



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

JUN 20 1983

Docket No. 50-275

MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for
Licensing, Division of Licensing

FROM: L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and
Plant Systems, Division of Systems Integration

SUBJECT: DIABLO CANYON - REVIEW AND SAFETY EVALUATION OF
THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM (TAC 49935)

As requested in Darrell Eisenhut's February 18, 1983 memorandum, Enclosure 1 is the Auxiliary Systems Branch's (ASB) safety evaluation report (SER) concerning the reevaluation of the Diablo Canyon component cooling water system (CCWS). This SER is based on ASB's rereview of the Diablo Canyon FSAR, a site walkdown conducted on January 12, 1983, information obtained during meetings with the applicant on January 28, 1983 and April 19, 1983, and letters from the applicant dated March 15, 1983, March 18, 1983, March 25, 1983, April 4, 1983, April 7, 1983, April 15, 1983, May 3, 1983, and May 18, 1983. ASB has addressed in the SER the following four points identified in the February 18, 1983 memorandum:

1. CCWS design compliance with FSAR commitments.
2. CCWS design compliance with applicable NRC regulations.
3. CCWS design compliance with criteria in the current SRP (Section 9.2.2).
4. Generic implications of the above determinations regarding adequacy of the Diablo Canyon design approach and philosophy.

In summary, we conclude that the applicant has satisfied the original FSAR commitments and applicable regulations with the CCWS design. However, confirmation of commitments made regarding the following items as discussed in detail in the SER is required:

1. Incorporation of a technical specification governing CCWS operation when ocean water intake temperatures exceed 64°F.
2. Verification of the validity of the currently approved accident analyses for a 64°F intake temperature.
3. Assurance of an accurate and continuous ocean water temperature monitoring program.
4. Verification of acceptable CCWS operation with two CCW heat exchangers on line under the newly assumed conditions.

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Additionally, we have reviewed the design against the current SRP. There are three areas as follows wherein the Diablo Canyon CCWS does not meet the current criteria of SRP Section 9.2.2 as identified in the SER:

1. Moderate energy pipe crack leak rate (BTP ASB 3-1).
2. Tornado missile protection for the CCW surge tank.
3. Protection of reactor coolant pumps from multiple locked rotor accident due to loss of CCW.

We have also addressed in the SER the generic implications of the above determinations regarding the adequacy of the design approach and philosophy for the CCWS. A summary of the above findings is contained in the Conclusion section of the SER. In addition, we have addressed those allegations by Mr. Smith regarding the adequacy of the Diablo Canyon CCWS. These allegations concern the seismic design capability of the CCWS, CCWS heat removal capability following a LOCA and concurrent single failure, surge tank level instrumentation design, and the nonseismic Category I post-accident sample cooler added to the CCWS vital loop A. We believe our SER has satisfactorily resolved these concerns.

Details of the allegations which do not involve the CCWS follows:


1. Regarding Mr. Smith's concern with design classification of instrumentation at the plant. ICSB has reviewed information made available during the meeting of January 28, 1983, and has found it acceptable. Their evaluation and comments are presented in Enclosure 2.
2. Regarding Mr. Smith's concerns with the seismic qualification of the diesel generator air intake and exhaust piping, silencers and filters, the applicant indicated during the January 28, 1983 meeting that an evaluation of these components against seismic Category I criteria was underway, and corrective action would be taken as necessary to assure their seismic integrity. Acceptability of this will be confirmed in the IDVP Phase I review.
3. During the January 28, 1983 meeting, the applicant also informed us that they have verified the seismic Category I capability of the lube oil filters and piping on the safety injection pump. We consider this matter to be resolved.
4. Based on the discussion contained in the transcript of the meeting with Mr. Smith on January 6, 1983, we believe that arguments were presented that satisfactorily resolved the concern with the non-Class 1E design for the reactor protection system trip circuitry.

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5. Based on the discussion contained in the transcript of the meeting with Mr. Smith held on January 6, 1983, we believe his concern regarding proper documentation and understanding of the acceptance criteria used during the seismic interaction program (SIP) review at Diablo Canyon was resolved in his own mind by the conservative results applied in the plant design from the SIP evaluation.

The above discussion is our understanding of the status of the evaluation and resolution of the individuals' concerns with the Diablo Canyon design to date. Our review of the Diablo Canyon CCWS is complete.



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for Core and Plant Systems
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Enclosures:
As stated

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