

JAN 31 1983

16

15

MEMORANDUM FOR: Frank J. Miraglia, Assistant Director for Safety Assessment; DL
 THRU: Walter R. Butler, Acting Assistant Director for Reactor Safety, DSI
 FROM: Brian W. Sheron, Chief, Reactor Systems Branch, DSI
 SUBJECT: REACTOR SYSTEMS BRANCH COMMENTS ON JANUARY 1983 STATUS REPORT
 ON THE REVIEW OF STANDARDIZED PLANTS

need copy from DSI

The following comments on the review status for GESSAR and CESSAR are provided in response to your memo dated January 17, 1983. The comments are in the form of some corrections and additions to the summary items listed in the January 17 memo.

A. GESSAR-II FDA REVIEW

The following should be added as a potential problem area relating to the review:

- Transient Analyses with single failure.

RSB Question 440.20 requested that the applicant comply with the requirements in the Standard Review Plan by providing analyses for the five most limiting anticipated transients identified in the FSAR including the most limiting plant systems single failure for each. We have not yet received a response from GE for this question and may have to retain it as an open issue in our SER.

B. GESSAR-II PRA REVIEW

The following two items should be added to the list of potential problem areas:

- Primary System Radionuclide Retention Factors (DFs)

Mathematical modeling and test data for the treatment of primary system radionuclide retention appear to be insufficient at this time and could have a significant impact on the calculated risk.

- Containment Function/Structural Failure Assessment

The present PRA relies on the structural integrity of the drywell to a much greater extent than on the outer containment integrity. The combined

8362090515 JA

CONTACT: B. Hardin
 X28507

COPIES					
NO.					
DATE					

containment function including both the drywell/suppression pool and outer containment requires additional study. Further consideration needs to be given to static and dynamic loadings on the drywell and outer containment walls and to potential failures of the drywell resulting from thermal degradation of penetrations.

C. CESSAR SYSTEM 80 REVIEW

1. Page 1 of Enclosure 2 indicates that inputs to CESSAR SER revision 1 were due from RSB on January 21, 1983. Based on the current workload and priority, the CESSAR reviewer of RSB could not meet this requested due date. The RSB inputs to SER revision 1 will be made available to you by February 7, 1983. The staff review of interface requirements adequacy will also be addressed in the forthcoming inputs to SER revision 1.
2. CE PORV issue will remain as a confirmatory issue until final resolution can be reached. However staff will likely support interim operation of Palo Verde without PORVs if the Palo Verde applicant provides an acceptable report to justify it.
3. The following five confirmatory issues cannot be closed unless the applicant provides acceptable responses to the staff:
 - a. Natural Circulation and boron mixing test at a leading CESSAR plant - Palo Verde has committed to this test.
 - b. Steam generator tube rupture accident - staff requires CE reanalyze the event with a limiting single failure.
 - c. RCP seizure accident - staff requested analysis has not been provided.
 - d. Large steam line break accident - staff requested information has not been provided.
 - e. Feedwater line break accident - staff requested information has not been provided.

Original signed by:
Brian W. Sheron

Brian W. Sheron, Chief
Reactor Systems Branch
Division of Systems Integration

cc: see next page

Miraglia
RSB WHodges 1/27/83
RSB *CYL* CLiang 1/27/83
RSB *M* TMarsh 1/31/83

cc: RSB	RSB	DSI:RS		
BHardin 1k	BSheron	WButler		
1/27/83	1/28/83	1/29/83		

F. Miraglia

- 3 -

cc: R. Mattson
D. Eisenhut
T. Novak
J. Meyer
D. Scaletti
G. Meyer

OFFICE						
NAME						