decided to implement a trial program to determine whether to maintain the current policy with regard to enforcement conferences or to adopt a new policy that would allow most enforcement conferences to be open to attendance by all members of the public.

Policy Statement

Position

The NRC is implementing a two-year trial program to allow public observation of selected enforcement conferences. The NRC will monitor the program and determine whether to establish a permanent policy for conducting open enforcement conferences based on an assessment of the following criteria:

- (1) Whether the fact that the conference was open impacted the NRC's ability to conduct a meaningful conference and/or implement the NRC's enforcement program;
- (2) Whether the open conference impacted the licensee's participation in the conference;
- (3) Whether the NRC expended a significant amount of resources in making the conference public; and
- (4) The extent of public interest in opening the enforcement conference.

Two-Year Trial Program for Conducting Open Enforcement Conferences; Policy Statement

American Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Policy statement.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this policy statement on the implementation of a two-year trial program to allow selected enforcement conferences to be open to attendance by all members of the general public. This policy statement describes the two-year trial program and informs the public of how to get information on upcoming open enforcement conferences.

DATE: This trial program is effective on July 10, 1992, while comments on the program are being received. Submit comments on or before the completion of the trial program scheduled for July 11, 1992. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or before this date.

I. Criteria For Selecting Open Enforcement Conferences

Enforcement conferences will not be open to the public if the enforcement action being contemplated—

- (1) Would be taken against an individual, or if the action, though not taken against an individual, turns on whether an individual has committed wrongdoing;
- (2) Involves significant personal failures where the NRC has requested that the individual(s) involved be present at the conference;
- (3) Is based on the findings of an NRC Office of Investigations (OI) report or
- (4) Involves safeguards information, Privacy Act information, or other information which could be considered proprietary.

Enforcement conferences involving medical misadministrations or overexposures will be open assuming the conference can be conducted without disclosing the exposed individual's name. In addition, enforcement conferences will not be open to the public if the conference will be conducted by telephone or the conference will be conducted at a relatively small licensee's facility. Finally, with the approval of the Executive Director for Operations, enforcement conferences will not be open to the public in special cases where good cause has been shown after balancing the benefit of public observation against the potential impact on the agency's enforcement action in a particular case.

The NRC will strive to conduct open enforcement conferences during the two-year trial program in accordance with the following three goals:

- (1) Approximately 25 percent of all eligible enforcement conferences conducted by the NRC will be open for public observation;
- (2) At least one open enforcement conference will be conducted in each of the regional offices; and
- (3) Open enforcement conferences will be conducted with a variety of the types of licensees.

To avoid potential bias in the selection process and to attempt to meet the three goals stated above, every fourth eligible enforcement conference involving one of three categories of licensees will normally be open to the public during the trial program. However, in cases where there is an ongoing adjudicatory proceeding with one or more intervenors, enforcement conferences involving issues related to the subject matter of the ongoing adjudication may also be opened. For the purposes of this trial program, the

three categories of licensees will be commercial operating reactors, hospitals, and other licensees, which will consist of the remaining types of licensees.

II. Announcing Open Enforcement Conferences

As soon as it is determined that an enforcement conference will be open to public observation, the NRC will orally notify the licensee that the enforcement conference will be open to public observation as part of the agency's trial program and send the licensee a copy of this Federal Register notice that outlines the program. Licensees will be asked to estimate the number of participants it will bring to the enforcement conference so that the NRC can schedule an appropriately sized conference room. The NRC will also notify appropriate State liaison officers that an enforcement conference has been scheduled and that it is open to public observation.

The NRC intends to announce open enforcement conferences to the public normally at least 10 working days in advance of the enforcement conference through the following mechanisms:

- (1) Notices posted in the Public Document Rooms;
- (2) Toll-free telephone messages; and
- (3) Toll-free electronic bulletin board messages.

Pending establishment of the toll-free message systems, the public may call (301) 488-6733 to obtain a recording of upcoming open enforcement conferences. The NRC will issue another Federal Register notice after the toll-free message systems are established.

To assist the NRC in making appropriate arrangements to support public observation of enforcement conferences, individuals interested in attending a particular enforcement conference should notify the individual identified in the meeting notice announcing the open enforcement conference no later than five business days prior to the enforcement conference.

III. Conduct of Open Enforcement Conferences

In accordance with current practice, enforcement conferences will continue to normally be held at the NRC regional offices. Members of the public will be allowed access to the NRC regional offices to attend open enforcement conferences in accordance with the "Standard Operating Procedures For Providing Security Support For NRC Hearings And Meetings" published November 1, 1991 (56 FR 56231). These procedures provide that visitors may be

subject to personal screening, that signs, banners, posters, etc., not larger than 14" be permitted, and that disruptive persons may be removed.

Each regional office will continue to conduct the enforcement conference proceedings in accordance with regional practice. The enforcement conference will continue to be a meeting between the NRC and the licensee. While the enforcement conference is open for public observation, it is not open for public participation.

Persons attending open enforcement conferences are reminded that (1) the apparent violations discussed at open enforcement conferences are subject to further review and may be subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action and (2) the statements of views or expressions of opinion made by NRC employees at open enforcement conferences or the lack thereof, are not intended to represent final determinations or beliefs.

In addition to providing comments on the agency's trial program in accordance with the guidance in this notice, persons attending open enforcement conferences will be provided an opportunity to submit written comments anonymously to the regional office. These comments will subsequently be forwarded to the Director of the Office of Enforcement for review and consideration.

Dated at Rockville, MD, this 7th day of July 1992.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Samuel J. Chiffi,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 92-16233 Filed 7-8-92; 8:45 a.m.]
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Corrections

Federal Register

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Two-Year Trial Program for Conducting Open Enforcement Conferences; Policy Statement

Correction

In notice document 92-16233 beginning on page 30782 in the issue of Friday, July 10, 1992, on page 30782, in the second column, under DATE, beginning in the 5th row, "July 11, 1992" should read "July 11, 1994".

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