



Commonwealth Edison
Braidwood Nuclear Power Station
Route #1, Box 84
Braceville, Illinois 60407
Telephone 815/458-2801


September 11, 1992
BW/92-0470

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report from Braidwood Generating Station is being transmitted to you in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i) which requires a 30-day written report.

This report is number 92-009-00; Docket No. 50-456.


K. L. Kotron
Station Manager
Braidwood Nuclear Station

KLK/AJS/dla
624/ZD85G

Encl.: LER No. 92-009-00

cc: NRC Region III Administrator
NRC Resident Inspector
INPO Record Center
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1)

Docket Number (2)

Page (3)

Braidwood 1

0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 1 | of | 0 | 3

Title (4)

Untested Undervoltage Relay Contacts Due to Procedural Deficiency

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)			Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)
0 8 1 2 9 2	9 2	9 2		0 0 9	0 0	0 8 3 1 9 2			Braidwood 2	0 5 0 0 0 4 5 7

OPERATING MODE (9)

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)

1	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(i)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	Other (Specify
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	in Abstract
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	below and in
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	Text)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
G. Sharpe, Technical Staff Engineer	Ext. 2544
	8 1 5 4 5 8 - 2 8 0 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year
Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO			

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

A Safety-Related Surveillance Review Project was being conducted by ABB Impell at the request of the Commonwealth Edison Company Nuclear Engineering Department. ABB Impell identified that the undervoltage contacts on breakers for the Common Component Cooling Pump (OCC01P), the Auxiliary Building Supply Fans (OVA01CA-D) and the Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fans (OVA02CA-D) for their respective 4KV ESF Buses were not being tested. On August 12, 1992 at 1557 the 1A and 2A DG'S were declared inoperable due to the OVA01CA and OVA02CC Fans currently operating off 4KV ESF Bus 141 and 241 respectively. At 1610 OVA01CA and OVA02CC were shut down and both LCOAR's were exited. The Auxiliary Building Supply and Exhaust Fans OVA01CB and OVA02CB were started, both powered from Bus 142. The 1B DG was declared inoperable at the same time and LCOAR 8.1.1-1a was entered. The root cause of the event is that the Technical Specification requirement to test the undervoltage relay contacts was not implemented. Proper load shedding of the three breakers was verified using special test procedures. Regular testing of these breaker undervoltage contacts will be incorporated in existing Surveillances. There has been a previous occurrence of this type of event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION										Form Rev 2.0
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number						
Braidwood 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 5 6	9 2	-	0 0 9	-	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3	
TEXT	Energy Industry Identification System (EIIIS), codes are identified in the text as [XX]									

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: Braidwood 1; Event Date: August 12, 1992; Event Time: 1557
 Mode: 1 - Power Operation; Rx Power: 100%;
 RCS [Ab] Temperature/Pressure NOT / NQP;

Unit: Braidwood 2; Event Date: August 12, 1992; Event Time: 1557
 Mode: 1 - Power Operation; Rx Power: 895%;
 RCS [AB] Temperature/Pressure NOT / NQP;

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

There were no systems or components inoperable at the beginning of this situation which contributed to its severity.

A Safety-Related Surveillance Review Project was being conducted by ABB Impell at the request of CECo Nuclear Engineering Department (NED). The purpose of this project is to verify that all contacts which are required to be tested by the Technical Specifications and/or the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report are being tested. During performance of this project, ABB Impell identified three breakers on each of the 4KV ESF Buses did not appear to be tested per Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (TSSR) 4.8.1.1.2.f-4e. The three breakers were the Common Component Cooling Pump (OCC01P), Auxiliary Building Supply Fans (OVA01CA) and Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fans (OVA02CA-D) for their respective 4KV ESF Buses.

After notification of these preliminary results from ABB Impell, a review of associated surveillance procedures was conducted by Technical Staff, Regulatory Assurance, and NED. It was determined that the undervoltage contacts for the three breakers were not being tested per TSSR 4.8.1.1.2.f-4a. The purpose of TSSR 4.8.1.1.2.f-4a is to verify load shedding of the 4KV ESF Bus upon an undervoltage condition. This load shedding is to ensure that when the associated Diesel Generator (DG) re-energizes the bus, there are no loads on the bus that could overload the DG when sequencing required loads onto the bus.

On August 12, 1992 a technical conference call was made with representatives from NED, Technical Staff, Operations, Regulatory Assurance and Nuclear Licensing to confirm the preliminary results. At this time it was decided that the DG'S associated with the 4KV ESF Buses supplying power to the running Auxiliary Building Supply and Exhaust Fans would be declared inoperable. Since the Common Component Cooling Pump was not operating at this time, no operability concerns were noted.

On August 12, 1992 at 1557 hours the 1A and 2A DG'S were declared inoperable due to the OVA01CA and OVA02CC Fans currently operating off 4KV ESF Bus 141 and 241 respectively. Limiting Condition For Operation Action Requirement (LCOAR) 8.1.1-1a was entered for each unit. At 1610 hours OVA01CA and OVA02CC were shut down and both LCOAR's were exited. The Auxiliary Building Supply and Exhaust Fans OVA01CB and OVA02CB were started, both powered from Bus 142. The 1B DG was declared inoperable at this time and LCOAR 8.1.1-1a was entered.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) - any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Form Rev 2.0

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			Page (3)	
		Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number		
Braidwood 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 5 6	9 2	- 0 0 9	- 0 0	0 3	OF 0 3

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EII5) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The root cause of the event is a procedural deficiency. The Technical Specification requirement to test the undervoltage relay contacts was not implemented.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS:

This event had no effect on plant or public safety. The untested undervoltage trip contacts for the three breakers performed their load shed function as designed during execution of the special test procedures. If an undervoltage would have occurred prior to performance of the special test procedures, the load shed function would have taken place for the associated breakers.

The worst case condition is a loss of offsite power from 100% in conjunction with a loss of coolant accident. If the undervoltage condition would have occurred and the loads did not shed, the potential would exist to overload the diesel generator.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Immediate corrective actions included writing and performing Special Test Procedures (SPP's) #92-047,048,049 and 050. These SPP's verified proper load shedding of the three breakers on the ESF Buses during an Undervoltage Condition per TSSR 4.8.1.1.2.f-4a.

Long Term corrective actions will incorporate testing the three breakers Undervoltage contacts in existing Surveillances. This will be tracked to completion by action item 456-180-92-00901.

The review being performed by ABB Impell is still ongoing. Any other problems identified as a result of this review will be reported as a supplement to this LER.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

There has been a previous occurrence of untested undervoltage relay contacts resulting in violation of Technical Specification surveillance requirements.

LER	TITLE
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91-013	Untested Relay Contacts Cause Diesel Generator Inoperability
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This event is a previous occurrence, but this was discovered after an Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection at another CECO station. The breakers involved were the ESF to NON-ESF cross-tie breaker and the normal or alternate ESF bus feed breakers. At the time of LER 91-013, the Safety Related Surveillance Review Project by ABB Impell was already in progress. This review project was to include a review of similar breakers and relay contacts. This LER (92-009) documents the initial results of that review. As noted in the Corrective Actions section, any other problems identified as a result of this review will be reported as a supplement to this LER.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

This event was not the result of component failure, nor did any components fail as a result of this event.