UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
1600 EAST LAMAR BOULEVARD
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4511

April 14, 2020

Ms. Mary J. Fisher, Vice President
Energy Production and Nuclear Decommissioning
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station
Mail Stop FC-2-4
9610 Power Lane
Blair, NE 68008

SUBJECT: FORT CALHOUN STATION – NRC INSPECTION REPORT 050-00285/2020-001 AND 072-00054/2020-001

Dear Ms. Fisher:

This letter refers to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) independent fuel storage activities inspection conducted on February 10-13, 2020 and the decommissioning inspection conducted on March 9-12, 2020, at the Fort Calhoun Station, located near Blair, Nebraska. The NRC inspectors discussed the results of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) inspection with Mr. Brad Blome, Director of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, on February 13, 2020, and the decommissioning inspection with Mr. Tim Uehling, Senior Director of Decommissioning, and other members of your staff during a final exit meeting conducted on March 12, 2020. The inspection results are documented in the enclosure to this letter.

The NRC inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to public health and safety, the common defense and security and confirm compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observation of activities, and interviews with personnel. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed dry cask storage operations and compliance with the requirements specified in the Transnuclear Horizontal Storage Modular Certificate of Compliance No. 1004 license and Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 72, Part 50, and Part 20. The decommissioning inspection focused on your corrective action program, spent fuel pool management and safety program, decommissioning performance and organizational management. The NRC inspectors did not identify any violations in either program area.

In accordance with Title 10 *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390 of the NRC's "Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure," a copy of this letter, its enclosure and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To

the extent possible, your response, if you choose to provide one, should not include any personal privacy or proprietary, information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.

If you have any questions regarding this inspection report, please contact Mr. Chris Steely at 817-200-1432 or the undersigned at 817-200-1249.

Sincerely,

Gregory G. Warnick

Digitally signed by Gregory G. Warnick
Date: 2020.04.14 09:56:12 -05'00'

Greg G. Warnick, Chief
Reactor Inspection Branch
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

Docket Nos.: 50-285; 72-054
License No.: DPR-40

Enclosure:
Inspection Report 050-00285/2020-001
and 072-00054/2020-001

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket Nos.:	050-00285; 072-00054
License No.:	DPR-40
Report Nos.:	050-00285/2020-001; 072-00054/2020-001
Licensee:	Omaha Public Power District
Facility:	Fort Calhoun Station
Location:	9610 Power Lane Blair, Nebraska
Dates:	February 10-13, 2020 March 9-12, 2020
Inspectors:	Chris D. Steely Health Physicist Reactor Inspection Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
	Stephanie G. Anderson Health Physicist Reactor Inspection Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
	Lee E. Brookhart Senior ISFSI Inspector Reactor Inspection Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
	W. Chris Smith Reactor/ISFSI Inspector Reactor Inspection Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
Approved by:	Greg G. Warnick, Chief Reactor Inspection Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Fort Calhoun Station
NRC Inspection Report 050-00285/2020-001 and 072-00054/2020-001

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspections were a routine, announced inspection of decommissioning activities and of the on-going dry cask loading activities (associated with Canister No. 26 and 27) being conducted at the Fort Calhoun Station (FCS). In summary, the licensee was conducting these activities in accordance with site procedures, license requirements and applicable NRC regulations. Within the scope of the inspections, no violations were identified.

Spent Fuel Pool Safety at Permanently Shutdown Reactors

- The licensee's spent fuel pool was being maintained in accordance with permanently defueled technical specifications and procedural requirements. The licensee was safely storing the spent fuel assemblies contained in the spent fuel pool. (Section 1.2)

Organization, Management, and Cost Controls at Permanently Shutdown Reactors

- The licensee maintained an overall organizational structure to support decommissioning activities as required by the Post Defueled Technical Specifications and Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report. The licensee was continuing to benchmark activities in preparation of the DECON strategy with other decommissioned facilities. The licensee was implementing its employee concerns program in which individuals could raise concerns without fear of retaliation. (Section 2.2)

Self-Assessment, Auditing, and Corrective Action at Permanently Shutdown Reactors

- The licensee was adequately implementing its corrective action program in accordance with regulatory requirements and commitments. The licensee's audit program was being conducted and maintained in accordance with the appropriate regulatory requirements as prescribed by the Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR), Revision 12. (Section 3.2)

Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shutdown Reactors

- The licensee was implementing the decommissioning activities in accordance with the regulations and license requirements. The inspectors determined that the licensee was adequately controlling decommissioning activities and radiological work areas at the facility. (Section 4.2)

Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

- The inspectors observed critical loading activities of Canister No. 26 and 27. The licensee's loading operations were conducted in accordance with site procedures and in accordance with the NRC's rules and regulations. Selected Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Condition Reports (CRs) were reviewed for the period November 2019 through February 2020. Resolution of the issues was appropriate for

the significance of each issue. No adverse trends were identified during the review. (Section 5.2)

Review of 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations

- The inspectors reviewed a sample of 10 CFR 72.48 safety screenings that had been performed within the inspection period. No findings were identified during the selected sample review. (Section 6.2)

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

On June 24, 2016, Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), the licensee, formally notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) by letter of its intent to permanently ease operations of Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) (ADAMS Accession No. ML16176A213). By letter dated November 13, 2016, OPPD notified NRC that it had permanently ceased power operations at FCS on October 14, 2016, and certified pursuant to Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.82(a)(1)(ii), that as of November 13, 2016, all fuel had been permanently removed from the FCS reactor vessel and placed in the FCS spent fuel pool (ADAMS Accession No. ML16319A254). On December 28, 2016, the NRC informed the licensee that it was no longer under NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0305, "Operating Reactor Assessment Program," IMC 0608, "Performance Indicator Program" and IMC 2515, "Light-water Reactor Inspection Program," when conducting oversight activities and assessing site performance (ADAMS Accession No. ML1636A449). The licensee was informed that the NRC's oversight of licensed activities under decommissioning would be conducted under the provisions of IMC 2561, "Decommissioning Power Reactor Inspection Program."

The licensee submitted its Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) on March 20, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17089A759). The PSDAR is not a licensing action and therefore is not approved by the NRC; however, the NRC reviewed the report. The licensee's PDSAR described the decommissioning activities and schedule to support SAFSTOR strategy for the facility which is one of the options allowed by the NRC for decommissioning. The NRC subsequently held a public meeting in Omaha, Nebraska on May 31, 2017, to discuss comments regarding the FCS PSDAR. The transcript of the public meeting is available on the NRC's Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, under (ADAMS Accession No. ML17160A394).

The licensee selected the SAFSTOR decommissioning options as described in the PDSAR. The licensee had planned to continue in SAFSTOR until the spent fuel was transferred to the U.S. Department of Energy in 2058. On April 29, 2019, however, the OPPD voted to change its decommissioning approach from SAFSTOR to DECON by contracting with Energy Solutions. DECON will consist of decontamination and destruction of the site in a process that will be begin much sooner on a date to be determined by OPPD. FCS submitted a new PDSAR to reflect the change from SAFSTOR to DECON (ADAMS Accession No. ML19351E355).

On April 12, 2017, Region IV closed the Confirmatory Action Letter regarding the resolution of design issues that had been documented during the IMC 0350 operation period, based on FCS's commitment to either: (1) complete the design and licensing basis reconstruction for spent fuel pool/cooling and supporting structures, systems and components, or (2) submit a license amendment request for an independent spent fuel cooling system (ADAMS Accession No. ML17102B737). On December 14, 2017, the licensee requested to remove Option 2 above and committed to complete Option 1 by June 25, 2018. The licensee entered the commitment into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 2017-00842. By letter dated June 24, 2018, the licensee informed the NRC that the commitment actions and associated condition report had been closed (ADAMS Accession No. ML18205A090).

On December 11, 2017, the NRC issued exemptions to Emergency Planning requirements and related safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML 17263B198). The NRC issued License Amendment No. 295 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18276B286) for the Permanently Defueled

Emergency Plan (PDEP) that is commensurate with significantly reduced spectrum of credible accidents that can occur in the permanently defueled condition. The license amendment became effective on April 7, 2018 and the licensee officially implemented the PDEP on April 9, 2018.

On March 6, 2018, the NRC issued License Amendment 297 for the Decommissioning Technical Specifications (ADAMS Accession No. ML18010A087). The license amendment established a licensing and safety basis that reflects the permanently shutdown and defueled conditions of the facility. In general, the amendment eliminated the requirements for operations MODES and MODES where fuel was emplaced in the reactor vessel.

On February 28, 2019, FCS requested a license amendment to replace the existing PDEP and associated Emergency Action Levels (EALs) with an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) – only Emergency Plan and its associated EALs (ADAMS Accession No. ML19064A758) to reflect the ISFSI-only configuration planned for the site by the middle of calendar year 2020 (CY2020). On May 1, 2019, the NRC determined that the license amendment request had sufficient technical information for the NRC to accept it for review (ADAMS Accession No. ML19126A280).

The licensee's ISFSI contained a total of 26 loaded Horizontal Storage Modules (HSMs) at the conclusion of the ISFSI inspection that was conducted February 10-13, 2020. The licensee was in progress and is scheduled to load a total of 30 canisters during the 2019-2020 loading campaign to remove all fuel from the site's spent fuel pool. The inspectors observed loading operations associated with the 16th and 17th canisters of the 30-canister campaign. The 2019-2020 loading campaign was being conducted in accordance with Transnuclear (TN) Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 1004, Amendment 15, and TN Standardized Nuclear Horizontal Modular Storage (NUHOMS) Final Safety Analysis Report Revision (FSAR) 18.

1 Spent Fuel Pool Safety at Permanently Shutdown Reactors (60801)

1.1 Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed documents and interviewed plant personnel to assess the licensee's performance in the following areas:

- Design, operational, and administrative measures are in place to prevent a substantial reduction in Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) coolant inventory under normal and accident conditions;

- SFP instrumentation, alarms, and leakage detection systems are adequate to assure safe wet storage of spent fuel;

- SFP water chemistry and cleanliness control programs maintain water purity standards, limits on radionuclide concentration, and minimum boron concentration in accordance with the technical specifications (TS) requirements (as applicable);

- Critical controls are consistent with the applicable nuclear criticality safety analyses;

- Procedures, drawings, and Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) descriptions and operations regarding the SFP operation and power supplies are adequate; and

- Problem identification issues related to SFP activities are entered into the corrective action program at an appropriate threshold.

1.2 Observations and Findings

The Post Defueled Technical Specifications (PDTS), Section 2.8.3, requires the SFP water level be maintained greater than or equal to 23 feet over the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies stored in the SFP and the SFP boron concentration to be greater or equal to 500 parts per million (ppm). The NRC inspectors reviewed the SFP level operational logs and reviewed chemistry data for the period since the last inspection. The inspectors concluded that the SFP level remained relatively steady at approximately 41 feet, which is roughly 28 feet above the top of irradiated fuel, for the monitoring periods reviewed. The boron concentration in the SFP was 2862 ppm, which sufficiently met the refueling operational requirements in the PDTS, as stated above.

The SFP temperature was procedurally required to be maintained between 45 and 100 degrees Fahrenheit (°F). The temperature was tracked in the control room, where alarm panel annunciators were set to alert operators if SFP temperatures exceeded 120°F or fell below 50°F. The SFP temperature was approximately 84°F at the time of the inspection.

The licensee was continuing to monitor the leaks from the spent fuel pool to the liner and subsequently to the drain lines. The licensee has been monitoring the leak rate monthly and calculated the approximate leak rate at approximately 2 quarts per day (total for both SFP and fuel transfer canal) over the past year. All leakage was contained and had not impacted the external environment.

1.3 Conclusion

The licensee's SFP was being maintained in accordance with PDTS and procedural requirements. The licensee was safely storing the spent fuel assemblies contained in the SFP.

2 Organization, Management, and Cost Controls at Permanently Shutdown Reactors (36801)

2.1 Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed documents and interviewed plant personnel to assess the licensee's performance in the following areas:

- Evaluate methods the licensee resolves employee/safety concern and provides information to the employees;

- Regulatory requirements are properly implemented with respect to the site organization, staffing, and staff qualifications;

- Licensee appropriately implements the technical specifications and PSDAR; and

- Licensee decommissioning activities are initiated, sequenced, performed, and completed in a manner that is reasonably consistent with docketed planning and scheduling information.

2.2 Observations and Findings

The overall organizational structure at FCS was described in section 5.2 of the PDTS. The inspectors verified the licensee maintained an overall organizational structure to support decommissioning activities and meet the minimum staffing requirements to perform activities specified in the PDTS and PSDAR. The licensee continued to manage and implement several oversight and review committees that established and maintained effective oversight of decommissioning activities. The licensee continues to perform benchmarking with other decommissioning facilities and reviewed and evaluated regulatory information to help inform its decommissioning processes.

The inspectors attended the licensee's Senior Leadership Team meeting in which major and significant risk activities were discussed, as well as the status of other activities being conducted at the site. Based on a review of the tracking tools, and the level of management involvement, the inspectors determined the licensee was planning and sequencing activities in a manner that was consistent with the PSDAR. The inspectors did not review the cost assessment associated with the activities, because that particular review is performed by NRC headquarters.

Discussions were held with licensee training personnel on the Certified Fuel Handler (CFH) training and requalification program. The inspectors reviewed current staffing and the plan moving forward this year as the site transitions to ISFSI-only as well as training of remaining site personnel once CFH numbers are reduced. The inspectors also noted that the site was continuing the Systematic Approach to Training as evidenced by the recent requalification job performance measures administered to all CFH.

The licensee continued to implement its employee concerns and safety conscious work environment (SCWE) programs, in which workers can feel free to raise concerns to either the licensee or the NRC without fear of retaliation. The inspectors reviewed licensee Procedures EI-FC-101, "Employee Concerns Program," Revision 3, and LS-FC-1012, "Safety Culture Monitoring," Revision 1. Based on discussions with the licensee employee concerns and SCWE program manager the inspectors concluded that both programs were being effectively implemented within all regulatory requirements. The inspectors observed that posters regarding the employee concerns program were prominently displayed across the site.

The licensee is also continuing to implement its nuclear oversight program. The inspectors reviewed NO-FC-210, "Nuclear Oversight Regulatory Audit Procedure," Revision 8 along with a sample of all nuclear oversight audits completed in 2019. The nuclear oversight committee provided management with candid observations of site performance and identified areas where management attention was required.

2.2 Conclusion

The licensee maintained an overall organizational structure to support decommissioning activities as required by the PDTS and the PSDAR. The licensee was continuing to benchmark activities in preparation of the DECON strategy with other decommissioned facilities. The licensee was implementing its employee concerns program in which individuals could raise concerns without fear of retaliation.

3 Self-Assessment, Auditing, and Corrective Action at Permanently Shutdown Reactors (40801)

3.1 Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed documents and interviewed plant personnel to assess the licensee's performance in the following areas:

- Administrative procedures prescribed actions for the identification, evaluation, and resolution of problems;
- Licensee procedures prescribed thresholds for the performance of self-assessments, audits, and surveillances;
- Licensee management reviewed self-assessments, audits, and corrective actions to remain knowledgeable of plant performance;
- Issues or problems were identified and corrected in accordance with the licensee's corrective action program (CAP);
- Quality assurance personnel audited changes in the status of decommissioning and licensee organization; and
- Licensee management observed maintenance and surveillance activities, operations evolutions and training.

3.2 Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed the Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR), Revision 12, Chapter 16, "Corrective Action," that described the licensee's program to identify and correct conditions adverse to quality and reviewed the licensee's Procedure PI-FC-125, "Decommissioning Corrective Action Program," Revision 2, which governs the corrective action program.

The inspectors observed a Management Review Committee meeting which are typically held weekly. The Management Review Committee had representatives from the different functional areas and a quorum was met, as specified by procedure. The inspectors observed a good discussion by the Management Review Committee members regarding the appropriate significance level, ownership, and task assignments of the condition reports on the agenda.

The inspectors reviewed approximately 20 condition reports, and concluded that the condition reports provided adequate documentation and description of the condition adverse to quality or condition adverse to regulatory compliance as defined by the licensee's procedure. In addition, the inspectors determined that the significance levels assigned to the respective condition reports were appropriate. The inspectors also verified that the corrective actions adequately addressed the deficiencies described in the documentation.

3.3 Conclusion

The licensee was adequately implementing its corrective action program in accordance with regulatory requirements and commitments. The licensee's audit program was being conducted and maintained in accordance with the appropriate regulatory requirements as prescribed by the QATR, Revision 12.

4 Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shutdown Reactors (71801)

4.1 Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed documents and interviewed plant personnel to assess the licensee's performance in the following areas:

- Status of ongoing decommissioning activities and planning for future activities;
- Operability and functionality of systems necessary for safe decommissioning were assessed through plant walkdowns, such as: radioactive effluent monitoring, spent fuel pool level and temperature control, and radiation protection monitors and alarms;
- Performed plant tours to assess field conditions and decommissioning activities; and
- Observed and assessed the status of facility housekeeping.

4.2 Observations and Findings

The inspectors observed the weekly senior leadership team meeting, which focused on the overall status of the plant and the upcoming major work activities. The licensee's presentations were detailed, and management facilitated knowledgeable, wide ranging discussions to discern risk, schedule, resource needs, and how to improve the process controls and oversight. The licensee management discussions demonstrated a focus on safety in addition to efficiency and budget. The inspectors also met with the Senior Director for Decommissioning to discuss plans for decommissioning activities, projected staffing levels as site activities progress, and the decommissioning milestones.

During this inspection, plant tours were conducted of the facility, including the control room, spent fuel pool, intake structure, containment, ISFSI Pad, and the ISFSI Operation Facility (IOF). The control room staffing met or exceeded the technical specifications requirements during the inspection period. The operators were knowledgeable of plant conditions, including the status of the spent fuel pool. Based on observations and plant

tours, the inspectors determined the licensee was adequately maintaining the material condition of the facilities, as well as the systems, structures, and components that supported spent fuel safety.

Through observations, discussions with staff, and records review the inspectors determined that the licensee was appropriately controlling and conducting facility operations in a safe manner. General observations by the inspectors identified good housekeeping practices, appropriate radiological postings and labeling. Independent radiation surveys were conducted during the plant tours using a Thermo Scientific RadEye – G (NRC Identification No. 086962, Serial No. 374, calibration due date of December 16, 2020). The inspectors did not identify any radiation area that was not already identified and posted by the licensee.

Title 10 CFR 50.48(f) states, in part that the licensee shall maintain a fire protection program to address the potential for fires that could cause the release or spread of radioactive materials, or result in a radiological hazard. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's fire protection program for compliance with regulatory and license requirements. The inspectors reviewed the fire protection program as defined by Procedure CC-FC-211, "Fire Protection Program," Revision 7. The inspectors also reviewed the fire brigade staffing requirements, training records, surveillances for various fire suppression, and fire detection activities. All surveillances and staff training requirements were completed satisfactorily.

4.3 Conclusions

The licensee was implementing the decommissioning activities in accordance with the regulations and license requirements. The inspectors determined that the licensee was adequately controlling decommissioning activities and radiological work areas at the facility.

5 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (60855)

5.1 Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of FCS's ISFSI activities to verify compliance with requirements of the TN CoC No. 1004 and the TN Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The inspection reviewed critical loading operations, condition reports, and maintenance activities associated with the on-going loading campaign. Additionally, a tour of the ISFSI area was completed to ensure the spent fuel HSMs were maintained in compliance with license and FSAR requirements.

5.2 Observations and Findings

Various loading activities were observed by the NRC inspectors during the inspection. The licensee was in the process of loading Canister No. 26 at the beginning of the ISFSI inspection. The NRC inspectors observed heavy load movements to place the transfer cask from the cask processing area to the heavy haul transporter trailer. The auxiliary building crane (HE-2 crane) safely carried the heavy load with no issues. The licensee's staff was experienced in moving the loaded transfer cask and were proficient in ensuring the safe travel of transfer cask in the auxiliary building.

The inspectors observed the licensee's operations to travel the heavy haul trailer with loaded transfer cask along the designed heavy haul route to the ISFSI. Once at the ISFSI pad, the inspectors observed canister insertion into the 26th HSM. The licensee staff was experience and proficient in transportation and insertion activities. During all movements, FCS oversight actively participated, observed, and were thoroughly engaged in all canister movement activities.

For Canister No. 27, the inspectors observed placement of the empty canister into the transfer cask, placement of the canister/transfer cask into the spent fuel pool, and placement of spent fuel assemblies into the canister. The licensee's staff was proficient in locating the correct assembly, verifying the assembly, moving the assembly from the rack to the canister, and inserting the assembly into the assigned canister slot. All observed loading operations were conducted in accordance with the site's procedures and in accordance with the NRC's rules and regulations. No findings were identified related to the licensee's loading activities.

The NRC inspectors performed a review of FCS's CAP associated with ISFSI operations, including the cask handling crane. A list of Condition Reports (CRs) issued since the last NRC inspection of November 2019 was provided by the licensee. Several CRs were selected by the inspectors for further review based on operational issues and ISFSI related maintenance activities. Based on the range and types of problems identified, the licensee continued to demonstrate a low threshold for placing issues into its CAP. The actions taken for the resolution of the issues were appropriate to address the problems that were identified.

5.3 Conclusions

The inspectors observed critical loading activities of Canister No. 26 and 27. The licensee's loading operations were conducted in accordance with site procedures and in accordance with the NRC's rules and regulations. Selected ISFSI CRs were reviewed for the period November 2019 through February 2020. Resolution of the issues was appropriate for the significance of each issue. No adverse trends were identified during the review.

6 Review of 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations (60857)

6.1 Inspection Scope

The licensee's 10 CFR 72.48 screenings and evaluations performed since the NRC's last ISFSI inspection in February 2019, were reviewed to determine compliance with regulatory requirements

6.2 Observations and Findings

The licensee performed several procedure revisions and some equipment or process changes under the 10 CFR 72.48 process since the last inspection. NRC inspectors reviewed the 10 CFR 72.48 screenings for those procedure changes and design change packages made within the ISFSI program. None of the screenings led to a full 10 CFR 72.48 safety evaluation. All screenings were determined to be adequately evaluated.

6.3 Conclusions

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensee's required safety screenings and evaluations that had been performed within the inspection period. No findings were identified during the selected sample review.

7 Exit Meeting Summary

On February 13, 2020, the NRC inspectors presented the final ISFSI inspection results to Mr. Brad Blome, Director of Licensing and Regulatory Assurance, and other members of the licensee's staff. On March 12, 2020, the NRC inspectors presented the final decommissioning inspection results to Mr. Tim Uehling, Senior Director of Decommissioning, and other members of the licensee's staff. All proprietary information was returned by the NRC inspection teams.

SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

M. Fisher, Vice President, Energy Production and Nuclear Decommissioning
J. Geschwender, Fire Protection Program Engineer
C. Cameron, Principal Regulatory Specialist
B. Blome, Director, Licensing and Regulatory Assurance
T. Uehling, Senior Director, Decommissioning
J. McBride, Nuclear Oversight Lead
C. Longua, Manager, Operations
D. Bonwell, Operations Training Specialist, Operations
T. Maine, Plant Manager
A. Hansen, Principal Regulatory Specialist
K. Daughenbaugh, Shift Manger/Fire Marshall
N. Hurdesty, Project Manager, Dry Cask Storage
B. Obermeyer, Site Security Manager
D. Shaw, Licensing Manager, TN America

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 60801	Spent Fuel Pool Safety at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
IP 36801	Organization, Management, and Cost Controls at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
IP 40801	Self-Assessment, Auditing, and Corrective Action at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
IP 71801	Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
IP 60855	Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
IP 60857	Review of 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Open

None

Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF ACROYMNS

ADAMS	Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CFH	Certified Fuel Handler
CFR	*Code of Federal Regulations*
CR	Condition Report
CY	Calendar Year
FCS	Fort Calhoun Station
FSAR	Final Safety Analysis Report
HSM	Horizontal Storage Module
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
IP	Inspection Procedure
IOEP	ISFSI-only Emergency Plan
IOF	ISFSI Operations Facility
ISFSI	Interim Spent Fuel Storage Installation
NRC	U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OPPD	Omaha Public Power District
PDEP	Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan
PDTS	Post Defueled Technical Specifications
PSDAR	Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report
QATR	Quality Assurance Topical Report
SCWE	Safety Conscious Work Environment
SFP	Spent Fuel Pool

FORT CALHOUN STATION – NRC INSPECTION REPORT 050-00285/2020-001
AND 072-00054/2020-001 DATED – APRIL 14, 2020

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ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML20105A170

X SUNSI Review By: CDS	ADAMS: ■ Yes ☐ No	☐ Sensitive ■ Non-Sensitive	☐ Non-Publicly Available ■ Publicly Available		Keyword NRC-002
OFFICE	RIV DNMS/RxIB	DNMS/RxIB	DNMS/RxIB	DNMS/RxIB	C:RxIB
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