

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT I	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4)
REACTOR WATER CLEANUP ISOLATION VALVES

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (8)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
12	24	84	84	029	000	12	18	85			0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) **5**

POWER LEVEL (10) **0 0 0**

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.406(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(b)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.36(e)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(c)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.36(e)(2)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	<input type="checkbox"/>		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
T. L. Elton, Acting Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance	9 1 2 3 6 7 1 7 8 5 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
X	J/C	R/L	YG080	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 12/24/84 at approximately 1213 CST, and again that day at approximately 1345 CST, reactor water cleanup (RWCU) outboard isolation valve 1G31-F004 isolated on high differential flow and tripped the "B" RWCU pump (1G31-C001B).

On 12/25/84 at approximately 0105 CST, 1G31-F004 isolated on high differential flow and tripped RWCU pump 1G31-C001B.

After the first, second, and third and subsequent events (refer to LER 50-321/1985-001 for the subsequent events), plant personnel performed an engineering evaluation. This evaluation was performed because only the RWCU inboard isolation valve 1G31-F001 would isolate on a high differential flow signal when the "A" RWCU pump (1G31-C001A) was operating; only the RWCU outboard isolation valve 1G31-F004 would isolate when the "B" RWCU pump (1G31-C001B) was operating. This condition is the result of a design error which has existed since the unit began commercial operation (approximately 12/31/75).

On 12/25/84 at approximately 1801 CST, the "B" reactor protection system (RPS) motor generator (1G71-S001B) tripped and caused a partial group 2 and a partial group 5 primary containment valve isolation. After an investigation, plant personnel determined that the RPS motor generator's transfer relay (K1B) was burned up.

These four events are reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) because they show that primary containment isolation valves, which are engineered safety features, were actuated. Additionally, the first three events are reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), because they show that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.7.D.1 and Table 3.7-1 for valves 1G31-F001 and F004.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	OF	0 3
		84	0 2 9	0 0		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

This 30 day LER is required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) because these events show that unplanned actuations of engineered safety features occurred. Additionally the first three events are reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), because they show that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.7.D.1 and Table 3.7-1 for valves 1G31-F001 and F004, when both RWCU pumps were not running.

On 12/24/84 at approximately 1213 CST, with the reactor in the refuel mode, the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) outboard isolation valve (1G31-F004) isolated on high differential flow and tripped the "B" RWCU pump (1G31-C001B). Again, at approximately 1345 CST on 12/24/84, valve 1G31-F004 isolated on high differential flow and tripped RWCU pump 1G31-C001B. However, the RWCU inboard isolation valve (1G31-F001) did not isolate during these events as required by Tech. Specs. section 3.7.D.1 and Table 3.7-1.

On 12/25/84 at approximately 0105 CST, with the reactor in the refuel mode, and upon completion of the "CRD TIMING" procedure (HNP-1-9404), operating personnel proceeded to discontinue dumping reactor water into the condenser. When the reactor water dump flow to the condenser was terminated and a flow was established through the reactor water cleanup system, valve 1G31-F004 isolated on high differential flow and tripped RWCU pump 1G31-C001B. Again, valve 1G31-F001 did not isolate as required by Tech. Specs. section 3.7.D.1 and Table 3.7-1.

On 12/25/84 at approximately 1801 CST, with the reactor in the refuel mode, the "B" reactor protection system (RPS) motor generator set (1C71-S001B) tripped, thus causing a partial group 2 and partial group 5 isolation. Consequently, reactor water cleanup (RWCU) isolation valve 1G31-F004 isolated and caused RWCU pump 1G31-C001B to trip; residual heat removal shutdown cooling isolation valve 1E11-F008 isolated and caused RHR shutdown cooling pump 1E11-C002B to trip; standby gas treatment B train auto started; and drywell equipment and floor drain outboard isolation valves (1G11-F004 and 1G11-F020, respectively) isolated.

In these four events, primary containment isolation valves (which are engineered safety features) were actuated; therefore, these events are reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

After an investigation of the first, second and third events, plant personnel determined that the instrument lines on RWCU flow transmitters 1G31-N012, 1G31-N036, and 1G31-N041 had air in them.

The transmitters' instrument lines were then backfilled with water. The three RWCU flow transmitters were then satisfactorily functionally tested per the "RWCU SYSTEM DIFF. FLOW INSTRUMENT F.T.&C" procedure (HNP-1-3501) and returned to service on 12/25/84 at approximately 1610 CST.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

After the first, second, and third and subsequent events (refer to LER 50-321/1985-001 for the subsequent events), plant personnel performed an engineering evaluation of the RWCU system. This evaluation was performed because the RWCU outboard isolation valve (1G31-F004) and the inboard RWCU isolation valve (1G31-F001) did not both isolate when a RWCU high differential flow signal was received. As a result of the engineering evaluation, a design change request was implemented. Per the DCR, the RWCU system's isolation logic circuitry has been changed such that both RWCU isolation valves (1G31-F001 and 1G31-F004) will isolate upon a RWCU high differential flow signal with either, both, or neither of the RWCU pumps (1G31-C001A or 1G31-C001B) in operation. After the DCR was implemented, the RWCU system was satisfactorily tested per the DCR functional test, and returned to service on 01/12/85. The RWCU system now meets the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.7.D.1 and Table 3.7.-1.


It should be noted that there are other signals which would have isolated both RWCU isolation valves regardless of RWCU pump status. They are as follow: Low reactor vessel water level scram, high RWCU equipment room ambient temperature, and high differential temperature across the RWCU equipment room ventilation ducts.

After an investigation of the fourth event, plant personnel determined that the reactor "B" protection system motor generator set's (1C71-S001B) transfer relay (K1B) was burned up. The transfer relay (K1B) was replaced, and 1C71-S001B was then satisfactorily returned to service on 12/26/84 at approximately 0530 CST.

No actual or potential safety consequences or implications resulted from these events; nor did they affect other systems in Unit 1 or Unit 2.

The health and safety of the public were not affected by these non-repetitive events.

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Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant


January 21, 1985

GM-84-036

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-321/1984-029. This report is required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), and 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).


H. C. Nix
General Manager

HCN
HCN/TLE/vlz

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