


James A. FitzPatrick
Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 41
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315 342-3840



Harry P. Salmon, Jr.
Resident Manager

September 4, 1992
JAFP-92-0641

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: DOCKET NO. 50-333
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: 92-040-00 - Inadvertent
Actuation of Isolation
Function of the Reactor
Building Ventilatica System

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Questions concerning this report may be addressed to
Mr. W. Verne Childs at (315) 349-6071.

Very truly yours,

HARRY P. SALMON, JR.

HPS:WVC:tmk

Enclosure

cc: USNRC, Region I
USNRC Resident Inspector
INPO Records Center

Per No P64 705006
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PDR ADDCK 05010333
PDR

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20545, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 1 OF 0 3

TITLE (3) REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM ISOLATION DUE TO FALSE ACTUATION SIGNAL

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
08	06	92	040	00	09	04	92		0 5 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5 (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9)	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 01010	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(i)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	DTC: "Specify in Abstract 09/04 and in Text, NRC Form 306A"
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(c)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) W. Verne Childs, Senior Licensing Engineer TELEPHONE NUMBER 3 1 5 3 4 9 - 6 0 7 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRCDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRCDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 500 words. Specify typewritten length.)

EIIS Codes are in []

Abstract

The Plant was shutdown and in the cold condition for maintenance and refuel with all irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool. On August 6, 1992 an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation occurred due to a false automatic isolation of the Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) [NG] Ventilation System. The actuation occurred when an Operator loosened a terminal lug to install a jumper. There was a momentary loss of continuity which caused the automatic half isolation on the 'B' side. Actuation of the B side logic caused automatic closure of one of two isolation valves in the normal ventilation supply and exhaust ducts. The other isolation valves in the supply and exhaust ducts, which are actuated by the A side logic, remained open as expected. The Operator immediately re-tightened the lug, the Reactor Building isolation was reset and the Reactor Building ventilation system was restored to normal. A procedure change to isolate the system prior to jumper installation will be completed by September 24, 1992.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F-830), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20545, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 9 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

EIIS Codes are in []

Event Description

The plant was shutdown and in the cold condition for maintenance and refuel with all irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool.

On August 6, 1992 an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation occurred due to an automatic isolation of the Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) [NG] Ventilation System. The actuation occurred when an Operator loosened a terminal lug to install a jumper which would prevent an automatic Reactor Building isolation while de-energizing a safety related 600 VAC Bus [ED] for planned maintenance.

When the operator loosened the terminal lug to install the jumper, there was momentary loss of continuity which caused a false automatic half isolation on the 'B' side. Actuation of the B side logic caused automatic closure of one of two isolation valves in the normal ventilation supply and exhaust ducts. The other isolation valves in the supply and exhaust ducts, which are actuated by the A side logic, remained open as expected. The Operator immediately re-tightened the lug and the Reactor Building isolation was reset. The Reactor Building ventilation system was restored to normal within ten minutes.

Following return to normal status, operations completed the procedure. The jumper was installed using alligator clips instead of terminating the jumper wire at the lug ends. No further problems were encountered.

Cause

The FitzPatrick Operating Procedure for normal AC power distribution identifies the installation of jumpers in the panel to prevent Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) [JE] fail safe isolation signals while de-energizing the bus. The plant work activity control procedure on jumpers discourages the use of electrical "alligator clip" jumpers. Operations attempted to perform the jumper installation using the terminal lugs, and did not adequately assess the potential to lose circuit continuity, and cause the isolation.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20545, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		9 2	- 0 4 0	- 0 0	0 3	OF 0 3

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

Analysis

This event resulted in an unplanned false automatic initiation of the Reactor Ventilation System isolation function which is an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF). The event is therefore reportable per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). The automatic initiation of the isolation was false in that none of the process variables that provide automatic isolation were in an offnormal condition.

Corrective Action

1. The Operator immediately re-tightened the terminal lug and notified the Control Room of the circumstances. The Reactor Building isolation logic was reset, and the Reactor Building Ventilation System was restored to normal.
2. The operating procedure is being revised to require the operator to manually isolate the Reactor Building Ventilation prior to installation of the jumper. Procedure to be revised by September 24, 1992.
3. The Work Activity Control Procedure will be changed to provide better direction on use or avoidance of "alligator clips". Procedure to be revised by October 31, 1992.
4. This event, and placement of jumpers in deenergize to function (normally energized) circuits will be reviewed with all operating shifts. To be completed by October 16, 1992.

Additional Information

Failed Components: None

Previous Similar Events: LERs 89-013 and 92-039 describe other events involving false engineered safety feature actuation during temporary modifications (jumper) installation or removal.